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Norm-Takers or Norm-Makers? The Role of Developing Countries in the Evolution of 
International Norms of Intervention and State Sovereignty 
Marek K. Brzezinski 
Since the end of the Cold War, the norms of sovereignty and non-intervention 
enshrined in the UN Charter have been subject to significant challenge by practices of 
"humanitarian intervention" in civil conflicts and humanitarian crises involving massive 
human rights violations. Since 2001, the "responsibility to protect" has been considered 
by some to be an "emerging norm" in international society which seeks to redefine the 
sovereignty of nation-states in terms of their responsibility to protect their populations 
from massive human rights abuses and to establish a responsibility of the international 
community as a whole to intervene, including through military force in extreme cases, 
where states are unwilling or unable to fulfill their sovereign responsibilities. This thesis 
examines the role of developing countries in the emergence and evolution of the 
"responsibility to protect" and attempts to develop a theory to explain the ability of 
developing countries to influence the direction of change in international norms of 
sovereignty and intervention. It does so by conducting a plausibility probe of several 
hypotheses derived from Stephen Krasner's theory of "international regime change" and 
applying these to a case-study of international debates around "humanitarian 
intervention" and the "responsibility to protect" between 1999 and 2005. 
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Since the end of the Cold War, the norms of sovereignty and non-intervention 
enshrined in the UN Charter have been subject to significant challenge by practices of 
"humanitarian intervention" in civil conflicts and humanitarian crises involving massive 
human rights violations. Since 2001, the "responsibility to protect" has been considered 
by some to be an "emerging norm" in international society which seeks to redefine the 
sovereignty of nation-states in terms of their responsibility to protect their populations 
from massive human rights abuses and to establish a responsibility of the international 
community as a whole to intervene, including through military force in extreme cases, 
where states are unwilling or unable to fulfill their sovereign responsibilities to protect 
their populations. Since the 1990s, the most consistent sceptics of the concept of 
"humanitarian intervention" in international society have been developing states. In 
international gatherings inside and outside the UN, state representatives from the global 
South have repeatedly rejected the "so-called 'right' of humanitarian intervention" and— 
especially since the 2003 US-UK-led invasion of Iraq—some have warned against 
allowing the "responsibility to protect" to become a Trojan horse for military intervention 
for strategic reasons by Northern great powers. 
This thesis sets out to assess how successful developing states have been in 
influencing the direction of change in international norms concerning sovereignty and 
intervention. How have they used existing international institutions to try to influence the 
evolution of these norms? How unified has the "global South" been in its position on 
intervention and sovereignty? How have attitudes in the "global North" affected the 
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ability of developing states to influence the debate? In order to answer these questions, 
and to develop a theory concerning the ability of developing states to influence the 
evolution of international norms more generally, I conduct a plausibility-probe of several 
hypotheses derived from Stephen Krasner's theory of "international regime change." In 
particular, I apply these hypotheses to a case-study of international debates around 
"humanitarian intervention" and the "responsibility to protect" beginning in 1999 after 
NATO's intervention in the conflict "in Kosovo in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. 
Extrapolating from Krasner's theory, I will probe the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1: As existing international institutions facilitate the participation of 
developing countries in decision-making, the success of developing countries in 
influencing the direction of change in international norms of sovereignty and intervention 
should also increase. 
Hypothesis 2: As the ideological coherence of the Southern diplomacy on issues 
of sovereignty and intervention increases, the success of developing countries in 
influencing the direction of change in international norms of sovereignty and intervention 
should also increase. 
Hypothesis 3: As Northern capabilities decline, the success of developing 
countries in influencing the direction change in international norms of sovereignty and 
intervention should also increase, provided Northern attitudes remain committed to action 
through multilateral institutions. 
The reason for conducting a plausibility probe rather than theory-testing is the 
lack of an existing theory specifically concerned with the issue of developing states and 
norm evolution. As I argue the next chapter, while existing literature on international 
norms generally recognizes the historic role of developing states in promoting 
international norm change (e.g. during the period of decolonization), it provides little in 
tenns of systematic analysis of the ability of developing countries to act as "norm 
entrepreneurs" in the current international system. Hence the need to adapt possible 
2 
hypotheses from existing theory in another area of International Relations (IR) and 
attempt to determine whether more intensive testing of my derived hypotheses is 
warranted. 
1. Structure 
This introduction is followed by four chapters and a conclusion. Chapter 1 
surveys the existing literature in IR on the subject of international norms. I argue that 
there is little attention in this literature to the role of developing states in international 
norm change, and little attempt to systematically investigate the ability of developing 
states to influence the direction of norm change. I then introduce Stephen Kxasner's 
theory of "international regime change," developed in the context of the North-South 
conflict of the 1970s and 1980s. 
In Chapter 2 I present my research design, beginning with a fuller explanation of 
the "modified structural" theory of international politics which I draw on, and the way in 
which I adapt Kxasner's theory of "international regime change" to investigate the role of 
developing countries in the evolution of international norms. I then present my three 
working hypotheses (stated above) and define and explain how I will operationalize my 
variables. Here I explain what I mean by "international norms of sovereignty and 
intervention," focusing in particular on the three core norms of what I call the 
"postcolonial sovereignty regime": non-intervention, non-use offeree and sovereign 
equality. In this section I emphasize the degree to which these norms are contested along 
several dimensions and suggest how shifting areas of international consensus and 
contestation might be measured. I then define and explain how I will measure "Northern 
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attitudes and capabilities," "ideological coherence of Southern diplomacy," and the 
degree to which international institutions facilitate Southern participation in decision-
making ("institutional environment"). 
The next two chapters present my case study in two parts, each covering a 
separate chronological period. Chapter 3 analyzes developments between the 1999 
NATO intervention in Kosovo and the 2001 publication of the report of the International 
Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty which first articulated the concept of 
the "responsibility to protect." Chapter 4 analyzes developments between 2002 and 2005, 
with a particular focus on the lead-up to the 2005 World Summit during which world 
leaders in the UN General Assembly agreed to a version of the "responsibility to protect" 
concept. In both of these chapters I seek to assess the state of all three of my independent 
variables—Northern capabilities and attitudes, ideological coherence of Southern 
diplomacy, and institutional environments—and their impact on the success of 
developing countries in influencing the development of international norms. In doing so I 
follow the within-case method proposed by George and Bennett, using process-tracing to 
identify causal relations between variables at different points in the case.1 It is important 
to note that process-tracing in a single case can provide multiple observations along the 
causal path linking independent and dependent variables. Because of this, as George and 
Bennett note, it is possible to overcome the problem of underdetermination which arises 
when variables outnumber cases (as they usually do in single-case designs, including 
George and Bennett propose within-case methods as an alternative or complementary research 
method to controlled comparison of different cases, which they argue it is difficult to find adequate cases 
for in the social sciences. Within-case methods attempt to establish the causal impact of particular 
variables, not by focusing on analysis of variables across cases, but on uncovering causal paths within a 
single case. Process-tracing seeks to identify the causal chains or mechanisms linking independent and 
dependent variables. See Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development 
in the Social Sciences (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2005), chapters 8-10. 
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mine).2 Both parts of my case study thus contain separate observations for all variables in 
a given chronological period. In general my observations on the "ideological coherence 
of Southern diplomacy" are the lengthiest. This is so both because of the importance of 
this variable, and because there is much useful empirical data on the views of the "global 
South" on intervention that is (unfortunately) not widely made use of by IR scholars 
interested in these issues. 
2. General conclusions 
Based on my case study, I conclude that the empirical evidence generally supports 
my hypotheses, meaning that these are worthy of further and more rigorous testing. In 
general terms, the evolution of the international debate on "humanitarian intervention" 
from 1999 to 2005, and in particular the emergence and development of the concept of 
the "responsibility to protect," confirms that developing states can, at least in the area of 
sovereignty and intervention, impact the direction of international norm change, if only 
by defusing radical challenges to existing norms. In broad terms, my conclusion is that, 
where Northern states have sought to bring about reform of the norms of sovereignty and 
intervention through multilateral institutions that grant developing countries the 
opportunity to participate in decision-making, and where the global South has managed 
to forge some coherence in its response to these Northern initiatives, developing 
countries have been able to shape the direction of norm change. Where Northern states 
have chosen to act through narrower mechanisms, where institutional environments allow 
for less direct Southern participation in decision-making, or where developing states have 
2
 Ibid, 28-29. 
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been divided over the issue of sovereignty and intervention, the global South has been 
less successful in influencing the direction of norm change. 
Chapter 1: Literature Review 
This chapter reviews the relevant scholarship in International Relations (IR) on 
the subject of international norms and their evolution. In particular, I focus on identifying 
scholarship relevant to thinking about the role of developing states in influencing (or 
resisting) international norm change and answering my research question: how do the 
structures of international institutions, the ideological coherence of Southern diplomacy, 
and Northern attitudes and capabilities affect the success of developing countries in 
influencing the direction of change in international norms of sovereignty and 
intervention? In the first section of this chapter I consider IR scholarship on international 
norms in general and the conceptual and methodological debates that have emerged in 
this scholarship. In the second section I consider how such scholarship addresses the 
issue of norm change and the relationship between norms and power in international 
politics. I suggest that some of this scholarship underestimates the way in which power 
asymmetries in the international system shape processes of norm diffusion and norm 
change. In the third section I consider what role developing states can play in influencing 
the development of international norms given the vast power asymmetries that 
characterize the international system. I argue that this problem has not been 
systematically addressed in the literature and I find in Stephen Krasner s work on the 
North-South conflict a potentially useful theoretical framework for thinking about the 
conditions that are likely to affect the ability of developing states to collectively influence 
the development of international norms. 
1. Norms in international relations: conceptual and methodological issues 
The study of international norms has become a prominent area of research within 
IR since at least the 1980s. As Martha Finnemore and Kafhryn Sikkink note, while the 
concern with norms and "ideas" in IR has a long history—including in the work of such 
archetypically "realist" figures as E.H. Carr and Hans Morgenthau—there was a definite 
"return to norms" in IR scholarship in the 1980s and 1990s.3 This "return to norms" 
followed an earlier turn away from norms and normative concerns associated with the 
1970s "behavioural revolution" and the rise to prominence of materialist-structural 
theories of international politics (especially Kenneth Waltz's neorealism). Outside of the 
United States, a concern with norms remained central in IR even in the 1970s, however, 
particularly in the work of "English school" scholars such as Martin Wight and Hedley 
Bull, for whom norms shared by states formed the very basis of "international society." 
Within American IR, the early 1980s saw the rise of a concern with international regimes 
which included analysis of norms as key components of regimes of inter-state 
cooperation formed in specific issue-areas.5 Since the 1980s, norms have formed an 
important part of the research agenda of constructivist IR theories which depart from the 
materialist assumptions of neorealism and regime scholarship and focus on the social 
nature of international politics, including the norms that constitute the identities and 
preferences of states.6 
Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, "International Norm Dynamics and Political Change,"' 
International Organization 52, no. 4 (Autumn 1998): 889-890. 
Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1977). 
See Stephen Krasner ed., International Regimes (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 
1983). 
6
 Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 1999). 
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Scholarship on international norms since the 1980s has had to contend with 
several key conceptual and methodological issues. The first concerns the question of 
definition. While definitions of norms have proliferated in the literature, a key conceptual 
division among them concerns whether norms in international politics are best defined in 
behavioural terms as regularities of behaviour (as "normal practices in the international 
system" ) or in normative terms as shared understandings of ethical obligation. There are 
important advantages to both types of definitions. Defining norms in terms of regularities 
of behaviour draws our attention to the difference between professed principles and 
actual practice, and thus to instances of what Stephen Krasner calls "organized 
Q 
hypocrisy," or the continued adherence to principles widely violated in practice. 
Defining norms in terms of prescriptions—i.e. in terms of what should be "normal" 
behaviour for an actor with a given identity—draws our attention to the way in which the 
meaning of behaviour in international politics is always established intersubjectively 
among a group of actors interpreting any action. This then allows us to attend to 
processes of normative contestation and to identify the role of such contestation in 
changing "normal" behaviour over time. It is useful then, as Neta C. Crawford argues, to 
maintain a conceptual distinction between behavioural norms (viz. norms as "normaF 
behaviour) on the one hand and "normative beliefs" (convictions about right and wrong) 
on the other. This allows us to continue to understand norms as regularities of practice in 
the international system, but ones which are subject to contestation by a variety of actors. 
Janice E. Thomson, "Norms in International Relations: A Conceptual Analysis," International 
Journal of Group Tensions 23, no. 1 (1993): 67. 
Stephen Krasner, Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 
1999). 
Neta C. Crawford, Argument and Change in World Politics: Ethics, Decolonization and 
Humanitarian Intervention (Cambridge. UK: Cambridge University Press. 2002), 86-92. 
9 
Over time, contestation can lead to changes in what behaviour is considered "normal" in 
international practice. 
Aside from definitional issues, IR scholarship on international norms has also 
faced questions regarding to proper methodology for studying norms. For theorists 
committed to positivist social science, international norms can be studied as variables 
whose impact on state behaviour can be assessed and measured, including by quantitative 
analysis.10 Even for many constructivist scholars, basically positivist methods can be 
used to study the process by which norms influence state behaviour, for example by 
altering state preferences. Other constructivists, however, argue that positivist 
methodology cannot account for the fundamentally inter subjective nature of norms. Thus 
Friedrich Kratochwil and John Gerard Ruggie argue that the positivist method of looking 
to state practice as observable evidence for falsifiable hypotheses regarding the causal 
impact of norms on behaviour is flawed because norm-compliance and norm-violation 
have no existence independent of the interpretative and communicative practices through 
which behaviour is understood by the relevant community of states.12 Thus Kratochwil 
compares norms to performative "speech-acts" such as promises and threats: it is not 
enough to understand such utterances as "causes" of behaviour; explaining them requires 
an examination of the processes of reasoning and deliberation that reveal the shared rule-
structure that makes them meaningful.13 
10
 See e.g. Gary Goertz and Paul F. Diehl, "Toward a Theory of International Norms," Journal of 
Conflict Resolution 36, no. 4 (December 1992): 634-664. 
" E.g. Audie Klotz, "Norms Reconstituting Interests: Global Racial Equality and U.S. Sanctions 
Against South Africa," International Organization 49, no. 3 (Summer 1995): 451-478. 
12
 Friedrich Kratochwil and John Gerard Ruggie, "International Organization: The State of the Art 
and the Art of the State," International Organization 40, no. 4 (Autumn 1986): 767. 
''' Friedrich Kratochwil, Rules, Norms and Decisions: On the Foundations of Practical and Legal 
Reasoning in Domestic and International Affairs (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991), chapter 
1. 
10 
Alexander Wendt has proposed that the debate between positivism and the kind of 
post-positivist interpretivism represented by Ruggie and Kratochwil can be moderated by 
a middle way "constructivist realist" approach to social science. Such an approach would 
adopt apositivist epistemology—treating objects (including "social kinds" like norms) as 
existing independently of the knowing subject—and a constructivist ontology—treating 
unobservable, ideational phenomena as real.1 Constructivist realism a la Wendt grants 
the role (indeed, the primacy) of ideas in social life (including international life) but 
argues that even ideational phenomena like norms can be studied by positivist methods. 
This is because, while these phenomena are indeed, as Kratochwil and Ruggie insist, 
constituted socially and therefore not "mind-independent" of the collectivity that shares 
them, they can nonetheless be conceived of as mind-independent of the individual that 
wishes to explain them. The processes of reasoning, deliberation, and contestation by 
which the relevant community makes meaning of given events can itself be studied 
empirically. To take the example of norm compliance and violation, Kratochwil and 
Ruggie are surely correct to point to the fact that individual violations of norms do not 
necessarily invalidate them, and that what is important is the reasons proffered by the 
violator and the responses of other states. While a purely positivist methodology cannot 
capture these communicative dynamics, it is also the case that positivism is useful (as 
Kratochwil and Ruggie themselves admit) in cases "where noncompliance [with norms] 
is widespread, persistent, and unexcused."15 In these cases, positivist methodology— 
which treats state behaviour as an indicator of the operation and strength of a norm— 
seems to be the only way to measure just how "widespread and persistent" 
Wendt. Social Theoiy of International Politics, chapter 2. 
15
 Kratochwil and Ruggie. "International Organization." 768. 
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noncompliance (or compliance) actually is, while a more interpretivist approach—which 
attends to reasoning and argument—is required to determine what counts (and to whom) 
as an "excuse" in any given context. As we shall see, analyzing the phenomena of 
"humanitarian intervention" and "sovereignty as responsibility" requires both types of 
analysis, establishing regularities of "normal" behaviour and the (contested) meaning 
attributed to them by particular actors. 
2. Norms, norm change, and power 
Even if one adopts a "constructivist realist" approach to studying international 
norms, it is important to distinguish between two different aspects of international norms 
that can be studied by positivist means. The first is the causal influence of norms on state 
behaviour, treating norms as an independent variable and state behaviour as a dependent 
variable. The second is the change in international norms and the causal factors that 
explain such change. Charting changes in "normal" state behaviour and identifying causal 
mechanisms that explain why particular norms emerge, spread, are modified, and decline 
has been a central preoccupation of research on international norms. Different theories of 
norm change have been proposed. Ann Florini, for instance, has proposed a model of 
international norm change based on an analogy from biological evolution and the natural 
selection of genes. Norms (like genes), she argues, are "inherited" from one generation of 
state leaders to another; different norms are "selected" over time based on their 
"prominence" in the international system, their coherence with other prevailing norms, 
and their relation with the prevailing political and material environment.16 Other scholars 
Ann Florini, "The Evolution of International Norms," International Studies Quarterly 40, no. 3 
(September 1996): 363-389. 
12 
have tried to provide more precise models of the mechanisms by which international 
norms emerge and become dominant. Thus for example Finnemore and Sikkink 
conceptualize norm change in terms of a "life cycle" divided into three phases: a first 
phase of "norm emergence" during which "norm entrepreneurs" attempt to persuade a 
critical mass of states to embrace a new norm; a second phase of "norm cascade" during 
which states that have adopted the new norm (and the international organizations of 
which they are members) attempt to socialize other states into accepting it; and a third 
phase of "norm internalization" during which a norm acquires a taken-for-granted quality 
and is no longer subject to public debate.17 
One of the important causal mechanisms to which theorists of international norm 
change have pointed is the process of persuasion and argument. While norm change can 
be brought about by many means (including emulation, coercion, and bargaining), the use 
of normative argument to change the behaviour of "target" actors has drawn substantial 
attention. Crawford, for instance, has sought to investigate the causal role played by 
ethical arguments in changing dominant norms regarding the propriety of colonialism, 
slavery and racism since the sixteenth century.18 Others have emphasized the role of 
argument in the diffusion of norms of human rights from the international to the domestic 
level, emphasizing the way normative arguments can "entrap" states into acknowledging 
and eventually internalizing norms they have previously rejected.19 One of the central 
theoretical issues that a focus on argument must face is how to distinguish the relative 
Finnemore and Sikkink, "International Norm Dynamics," 895-905. 
Crawford, Argument and Change. 
19
 Thomas Risse and Kathryn Sikkink, "The Socialization of International Human Rights Norms 
Into Domestic Practices: Introduction," in The Power of Human Rights: International Nonns and Domestic 
Change, eds. Thomas Risse, Stephen C. Ropp, and Kathryn Sikkink (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 1999), 1-38. 
13 
weight of normative argument in bringing about norm change as compared to other 
factors, including material factors such inequalities of power. Indeed, the problematic 
relationship between norms and power is at the heart of the question of what role norms 
play in international politics. 
Theorists of international norms typically depart from strictly materialist theories 
of IR, for which norms are merely epiphenomenal to more basic considerations of 
material power. For what Krasner calls "modified structural" theories of international 
regimes, norms can be thought of as intervening variables between "basic causal 
variables" (including power and interests) and state behaviour. They are thus seen as 
having some independent impact on the state behaviour, but are themselves dependent (to 
70 
a greater or lesser degree) on underlying material power dynamics. An example of such 
a "modified structural" theory of norms would be Krasner s own theory of state 
sovereignty as "organized hypocrisy." According to Krasner, the international norm of 
"Westphalian sovereignty," while widely recognized as a fundamental norm of 
international politics, has long been (and continues to be) frequently violated in practice. 
Such violation occurs in particular when the norms of sovereignty conflict with the 
interests of powerful actors. This is inevitable, Krasner argues, in an anarchical 
environment characterized by vast asymmetries of material power, where "logics of 
consequence" (the pursuit of interests) will always trump "logics of appropriateness" 
71 
(conduct according to norms). Others scholars of international norms are less 
pessimistic than Krasner about the perpetual dominance of "logics of consequence" over 
"logics of appropriateness" in international politics. They argue that state practice is in 
20
 Stephen Krasner, "Structural causes and regime consequences/' in International Regimes, ed. 
Stephen Krasner (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press. 1983). 5. 
*' Stephen Krasner, Sovereignty, 6. 
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fact, however imperfectly, constrained and guided by normative and ethical principles. 
While divergent interpretations of norms are possible in an anarchical system, there are 
limits to this divergence and some level of consensus based on shared interpretation is 
possible. 
We will return to the specific question of norms of sovereignty in the next 
chapter, but for the time being Krasner's analysis can help illustrate several conceptual, 
methodological and theoretical points regarding norm change and power. First, as Daniel 
Philpott has argued, it is open to question to what degree Krasner successfully 
demonstrates that state practice in the realm of sovereignty actually "refutes" the idea of 
sovereignty as a fundamental norm shaping international society and reveals it to be an 
instance of "organized hypocrisy." A key question remains unanswered in his analysis: 
just how "frequent" do violations of sovereignty have to be to say that the norm is an 
instance of "organized hypocrisy"? To answer this question requires a means of 
quantifying proportionally instances of norm-violation in a universe of norm-
compliance. Second, some of the instances of sovereignty-violation that Krasner cites 
as evidence of the "organized hypocrisy" of sovereignty, such as sovereignty-violation 
"by invitation" through consensually agreed treaties, are not usually considered as such. 
Indeed, it is an established principle of classical definitions of sovereignty in international 
law that state consent to treaty obligations is not a limitation of sovereignty but rather as 
See Andrew Hurrell, "Norms and Ethics in International Relations." in Handbook of 
International Relations, eds. Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse, and Beth A. Simmons (Thousand Oaks, CA: 
Sage, 2002), 137-154. 
23
 Daniel Philpott, "Usurping the Sovereignty of Sovereignty?" World Politics 53 (January 2001): 
308. 
15 
an expression of it. This crucial distinction reminds us, as Kratochwil and Ruggie 
would insist, that the very status of a norm-violation as such cannot be established 
without attending to the interpretive and communicative processes which make such 
practices meaningful within international society—the interpretivist element of our 
analysis that is lacking in Krasner's work. 
Keeping these criticisms in mind, Krasner's central thesis—that power 
asymmetries severely limit the constraining effects of norms on powerful actors—is an 
important one, particularly for theories of norms and norm change that emphasize 
processes of "persuasion" and argument. Presumably, "persuasion" looks very different 
when it is a powerful actor seeking to persuade a less powerful one about a norm than 
vice versa. This problem is directly recognized by some scholars of international norms. 
Thus, for example, Thomas Risse, analyzing arguments about norms in terms of 
Habermas' conception "communicative action" recognizes that the international arena 
does not perfectly fulfill the conditions of an "ideal speech situation" outlined by 
Habermas, particularly the requirement that actors regularly explain and justify their 
behaviour on the basis of "equal access" and in the absence of hierarchy. Risse 
nonetheless argues that by relaxing certain of Habermas' assumptions—including, 
crucially that of "equal access" and non-hierarchy—it is possible to identify situations 
approaching genuine communicative action in international politics. The central task for 
researchers on international norms and norm contestation, Risse suggests, is to analyze 
The classic expression of this principle in international law is the judgment of the Permanent 
Court of Justice in the Wimbledon case of 1923. See Jan Klabbers, "Clinching the Concept of Sovereignty: 
Wimbledon Redux,'" Austrian Review of International and European Law 3, no. 3 (1999): 345-367. 
"""' Thomas Risse, "International Norms and Domestic Change: Argument and Communicative 
Behavior in the Human Rights Arena," Politics & Society 27, no. 4 (December 1999): 533-536. 
16 
"to what extent [power relations] can explain argumentative outcomes" and to what 
extent arguments are won simply by "the power of the better argument."26 
In practice, this central task is not always performed, with the result that some 
analysts of international norms arguably underestimate the way in which power 
asymmetries shape norm diffusion and norm change. Risse's own work on the diffusion 
of international human rights norms is an example of this. Risse argues that the 
argumentative process involved in the diffusion of human rights norms from 
transnational advocacy networks and domestic opposition groups to repressive 
governments is an example of Habermasian communicative action in so far as the 
obvious imbalance of material power in favour of the "target" state means that the non-
state actors in question (domestic and foreign) can rely only on "the power of the better 
argument," and that genuine argument is occurring. Yet Risse's own analysis reveals that 
such arguments occur within the context of a larger imbalance of power: all of the norm-
violators he discusses are developing states (they are not cases selected from "all regions 
of the world," as he states, but only from all regions of the global South) and an 
important part of his "spiral model" involves international NGOs (most of which are 
based in the North) mobilizing "Western states" and "Western publics" to exert leverage 
over the (third world) "target state." Risse admits that in at least some of his cases the 
resulting arguments over human rights can be described as "forced dialogues" initiated 
under the threat of economic or political sanctions by Western donors. While he argues 
that this does not disprove his theory because even these "forced dialogues" eventually 
take on the characteristics of "true argumentative exchanges" in which "both sides accept 
26
 Ibid., 536. 
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each other as valid interlocutors...and agree on the norms guiding the situation," he 
ignores the degree to which the leverage of "economic and political sanctions" by 
Western donors remains in the background of such dialogue even if it is not explicitly 
invoked. In the presence of potential sanctions, the image of non-state actors as the 
weaker party relying solely on "the power of the better argument" is misleading. To 
illustrate this one need only imagine a situation in which the "target" state is one from the 
global North targeted by NGOs based in the global South—viz. NGOs without the 
potential economic and political leverage of "Western states" backing them up. 
As Risse argues, the relative impact of argument and power in such cases of norm 
diffusion and internalization can in principle be distinguished by careful empirical 
analysis. But there is a second way in which Risse's analysis of norm change and 
diffusion underestimates the limiting effects of power on the functioning of international 
norms. This is indicated by his very definition of international norms of "human rights" 
as exclusively civil and political rights. Risse's five-stage model of norm internalization 
is triggered by "repression" in the "target state," rather than by, say, economic 
deprivation, preventable disease, or environmental degradation. While he takes this 
definition as neutral, the definition is itself arguably the product of power relations. Risse 
ignores the history of contestation over the very definition of rights which developed in 
the post-war period between the Western bloc, the Eastern bloc, and the Third World, in 
which the latter two groups of states emphasized social, economic and cultural rights 
while the former focused on civil and political rights. Some scholars have argued that the 
hegemony of civil and political rights in the post-Cold War period itself reflects the 
hegemony of the US following the collapse of the Eastern bloc and the fragmentation of 
27
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the Third World bloc. Thus it maybe that the "global human rights regime" that Risse 
takes to be the functional equivalent of the Habermasian "common lifeworld" in the 
international sphere is itself in part the product of hegemonic power, and that the very 
terms of human rights discourse reflect power relations. 
3. International norms and developing states 
As the foregoing critique of Risse indicates, one important axis along which 
power relations may condition and limit norm change is that which separates the 
industrialized states of the global North from the developing/underdeveloped states of the 
global South. The potentially different roles of developed and developing states in 
processes of norm diffusion and norm change are not always noticed or addressed 
systematically by scholars of international norms. To return to the example of human 
rights norms, Risse's "spiral model" of norm internalization is exclusively concerned 
with understanding norm diffusion from the "global human rights polity" (which includes 
INGOs, Western publics, governments and IOs, but notably excludes non-Western states) 
to "norm-violating" states (which seem to be developing countries by definition). What 
is not considered is the possibility of norm diffusion in the other direction - i.e. instances 
in which non-Western and developing states and international organizations might try to 
change behaviour of "Western liberal states" either domestically or internationally. 
The question of the ability of developing states to actually shape the content of 
international norms and influence international norm change has not been sufficiently or 
systematically explored in the literature on international norms. To be sure, the role of 
28
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developing states in key instances of norm change, especially in the promotion of norms 
of decolonization in the 1950s and 1960s, has been widely recognized.30 The role of 
developing states acting in multilateral settings (the UN, the Commonwealth, the OAU) 
to delegitimize South African apartheid and promote norms of anti-racism has been 
analyzed by Audie Klotz.31 But these success stories seem to be exceptions. While 
acknowledging them, most scholars of North-South politics tend to be rather pessimistic 
regarding the ability of developing states to influence the direction of international norm 
change. Developing states, they argue, act far more frequently as "norm-takers" than as 
"norm-setters," as "the objects but not the authors of norms and laws that are supposedly 
international."32 Thus, for example, in the realm of political economy, critical theorists 
have argued that the post-Cold War triumph of neo-liberal economic programs has seen 
the diffusion to developing countries of dominant norms of macroeconomic governance 
that enshrine investor freedoms and the property rights for transnational enterprises over 
democratic participation. According to Jacqueline Anne Braveboy-Wagner, the norms 
that form the heart of many contemporary international regimes "have tended to be 
promoted by the northern nations and imposed on, or put more generously, diffused to, 
southern nations normally through elite groups and then governmental sectors... The 
E.g. Robert Jackson, "The Weight of Ideas in Decolonization: Normative Change in 
International Relations," in Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions and Political Change, eds. Judith 
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inclusiveness of the dialogue relevant to the establishment of most such regimes is 
therefore open to question."34 
Under what conditions can developing states act as successful "norm 
entrepreneurs"? There are some hints towards an answer to this question within the 
literature on international norms, but little in terms of systematic analysis. One suggestion 
has been that a key constraint on successful norm entrepreneurship is the ability to access 
the relevant international discussions and forums. Thus, for example, Crawford argues 
that the power inequalities of international "speech situations" can be seen as being in 
part about variation in the ability to have one's arguments heard.35 Florini notes that 
powerful states have important advantages over weaker states as norm entrepreneurs by 
virtue of their superior "communicative resources": "norms held by powerful actors 
simply have many more opportunities to reproduce through the greater number of 
opportunities afforded to powerful states to persuade others of the rightness of their 
views"36 One way in which developing states have sought to overcome this deficiency is 
by using international organizations as platforms in which to have their voices heard. 
This includes both the major "tricontinental" intergovernmental forums (the Non-Aligned 
Movement and the Group of 77), and universal membership bodies such as the UN 
General Assembly, as well as regional and subregional organizations. Quantitative 
analysis has pointed to the particular propensity of weaker states to participate in 
international organizations. While some of this participation can be explained by 
34
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conventional neoliberal institutionalist explanations of state cooperation in general, 
scholars of developing states have emphasized the particular rationale for Third World 
cooperation and "solidarity" in pooling diplomatic resources to achieve collectively 
results in bargaining with developed states that they would be unable to achieve 
individually.38 
Some such South-South cooperation has clearly had as its goal the alteration of 
international norms (e.g. the push for rapid decolonization in the 1950s and 1960s, the 
struggle against apartheid). How and why some of these efforts at international norm 
change succeeded while others failed is a question that has yet to be addressed in a 
systematic manner by the literature on international norms. Perhaps the most prominent 
example of a failed attempt at norm change initiated by the global South is the group of 
initiatives collectively referred to as the New International Economic Order (NIEO). The 
NIEO, which was at the centre of North-South confrontation in the 1970s, is the subject 
of an extensive body of literature in IR, IPE and International Law.39 As the NIEO's 
proposed reforms of the global economy included unmistakably normative components 
(relating in particular to the norms defining the rights and duties of states), studies of the 
NIEO and of why it largely failed to achieve its goals can provide a good starting point 
for developing a theory of the conditions under which developing countries can influence 
the formulation of international norms. 
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4. Determinants of Southern success in influencing international norm change 
Particularly helpful in this respect is Stephen Krasner's structural realist account 
of the NIEO. Taking as his starting point a realist theory of international regimes, Krasner 
argues that the NIEO is best seen as an attempt by developing countries to bring about 
"international regime change," changing the liberal trade regime established after World 
War II into a new regime based on principles and norms of "authoritative" allocation of 
wealth.40 According to Krasner, attempts by developing countries to bring about such 
regime change stemmed largely from the political weakness and vulnerability of their 
governments to pressures of the global market which they were too weak to either 
influence unilaterally or to adjust to internally. Facing a weak international position and 
internal underdevelopment, such governments sought to expand their power 
internationally and consolidate their control domestically by altering the principles and 
norms of existing international regimes away from market-oriented modes of allocation 
towards authoritative allocation which could guarantee both an increased flow of 
resources and a more predictable and stable international environment.41 According to 
Krasner, this involved two related strategies. The first was to seek to alter existing 
international institutions, demanding both greater participation in existing global forums 
and the creation of new international bureaucracies more congruent with regimes based 
on authoritative allocation, e.g. with the power to compel resource transfer from North to 
South.42 The second strategy was to support international regimes that expanded the 
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scope of activities recognized as being subject to the sovereign control of states, e.g. by 
extending the sovereign control of resources or by legitimating national controls on 
multinational corporations.43 Developing states also sought to resist Northern efforts to 
create international regimes limiting sovereign powers, e.g. in the areas of population 
control or human rights.44 
According to Krasner, the degree to which the governments of developing 
countries succeeded in altering international regimes to align them with their preferred 
principles and norms was a function of three variables: first, the nature of existing regime 
structures, including existing international organizations; second, the ability of 
developing states to articulate a "coherent system of ideas" that set the international 
agenda and consolidated Third World unity; and third, the power and attitudes of the 
global North, especially the United States.45 Krasner argues that developing countries 
were particularly successful in promoting international regime change when using 
international forums—like the UN General Assembly—based on the principle of 
sovereign equality and "one nation, one vote" decision-making procedures, rather than 
those forums, such as the Bretton Woods institutions or the UN Security Council, in 
which the principle of great-power primacy was recognized and enshrined in weighted 
voting or the power of the veto. They were also more successful to the degree to which 
they were able to coordinate their actions around a coherent ideological program which 
placed the responsibility for underdevelopment on the functioning of the liberal 
international economy and called for authoritative allocation at the international level. 
43
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Finally, Krasner argues that the 1970s provided developing countries with a window of 
opportunity opened by the relative decline of the US as a hegemonic power, but one still 
committed to the international institutions which it had been instrumental in establishing 
in the aftermath of World War II. The highpoint of Third World success was the formal 
assent of the North in the UN General Assembly to the demands of the NIEO, which 
articulated principles and norms that departed in significant respects from the market-
oriented model of international allocation. Beginning in the late 1970s, however, the 
window of opportunity began to close as Northern commitments to institutions in which 
developing countries set the agenda began to erode: the US temporarily withdrew from 
the International Labour Organization in the late 1970s, and formally withdrew from 
UNESCO in 1985; in 1982, several Northern states rejected the UN Law of the Sea 
Convention. For Krasner, writing in 1985, the ultimate outcome of these developments 
was unclear, though the declining Northern commitment to multilateral forums suggested 
that developing states would ultimately be unsuccessful in achieving international regime 
change. Krasner concluded that these states ultimately lacked the "meta-power" that was 
needed by states to establish new regimes (as opposed to "relational power" used to 
maximize advantage within existing regimes).47 
We do not have to accept all of Krasner's ideas to find his theoretical framework 
and hypotheses useful. Krasner's essentially neorealist explanation of the motivations of 
developing states in seeking international regime change, for example, is called into 
question by Craig Murphy, who has studied the "NIEO ideology" in some detail.48 
Nonetheless, Krasner's structural theory of North-South conflict and the conditions for 
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successful international regime change driven by the global South suggests a more 
general theoretical framework for systematically analyzing the role of developing states 
in influencing the development of international norms. Norms, along with principles, are 
key elements of international regimes. According to Krasner, changes in the norms and 
principles of a particular regime are changes of the regime itself (unlike changes in rules 
and decision-making procedures, which are changes within regimes). It should therefore 
be possible to apply Krasner's theory of the conditions for southern success in altering 
international regimes to cases of change of international norms. Applying Krasner's 
theory in this way would produce the following working hypothesis: The ability of 
developing countries to influence the direction of change in international norms should 
increase as a result of international regimes that grant them a large degree of access to 
and participation in international decision-making, as a result of increased ideological 
coherence in Southern diplomacy, and as a result of a decline in Northern capabilities, 
provided Northern attitudes remain committed to multilateralism. This is the more 
general theory whose plausibility I want to investigate, taking as my case post-Cold War 
attempts to alter international norms on sovereignty and intervention through the practice 
of "humanitarian intervention" and arguments about "responsible sovereignty." As 
numerous scholars have noted, most Third World states opposed such efforts and clung to 
more traditional conceptions of sovereignty, non-intervention and Charter-based notions 
of states' rights, even as they increasing accepted the validity of international human 
rights norms.50 Indeed, Southern opposition to the so-called "right of humanitarian 
intervention" is credited in part with shifting the debate over human rights and 
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sovereignty away from discussions of "humanitarian intervention" and towards the 
"emerging norm" of the "responsibility to protect." In my paper I will seek to apply 
Krasner's theory of the conditions for Southern influence on international regime change 
to the case of Southern opposition to "humanitarian intervention" and the alteration of the 
international norms of state sovereignty. How have existing regime structures (including 
IOs), the ideological coherence of Southern diplomacy, and Northern attitudes and 
capabilities affected the success of developing countries in influencing the direction of 
change in the international norms of sovereignty and intervention? 
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Chapter 2: Research Design 
In order to shed some light on the way in which developing countries are able or 
unable to influence the direction of international norm change, in this paper I will 
conduct a case study analyzing international debates over the concepts of "humanitarian 
intervention" and "responsibility to protect" and their implications for norms of 
sovereignty and intervention. My analysis will take the form of a plausibility probe of 
three hypotheses derived from Stephen Krasner's theory of "international regime 
change." These three hypotheses are applied to my case in an attempt to develop a theory 
explaining the ability or inability of developing countries to influence international norm 
change that could then be further tested. The reason for conducting a plausibility probe 
rather than theory-testing is the lack of an existing theory specifically concerned with the 
influence of developing states on norm evolution. As explained in the previous chapter, 
while the existing literature on international norms acknowledges the historic role of 
developing states in international norm change and contains suggestive hints regarding 
the role of materially more and less powerful states as "norm entrepreneurs," it provides 
little in terms of systematic analysis of the role of developing states in the evolution of 
international norms. Hence the need to adapt possible hypotheses from existing theory in 
another area of IR. 
In this chapter I explain the theoretical framework from which my hypotheses are 
derived, present my hypotheses, and describe how I will operationalize my variables. 
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1 Theoretical framework: international regimes and international norms 
The theoretical framework adopted in my case study is a "modified structural" 
theory of IR which understands international outcomes as caused in large part by the 
distribution of material capabilities among states in the international system, but which 
accords some independent causal role to international regimes, and to international norms 
as elements of those regimes. International regimes can be defined as "sets of implicit or 
explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors' 
expectations converge in a given area of international relations."51 According to regime 
theory, regime-governed behaviour in international politics is behaviour guided by 
principles and norms held in common by different actors, and not simply by narrow 
calculations of the self-interest of each actor individually. Norms, in this context, can be 
defined as "standards of behaviour defined in terms of rights and obligations."52 Along 
with principles—defined as "beliefs of fact, causation, and rectitude"—norms provide the 
"basic defining characteristics of a regime." Changes in norms or principles lead to 
changes in the regime itself (unlike changes in rules or decision-making procedures, 
which lead to change within a given regime). 
Stephen Krasner has used regime theory to analyze North-South conflict in the 
1970s and 1980s, describing attempts by developing countries to reform the international 
economic order during that period as an attempt at "international regime change," an 
attempt to replace the norms and principles of the liberal trade regime established 
following World War II with norms and principles of "authoritative allocation" and 
51
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global redistribution managed by international institutions. Krasner argues that the 
successes and failures of developing countries in achieving such regime change can be 
explained by three key variables: 1) the degree to which existing international institutions 
provided developing countries with access to and participation in international decision-
making; 2) the coherence of the ideology underpinning Third World demands; and 3) the 
capabilities and attitudes of Northern states. In brief, Krasner argues that during the 
1970s the existence of international institutions whose membership rules and decision-
making structures granted developing countries a large degree of participation in 
decision-making, the ideological convergence of the Third World bloc around 
structuralist explanations of underdevelopment, and the relative decline of US hegemony 
combined with continued Northern commitment to multilateralism increased the ability 
of developing countries to successfully challenge the existing international economic 
regime and make demands for international regime change. By the early 1980s, however, 
Northern attitudes towards the international institutions through which the Third World 
was making its demands became increasingly hostile, with the result that the Third 
World's demands for a "New International Economic Order" were marginalized, and the 
attempted international regime change failed.55 
Krasner's theory of the determinants of the ability of developing countries to 
bring about international regime change suggests a more general theoretical framework 
for systematically analyzing the role of developing states in influencing the evolution of 
international norms. As explained above, within regime theory, norms are key elements 
of international regimes, and changes in the norms of a particular regime bring about 
'" Krasner, Structural Conflict, 29. 
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changes in the regime itself. It should therefore be possible to apply Krasner's theory of 
the conditions for Southern success in altering international regimes to cases of change in 
international norms. Applying Krasner's theory in this way would produce the following 
working hypothesis: The ability of developing countries to change international norms 
should increase as a result of increased Southern participation in decision-making in 
international organizations, increased ideological coherence in Southern diplomacy, and 
a decline in Northern capabilities, provided that decline is accompanied by continued 
Northern commitment to the international institutions through which developing 
countries articulate their demands. If correct, this hypothesis should also indicate the 
conditions for successful Southern opposition to international norm change when such 
change is initiated by states in the global North. This is the situation which I investigate 
in the first part of my case study, taking as my example Northern attempts in the late 
1990s to alter international norms of sovereignty and intervention through the 
normalization of practices of "humanitarian intervention." I investigate the opposition of 
the global South to this attempt at international norm change, and the role of this 
opposition in shaping the subsequent emergence of the concept of the "responsibility to 
protect." The second part of my case concerns the ability of developing countries to 
shape the subsequent direction of the evolution of the "responsibility to protect." In both 
parts I am concerned with the ability of developing countries to influence the direction of 
change in norms of sovereignty and intervention. 
Krasner. "Structural causes/7 3-4. 
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2 Hypotheses and variables 
Applying Krasner's theory of international regime change to the issue of 
intervention and sovereignty, we arrive at the following three hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1: As existing international institutions facilitate the participation of 
developing countries in decision-making, the success of developing countries in 
influencing the direction of change in international norms of sovereignty and intervention 
should also increase. 
Hypothesis 2: As the ideological coherence of the Southern diplomacy on issues 
of sovereignty and intervention increases, the success of developing countries in 
influencing the direction of change in international norms of sovereignty and intervention 
should also increase. 
Hypothesis 3: As Northern capabilities decline, the success of developing 
countries in influencing the direction change in international norms of sovereignty and 
intervention should also increase, provided Northern attitudes remain committed to action 
through multilateral institutions. 
Testing the above hypotheses requires defining and measuring four variables: 
1) Success of developing countries in influencing the direction of change in 
international norms of sovereignty and intervention 
2) Participation of developing countries in decision-making in international 
institutions 
3) Ideological coherence of Southern diplomacy 
4) Northern capabilities and attitude 
3 Operationalization of dependent variable 
The success of developing countries in influencing the direction of change in 
international norms of sovereignty and intei~vention will be measured by assessing the 
degree to which the direction of change in prevailing norms of sovereignty and 
intervention corresponds to the expressed preferences and opinions of developing 
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countries. In this section I explain how this can be done by first clarifying what I mean by 
"change in norms of sovereignty and intervention." I then describe the three key norms of 
sovereignty with which I am concerned (non-intervention, non-use of force, and 
sovereign equality) and discuss how change in these norms can be observed and 
measured. 
3.1 Changing norms of sovereignty and intervention 
Measuring the ability of developing countries to influence the direction of change 
in norms of sovereignty and intervention requires acceptance of two theoretical 
assumptions about the nature of international politics. The first of these is the assumption 
that state sovereignty and practices of intervention can indeed be understood in terms of 
international norms. While a strict materialist perspective on IR would likely reject such a 
proposition, a "modified structural" theory, as described above, accepts that ideational 
phenomena such as norms play some role in shaping international behaviour, even if this 
role is fundamentally conditioned by material factors (the distribution of material 
capabilities among states) and by the structural conditions of international anarchy. In 
this respect, a "modified structural" theory is similar to the approach of the "English 
school" of IR pioneered by scholars like Martin Wight and Hedley Bull. For these 
scholars, while material power and self-help are extremely important in explaining 
international outcomes, international politics cannot be understood as being purely about 
competition between self-reliant states of varying material capabilities. Instead, states in 
the international system should be understood as members of an anarchical but ordered 
"international society," a group of states that are "conscious of certain common interests 
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and common values," that conceive of themselves as "bound by a common set of rules in 
their relations with one another," and which participate in common institutions.57 The 
mutual recognition by states of each other's sovereignty—viz. of each other's supreme 
authority over a given territorial jurisdiction—is among the most fundamental of these 
common institutions. State sovereignty is thus "the basic norm, or grundnorm, upon 
which the society of states ultimately rests."58 State sovereignty is the central standard of 
state behaviour in the current international system, and is defined in terms of both the 
rights and duties of states, particularly the right to supreme authority within a state's 
domestic jurisdiction and the duty to refrain from intervening in the domestic jurisdiction 
of other states. 
The second assumption underlying my approach is that the norms associated with 
state sovereignty are not static, but are subject to historical change, as well as to 
contestation by different actors at any given point in time. While this might seem to 
contradict the idea that sovereignty is the "basic norm" of international society, this is not 
necessarily so. Here we can borrow a distinction from constructivist IR between 
regulative norms—norms which regulate the behaviour of actors—and constitutive 
norms—norms which make possible certain actions by creating the identities and 
interests of actors.59 Sovereignty as a "basic norm" of international society can be seen as 
the fundamental constitutive norm of modern international politics in the sense that it 
defines sovereign states—viz. political authorities with exclusive territorial jurisdiction— 
as the basic actors in international politics. This differentiates modern international 
57
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society from, for example, medieval Europe, in which political authority was organized 
in terms of multiple, territorially-overlapping jurisdictions. While the constitutive norm 
that defines sovereign states as the primary actors in international society has remained 
essentially unchanged since the seventeenth-century, the attendant regulative norms that 
define the rights and obligations of states have changed significantly since then. To take 
one example, where state sovereignty was once understood to include a virtually 
unrestricted right of the sovereign to use of force, including preventively to maintain the 
balance of power, to gain territory from rivals, or to obtain the repayment of debts, this 
expansive definition of sovereign rights to use force has been progressively restricted in 
international legal agreements since the late nineteenth-century. 
Another way in which norms of sovereignty have changed is in terms of which 
actors are eligible for recognition as sovereigns. In the past two centuries alone, for 
example, we have witnessed, according to J. Samuel Barkin and Bruce Cronin, oscillation 
between periods during which sovereignty has been understood as belonging properly to 
states—i.e. to governmental structures exercising exclusive institutional authority over a 
given territorial jurisdiction—and periods during which it has been understood as 
belonging essentially to nations—viz. to structures ruling in over (and in the name of) a 
population belonging to a given "national" community.61 Probably the most radical 
change in this aspect of sovereignty, however, has been the change brought about in the 
second half of the twentieth-century by the formal decolonization of European empires. 
Before decolonization, "Westphalian sovereignty," associated with the norm of non-
60
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intervention within Europe, was overtly imperial beyond Europe, denying or 
circumscribing the sovereign rights of non-European societies and states, justifying their 
conquest and colonization—or at least subjection to highly interventionist supervision by 
European powers—by reference to their failure to measure up to a "standard of 
civilization" determined by European powers to be the requisite of full sovereignty. In 
the words of Christopher Clapham, "Westphalian sovereignty provided the formula under 
which territories which did not 'count' as states according to the criteria adopted by the 
European state system could be freely appropriated...by those which did count." 
Formal decolonization thus brought about a fundamental "revolution in sovereignty" 4 
which universalized sovereign statehood to all formerly colonized territories regardless of 
their internal systems of economic or political governance and regardless of their materia] 
capabilities. 
3.2 Thepostcolonial sovereignty regime 
By "norms of sovereignty and intervention," then, I mean the core norms of what 
Clapham calls the "postcolonial sovereignty regime," viz. those norms central to 
international society following decolonization. These are essentially three: non-
intervention, the non-use of force, and sovereign equality. To say that these three norms 
are the key norms of postcolonial international society is not to argue that all three have 
been followed by states in practice to the same extent, or even that all three are 
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interpreted by all states in the same manner. Indeed, as will emerge clearly in my case 
study, the contestation of norms—both of their content and their application in particular 
cases—is a key process in international politics and one that has the potential to spur 
norm change. Each of these three norms has been contested, and has the potential to 
change along several dimensions (see table below). 
3.2.1 Non-intervention. Non-intervention refers to the prohibition against interference 
by a state, group of states or international organization in matters falling within the 
domestic jurisdiction of a state. This norm emerges logically from the reciprocal 
recognition by states of each other's supreme authority in their domestic jurisdictions. In 
the words of R.J. Vincent: 
Where such final and absolute authorities are collected together in international 
society, it can be said that the recognition by each of them of the others' authority 
within their own domains—recognition of a principle of state sovereignty—is 
fundamental to their coexistence. If a state has a right to sovereignty, this implies 
that other states have a duty to respect that right by, among other things, 
refraining from intervention in its domestic affairs.65 
While older than the postcolonial sovereignty regime, the concept of non-intervention has 
been central in the postcolonial period in maintaining what Robert Jackson calls the 
"negative sovereignty" of weak states, viz. sovereignty guaranteed less by the ability of 
the states in question to prevent external intervention in their domestic affairs than by the 
forbearance of other states from such intervention. Non-intervention is thus a norm 
defined in terms of the rights of states (to the inviolability of their domestic jurisdiction) 
R.J. Vincent, Nonintei-vention and International Order (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University 
Press, 1974), 14. 
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and their obligations (to forebear from intervening in the domestic jurisdictions of 
others). 
The norm of non-intervention is subject to contestation and change along two 
dimensions. First, the scope of what is and is not considered to be within the domestic 
jurisdiction of the state—and therefore what is and is not protected by the norm of non-
intervention—has been contested and has changed over time. As Vincent writes, "the 
frontiers protected by the principle of nonintervention are unclear at any one time, they 
vary over time, and they are defined differently by different statesmen."67 The 
authoritative articulation of the norm of non-intervention in Article 2(7) of the UN 
Charter states that 
Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to 
intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any 
state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the 
present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of 
enforcement measures under Chapter VII.68 
The question of which matters fall "essentially within the domestic jurisdiction" of states, 
and which therefore are protected by the norm of non-intervention, is left undefined in 
the Charter and has been hotly debated throughout the Charter period. In the immediate 
postwar years, for instance, European colonial powers argued that the conduct of colonial 
authorities in colonized territories fell within the scope of matters "essentially within the 
domestic jurisdiction" of the colonial state, and was therefore exempt from any attempts 
at international supervision. This interpretation was vigorously rejected by Asian and 
Latin American states and by the Soviet bloc, who argued successfully that the non-
intervention norm should be interpreted in a manner that supported self-determination of 
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colonial peoples rather than continued colonial rule. Following decolonization, debates 
over the scope of the non-intervention within the UN largely pitted the emergent Third 
World bloc and communist states on one hand against the United States and its allies on 
the other. The former generally pressed for an expansive definition both of the scope of 
matters protected by the principle of non-intervention, and of the definition of acts 
constituting intervention, including indirect forms of subversion as well as economic 
70 
coercion. Western states generally opposed such expansive definitions as an attempt to 
restrict the "natural" interplay of international relations. 
The second dimension along which the norm of non-intervention has been 
contested and can potentially change concerns exceptions to the rule. The norm of non-
intervention not only provides a general rule against intervention, it also enables and 
legitimates certain exceptions to that rule—viz. it defines permissible and legitimate 
intervention. Thus Article 2(7) states specifically that the principle of non-intervention 
"shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII" of the 
Charter. Chapter VII of the Charter provides the Security Council with the authority to 
determine the existence of any "threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of 
aggression" (Article 39) and to decide on measures, both peaceful (Article 41) and 
involving the use of force (Article 42), necessary to "maintain or restore international 
peace and security." The Charter's exception to the non-intervention norm is thus both 
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narrow—restricting legitimate intervention to that authorized by the Security Council to 
maintain international peace and security—and potentially very broad—giving the 
Security Council considerable discretion in determining the existence of threats to 
international peace and security.72 In the polarized atmosphere of the Cold War, resort to 
Security Council authorized intervention was extremely limited due to the use of the veto 
by the Council's permanent members. Since the late 1980s, however, greater agreement 
among the permanent members of the Council and an expansion of the definition of 
threats to international peace and security, has introduced significant changes in practices 
of intervention, legitimating (even if inconsistently) enforcement measures authorized by 
the Council in the context of internal conflicts with grave human rights and humanitarian 
impacts.73 It is important to note that the new wave of "UN interventionism," while 
altering the scope of the non-intervention norm, did not of itself challenge the definition 
of exceptions to the norm of non-intervention contained in the Charter. Intervention not 
authorized by the Council, on the other hand, does constitute a potential challenge to this 
second element of the non-intervention norm, carving out an additional exception to the 
norm beyond Security Council authorization of collective enforcement measures. 
3.2.2 Non-use of force. The second major norm of the postcolonial sovereignty regime 
is that prohibiting the use of force in international relations and obliging states to seek 
peaceful resolution of international disputes. While the norm on the non-use offeree is 
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closely related to non-intervention (military action against a state without its consent by 
definition intervenes in its domestic jurisdiction), there are good reasons for keeping the 
two apart. As the above discussion of the scope of the non-intervention norm indicates, 
some states have favoured expansive definitions of what constitutes intervention that 
include a variety of activities beyond military action. By these definitions then, not every 
intervention involves the use of force. Conversely, not every use of force necessarily 
constitutes intervention: deployment of military force within a state with the consent of 
that state is not typically seen as intervention. Because the norm of non-use of force thus 
covers a narrower spectrum of behaviour than non-intervention, it is quite possible for the 
two norms to evolve separately, with, for example, the scope of the non-intervention 
norm shrinking without the norm of non-use of force being affected—viz. with a wider 
array of internal matters being considered beyond the realm of exclusive domestic 
jurisdiction, without thereby being necessarily seen as legitimate occasions for the use of 
force. 
From a historical perspective, the norm prohibiting the use of force is a rather 
dramatic departure from classical conceptions of sovereignty. Indeed, before the 
twentieth century, the use of force was considered a fundamental prerogative of 
sovereign states and international law recognized no rules about when it was permissible 
for the sovereign to wage war. The first attempts to promote norms restricting the 
freedom of sovereign states to use force occurred with the Hague Peace Conventions of 
1899 and 1907, which committed signatories not to commence hostilities without prior 
and unambiguous warning, and prohibited the recourse to armed force for the recovery of 
41 
contractual debts. The next, more ambitious and infamously unsuccessful attempt to 
restrain the sovereign right to use force was the Covenant of the League of Nations, 
which sought to create a collective security system that committed League members to 
protect any state facing aggression (Article 10), to submit international disputes to 
arbitration, judicial settlement, and international inquiry (Articles 12, 13, and 15), and not 
to resort to war with any state complying with decisions resulting from any of these 
processes (Article 13(4)). The first general prohibition of war considered legally 
binding was the 1928 Briand-Kellogg Pact which committed signatories to "condemn 
recourse to war for the solution of international controversies and renounce it as an 
instrument of national policy in their relations with one another," except in the case of 
self-defence. Both the League and the Brian-Kellogg Pact were, of course, ineffective 
in preventing the world war that followed. The UN Charter framework built on the 
experience of the failure of the League of Nations and the interwar system of collective 
security, and provided the most comprehensive formulation yet of a prohibition on the 
use of force. Article 2(4) of the Charter states that "All members shall refrain in their 
international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or 
political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes 
of the United Nations."77 
As with non-intervention, the norm of non-use of force both establishes a general 
rule prohibiting the resort to force in international affairs and establishes some forms of 
force as legitimate exceptions to the rule. In general, only two exceptions to the Charter's 
A. Randzelhofer, "Article 2(4)" in The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentaiy, ed. 
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general prohibition offeree are widely recognized. The first concerns collective 
enforcement measures authorized by the Security Council under Chapter VII. As we have 
seen above, Article 42 of the Charter provides the Council with the authority to authorize 
"such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore 
international peace and security," if it has determined the existence of a threat to peace 
and decided that peaceful means of addressing it "would be inadequate." The second 
generally accepted exception to the norm against the use of force is the right of individual 
and collective self-defence, recognized under customary international law and enshrined 
in the Article 51 of the Charter. Article 51 reserves to states the "inherent right of 
individual and collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the 
United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain 
international peace and security," and requires states exercising this right to report 
measures taken immediately to the Security Council. 
Contestation and potential change of the norm on the non-use of force can occur 
along two dimensions. First, the scope of existing exceptions to the rule prohibiting the 
use of force can be contested and can expand. For example, the definition of what 
constitutes a threat to international peace and security—and can therefore serve as a 
justification for use offeree authorized by the Security Council—has been seen by many 
as having expanded in the post-Cold War period to include certain internal developments 
within states. Similarly, the definition of legitimate self-defence has also been claimed to 
have expanded: while the Charter limits the right of self-defence to a response to an 
"armed attack," many states now believe that the right also allows use offeree to pre-
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empt an attack, provided that the necessity of self-defence is deemed to be "instant, 
O A 
overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no moment of deliberation." More 
controversially, the US under the George W. Bush administration asserted the right to use 
force in self-defence preventively against threats linked to transnational terrorism or 
weapons of mass destruction, "even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the 
enemy's attack."81 
The second dimension of contestation and change in the norm on the non-use of 
force has been the articulation of new exceptions to the rule. This has been far less 
common than attempts to alter the scope of existing exceptions. The claim of a right of 
"humanitarian intervention" without Security Council authorization would be an example 
of this. Such a claim was rarely if ever made by states during the Cold War: the three 
Cold War-era interventions which are closest candidates for genuine "humanitarian 
interventions"—Indian intervention in East Pakistan in 1971, the Vietnamese invasion of 
Cambodia in 1978, and the Tanzanian invasion of Uganda in 1979—were all justified 
primarily on the grounds of existing exceptions to the non-use of force (primarily self-
defence). In the post-Cold War period, as we shall see, claims for the legitimacy of 
"humanitarian intervention," including intervention not authorized by the Security 
Council, have been made in several instances. 
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3.2.3 Sovereign equality. The final major norm of the postcolonial sovereignty regime 
concerns sovereign equality. Sovereign equality is the idea that all states in international 
society should enjoy equal legal status and equal basic sovereign rights regardless of their 
material powers or domestic social systems, and that special rights and prerogatives 
should not be granted to states on the basis of power. While the concept of sovereign 
equality was promoted by writers on international law beginning in the eighteenth 
century, its widespread recognition by states occurred only in the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries. The decolonization of European empires in the second half of 
the twentieth century brought about a revolutionary change in this norm, extending to 
formerly colonized states the unconditional recognition of equal sovereign rights. This 
effectively overthrew the earlier "standard of civilization" according to which sovereign 
rights were reserved to an exclusive club of states and granted to newcomers only on the 
basis of criteria of empirical statehood and "civil" internal governance. 
Of the three norms of the postcolonial sovereignty regime surveyed here, 
sovereign equality is arguably the least settled and most contested. As Gerry Simpson has 
argued, the concept of sovereign equality, while frequently considered a single, uniform 
norm, can be further divided into three distinct forms. Formal equality refers to equality 
before the law, the principle that "injudicial settings states have equality in the 
vindication and 'exercise of rights'."85 This is not the same thing as states having entirely 
identical rights: different rules (e.g. regional customs or functional customary regimes) 
can still apply to different states (e.g. littoral vs. inland states), as long as rules that are 
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understood to apply to the same states are applied equally. An understanding of sovereign 
equality that understands it purely as formal equality is thus perfectly compatible with the 
granting of special rights and prerogatives to a select group of states, e.g. on the basis of 
their great power status. A stronger conception of sovereign equality, on the other hand, 
includes either legislative or existential equality, or both. Legislative equality refers to the 
role of states in international law- or rule-making processes, and implies both an equal 
role for all states in the formation and application of rules and an understanding that 
states are bound only by those norms to which they give their consent.87 Existential 
equality refers to the recognition that all sovereign states enjoy a minimum batch of 
inalienable rights—notably "the right to exist (territorial integrity), the right to choose the 
manner of existence (political independence) and the right to participate in the 
international system"—which guarantee their "liberty to pursue a number of different 
political programmes without fear of sanction from the international community." 
As Simpson argues, while formal sovereign equality has long been central to 
international society, commitment and fidelity to either legislative or existential equality 
has been historically variable. In particular, since the Concert of Europe in the nineteenth 
century, these two elements of sovereign equality have at various times been 
compromised by what Simpson calls "legalized hegemony"—the granting of special 
rights and prerogatives to great powers—and by what Simpson calls "anti-pluralism"— 
the tendency to divide states into separate classes depending on the legitimacy or 
morality of their institutions and cultures, and to seek to deprive a particular class of 
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change in the norm of sovereign equality has concerned primarily legislative and 
existential equality. While the UN Charter enshrines "the principle of the sovereign 
on 
equality of all its Members" among the foundational principles of the UN, as Edward 
Luck has noted, the founders of the UN understood sovereign equality "as a legal term, 
not one describing rules for inter-governmental decision-making"—i.e. not as legislative 
equality.90 Great power prerogative, in the form of the veto power of the permanent 
members of the Security Council, was enshrined at the very heart of the UN system. 
Indeed, as Simpson argues, the Charter as a whole is best seen as a "compromise between 
the political requirements of hegemony., .and the juridical commitment to equality (or the 
dignity and sovereignty of the smaller states)." ' This compromise is evident not only in 
the institutional arrangements of the Security Council, but also in persistence in the 
Charter of the language of colonial paternalism with respect to the peoples of "non-self-
governing territories" whose well-being the colonial powers were to promote as a "sacred 
trust."92 Indeed, as Mark Mazower has recently argued, despite the UN's subsequent 
instrumental role in facilitating decolonization, the organization was originally conceived 
by its European architects as a means of preserving rather than eliminating European 
colonial rule—viz. as means of maintaining a system of unequal sovereignty between 
sovereign European states and their colonial dependencies.93 
Beginning in the early postwar years, however, activism by postcolonial states 
was crucial in pushing for an expanded notion of sovereign equality that would include 
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not only formal equality among states but also existential and legislative equality. With 
regard to the former, Asian and Latin American states in the 1950s pushed for the 
immediate granting of unconditional sovereignty to colonized territories regardless of 
their level of internal development. As the General Assembly's 1960 Declaration on the 
Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples put it, colonial peoples 
were entitled to an unconditional right to "freely determine their political status and 
freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development" and "inadequacy of 
political, economic, social or educational preparedness should never serve as a pretext for 
delaying independence."9 Thus, while the new states that emerged from the ensuing 
wave of decolonization were expected to abide by existing international commitments 
(e.g. the commitment to territorial integrity and preservation of existing borders, even 
where these had been imposed by European imperialism), their sovereign rights 
internally were to be undiminished "however weak their government, however scant their 
control over territory, however inchoate their people." 5 In the terms proposed by Robert 
Jackson, they were granted the right of "juridical sovereignty" without having to 
demonstrate "empirical sovereignty." 
At the same time as they promoted greater existential sovereign equality, 
developing countries have also promoted legislative equality, in particular by challenging 
the granting of special rights or prerogatives to great powers. In the early twentieth 
century, Latin American states in particular were important critics of such special rights 
and used the occasion of the Hague conference of 1907—the first international meeting 
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to include the participation not only of great powers but also of smaller states—to push 
for equal rights among states analogous to equal civil and political rights for individuals 
within a liberal domestic constitution.97 Four decades later, the conflict between great 
power privilege and legislative equality was apparent at the San Francisco conference 
that founded the UN, particularly in debates over the composition, procedures and powers 
of the Security Council. While a majority of states, having learned the lesson of the 
League of Nations, accepted the need for special rights for the permanent five members 
of the Council, they still sought to soften the effect of these rights in a variety of ways: by 
seeking to limit the application of the veto to enforcement actions, by seeking to expand 
the membership of the Council so as to weaken the hold of the great powers on its 
decision-making, by seeking to establish a mechanism for reviewing the permanency of 
great power membership, and by seeking to constrain Council's decisions by instituting 
review mechanisms through the General Assembly or International Court of Justice. In 
the end, virtually every modification proposed by smaller states with respect to the 
Security Council was rejected. The effect—permanent status and the right of veto for the 
great powers—was an entrenchment of sovereign mequality which granted the permanent 
five (P5) members "de facto immunity from the enforcement jurisdiction of the Security 
Council while other states [were] subject to increasingly intrusive doctrines of 
intervention."98 
The following table summarizes the three norms of the postcolonial sovereignty 
regimes and the dimensions along which each has been contested and has the potential to 
change. 
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Norms of sovereignty and Possible dimensions of norm contestation and 
intervention change 
Non-intervention -change in scope of domestic jurisdiction 
-change in exceptions to the rule 
Non-use of force -change in scope of existing exceptions to the rule 
-articulation of new exception(s) to the rule 
Sovereign equality -change in recognition of legislative equality 
-change in recognition of existential equality 
3.3 Observing and measuring change in norms of sovereignty and intervention 
Accurately measuring the strength and content of international norms is a well-
known problem in IR scholarship on this subject. As numerous scholars have noted, the 
strength and content of norms cannot be deduced purely from state behaviour. Individual 
cases of what appears to be norm-compliance Or norm-violations do not necessarily prove 
or disprove the existence of a norm, and cannot be interpreted separately from the 
communicative practices of justification that accompany them. Verbal justifications, even 
if misleading or mendacious regarding the true circumstances and intentions of a given 
action, still reveal something about what a given group of states thinks the content of 
norms are in a given issue-area. Thus, for example, justifications for intervention, even if 
they are lies, reveal what is considered normal and justifiable behaviour in international 
society. For this reason, government statements regarding norms of sovereignty and 
intervention and statements justifying particular acts of intervention (or non-intervention) 
reveal the state of international understanding and the area of consensus—as well as the 
areas of contestation—concerning these norms. Debates between state representatives 
and consensual resolutions on these subjects within universal membership organizations 
can be particularly useful in assessing these areas of consensus and contestation. 
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Using such materials, Southern success in influencing the direction of norm 
change can be measured by assessing the degree to which the areas of international 
consensus and contestation regarding the content of the norms of non-intervention, non-
use of force, and sovereign equality have shifted in a direction more compatible with the 
stated positions of developing states and their international groupings. Such shifts can be 
measured by looking at resolutions expressing areas of agreement on issues relating to 
sovereignty and intervention (e.g. the 2005 World Summit Outcome) and comparing 
them to earlier policy statements of states advocating and states opposing departures from 
existing sovereignty norms. The lesser the distance between the area of "international 
consensus" and the expressed positions of developing states, the greater the success in 
influencing the direction of norm change. 
This method of measuring Southern success in influencing the direction of norm 
change obviously raises the problem of possible spurious effects: shifts in international 
consensus congruent with developing country preferences may occur for reasons other 
than developing country influence. Controlling for this possibility requires paying 
attention to other explanations and to possible evidence for these explanations in the 
empirical material revealed by process-tracing. For this reason, in both parts of my case 
study below I include evaluation of possible alternative explanations in my assessment of 
the impacts of my independent variables on Southern success in influencing the direction 
of norm change. 
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4 Operation alization of independent variables 
Testing my hypotheses requires the operationalization of three independent 
variables that may influence the ability of developing countries to shape the direction of 
international norm change: the extent to which international institutions facilitate the 
participation of developing countries in decision-making, the ideological coherence of the 
Southern diplomacy on issues of sovereignty and intervention, and Northern capabilities 
and attitudes towards multilateralism. Below I summarize how each of these three factors 
is defined in Krasner's theory of international regime change, how they will be defined 
for the purposes of my case study, and how they will be measured. 
4.1 Participation of developing countries in decision-making in international 
institutions 
This variable measures the extent to which international institutions grant 
developing countries access to and participation in decision-making processes. With 
regard to the North-South conflict in the 1970s and 1980s, Krasner argues that 
developing states were more successful in pushing for international regime change 
through institutional arrangements that were based on principles of universal membership 
and sovereign equality, and whose decision-making procedures operated on the basis of 
"one state, one vote." Thus the Third World bloc was successful in using institutions such 
as the UN General Assembly or the UN Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD) to promote the norms and principles of New International Economic Order, 
but was less succesful in institutions functioning according to other principles (such as 
great power primacy in the UN Security Council) or other decision-making procedures 
(such as weighted voting in the Bretton Woods institutions). 
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For the purpose of my case study, the key international institutions to be 
examined are the UN Security Council and the General Assembly. The Security Council, 
with primary authority under the Charter for maintaining international peace and security, 
has been the key venue for debates over military intervention in humanitarian crises. 
Since the easing of East-West conflict in the mid-to-late 1980s, the Council has 
increasingly become involved in internal wars and has authorized the use of force in such 
situations On numerous occasions by expanding the definition of threats to "international 
peace and security." In cases of interventions not explicitly authorized by the Council— 
such as Anglo-American intervention in Iraq throughout the 1990s and in 2003, NATO 
intervention in Kosovo, or the more recent Russian intervention in Georgia—the Council 
has been the key venue of debate between those in favour and those opposed to these 
interventions. In addition, the Council has considered in its various thematic debates 
broader questions of principle related to the enforcement of international humanitarian 
law, the definition of international peace and security, and the protection of civilians in 
armed conflict. The Security Council has thus been an important venue for the 
development of norms concerning sovereignty and intervention. 
Unlike the General Assembly, the Security Council functions according to the 
principle of great-power primacy, with the five permanent members possessing the power 
to veto any resolutions supported by any number of its other members. In theory, as 
David Malone notes, the guaranteed presence of seven non-permanent members from the 
global South (three from Africa, two from Asia and two from Latin America) and the 
requirement that Council resolutions be passed by at least nine of fifteen affirmative 
votes, gives the global South a potential "seventh veto" that could allow developing 
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countries to block resolutions favoured by the permanent members. In practice, this has 
never happened, and it is even less likely in the post-Cold War period. As we shall see in 
the next section, this is not so much because of a lack of cohesion among developing 
countries in voting practices in the Council (cohesion has actually been remarkably high 
since the 1980s) but because of increased voting cohesion between developing countries 
and the permanent five. Moreover, increased cohesion among the permanent five has 
meant that developing countries have lost the ability to play off permanent members 
against each other.' 
Besides the Security Council, the General Assembly has been the main venue for 
debate over "humanitarian intervention" and the "responsibility to protect," from the 
debate that occurred following NATO's intervention in Kosovo in 1999, through the 
2005 World Summit. Here the "one state, one vote" decision-making procedures, as well 
as the tendency in the post-Cold War period to seek consensus on Assembly resolutions, 
has given developing countries the potential to exert far greater leverage, at least to the 
degree that they present a coherent diplomatic front (see below). Conscious of this, 
developing countries have been among the strongest supporters of plans to "revitalize" 
the Genera] Assembly in recent years, and have protested loudly against the perceived 
"encroachment" of the Security Council on the prerogatives of the Assembly, including 
the promotion of international norms and the codification of international law. In addition 
to the full Assembly, several Assembly committees—particularly the third (Social, 
Cultural, and Humanitarian), fourth (Special Political and Decolonization), fifth 
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(Administrative and Budgetary) and sixth (Legal)—have played a significant role in the 
debates on "humanitarian intervention" and the evolution of the "responsibility to 
protect." All of these committees, like the Assembly itself, have universal membership 
and equal voting. 
For the purposes of the case study, participation of developing countries in 
decision-making in international institutions will thus be an essentially dichotomous 
variable, distinguishing between those international institutions that encourage such 
participation by their membership rules and voting procedures (e.g. the General 
Assembly) and those that do not (e.g. the Security Council). 
4.2 Ideological coherence of the Southern diplomacy 
This variable measures the extent to which developing states have articulated a 
cohesive ideological position on issues regarding intervention and sovereignty as a basis 
for a united diplomatic front in international forums. In the case of the North-South 
conflict of the 1970s, Krasner argues that Southern ideological coherence was provided 
primarily by a common adherence to economic theories (the structuralism of Raul 
Prebisch and the dependencia school) which attributed Third World underdevelopment 
primarily to international causes—unequal exchange, declining terms of trade—rather 
than to national policies. Within the main multilateral organization of the global South 
concerned with economic affairs—the Group of 77—these theories were molded into a 
coherent ideology justifying collective demands for international structural change.101 
This ideology then provided a basis for common diplomatic action and allowed 
The most detailed analysis of the emergence of this ideology is Craig Murphy. The Emergence 
of the NIEO Ideology (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press. 1984). 
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developing countries, acting collectively through the G77, to coordinate their demands 
across issue areas and to present a common front in negotiations with the North, which 
they did more often than not throughout the 1970s and early 1980s. Even more 
fundamentally, Krasner argues, this ideology provided the very basis for the idea of the 
"Third World" itself, by providing an image of a shared history and common future that 
helped bridge differences of history, economic position, and culture. 
Since the 1970s, the "Third Worldist" ideology that underpinned the demands of 
the NEIO has gone into dramatic decline.104 This decline has been driven in part by 
economic developments, especially the increasing economic differentiation within the 
"Third World" between the rising East Asian Newly Industrialized Countries (NICs) on 
the one hand, and sub-Saharan Africa, caught in a protracted debt crisis and economic 
stagnation, on the other. Such significant economic polarization within the "Third World" 
itself has called into question the continued viability not only of a single ideological 
framework to address the experiences and needs of a variety of different countries, but 
also of the very terminology used to describe them. The continued use of the term "Third 
World" has been criticized as analytically misleading,105 and the continued use of "North-
South" terminology in the context of the United Nations has been seen as being of little 
relevance to the actual interests of and conflicts between UN Member States.106 In the 
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wake of the end of the Cold War confrontation between the superpowers, one of the main 
ideological planks of the Third World bloc—"non-alignment"—seems to have lost its 
raison d'etre, and its main institutional platform is sometimes seen as an anachronism. 
Without diminishing the significance of these momentous changes or of the 
diversity of the contemporary global South, there are several good reasons to retain some 
collective term of reference for states of the former "Third World." As Vicky Randall has 
argued, while the term "Third World" may have lost much of its analytical usefulness for 
the purpose of the study of comparative politics, it remains useful for geopolitical 
analysis to describe the major axes of economic and political inequality in the 
international system.108 Not only is international economic inequality thought to have 
increased since the 1980s, it remains the case that the majority of poor people live in 
countries of the former Third World.' Moreover, looking at the international 
institutions in which significant decisions regarding the management of the global 
economy have been made since the end of the Cold War (the Bretton Woods Institutions, 
the Group 7/8 advanced industrial powers), the political marginalization of most states of 
the "global South" in economic decision-making is evident (though this may be changing 
with recent emergence of the G20). Thus, far from being irrelevant, some terminology to 
describe the relations between "North" and "South"—properly reconfigured to take into 
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account both the rise of the NICs and the peripheralization of parts of the former "Second 
World"—remains necessary.110 
For the purpose of my case study, it is worth retaining some collective designation 
for the "global South" for two additional reasons. The first is that, taken collectively, 
states in the global South have been and continue to be the most likely to experience the 
kinds of conflicts and humanitarian crises that lead to calls for "humanitarian 
intervention" or the invocation of the "responsibility to protect." In both the Cold War 
and post-Cold War periods, conflicts in the global South (both inter-state and intra-state) 
have vastly outnumbered those in the developed North. Whether one attributes this fact to 
poverty and underdevelopment generally1" or to the specific security predicaments of 
states undertaking "state-making" in the context of weak state-society relations and an 
unfavourable international environment,112 the fact is that, as the primary sites of conflict-
related human rights and humanitarian crises, developing countries are also the primary 
potential targets of practices of armed intervention to protect vulnerable populations. 
Most of the internal wars since the 1980s that have provided the focus for debates on 
"humanitarian intervention" have been in the former "Third Word." (The important 
exception, perhaps, is Yugoslavia, but even here it has been argued that the post-Cold 
War Balkans are best understood as a part of an expanded post-Cold War "Third World" 
For an argument along these lines see Caroline Thomas, "Where is the Third World Now?" 
Review of International Studies 25, no. 5 (1999): 225-244. 
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in that the region faces some of the same dynamics of conflict linked to economic 
vulnerability and ethno-nationalism seen as typical of the traditional "Third World"."3) 
The second, related reason why it is worth retaining a collective designation for 
developing countries is that, while they remain the likeliest targets for military 
"humanitarian intervention," states in the global South are also the least likely to be the 
agents of such interventions. As discussed above, coercive military interventions in 
conflict situations, whether authorized by the UN Security Council or not, have been 
conducted mostly by militaries from Northern states. An exception to this is military 
intervention by regional hegemons or regional organizations in the global South itself, 
e.g. Nigerian-led interventions by the Economic Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS) in Liberia and Sierra Leone in the 1990s, on which more below. 
There wee. prima facie good reasons, then, for using a collective designation to 
describe those states most likely to be targets, and least likely to be agents, of 
"humanitarian intervention." Whether this objective condition has translated in practice 
into an collective inter subjective understanding and a coherent ideological position 
regarding intervention among developing countries is another issue. During the Cold 
War, a principled stand on intervention was central to the ideology of Third World "non-
alignment," which opposed in principle intervention by the superpowers or former 
colonial powers in developing countries (though attitudes on particular interventions 
differed). The 1955 Afro-Asian conference in Bandung, Indonesia codified "abstention 
from intervention or interference in the internal affairs of another country" among its key 
founding principles. Since its founding in 1961, the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) has 
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repeatedly reaffirmed the principle of non-intervention. TheNAM's 1964 Cairo 
Declaration, for example, declared that "interference by economically developed foreign 
States in the internal affairs of newly independent, developing countries" constituted a 
"standing threat to peace and security." On the specific issue of "humanitarian 
intervention," the Third World during the Cold War showed some degree of consensus in 
rejecting its legitimacy: in two Cold War cases frequently cited as examples of 
"humanitarian intervention" (East Pakistan and Cambodia), the non-aligned states were 
generally united in their criticism of these interventions as contrary to the non-
intervention norm. 
In the post-Cold War period, several Southern states have sought to keep alive the 
ideology of non-alignment and its condemnation of all interventionism as an imperialist 
practice. This has particularly been the case with those countries that have faced frequent 
covert or overt intervention by the US such as Cuba, Iraq, Iran, and Sudan. Other states 
(including Algeria, Malaysia, Indonesia and India) that have sought to avoid direct 
confrontation with the US, have continued to voice concerns over the growing 
interventionism of the North and of the UN Security Council. This perspective has been 
reflected in the post-Cold War statements of the NAM. For example, theNAM's 1995 
summit in Cartagena, Colombia produced a pledge by the assembled states to oppose 
"new interventionist trends" and to defend the principles of sovereign equality and non-
Non-Aligned Movement, Program for Peace and International Cooperation: Final 
Declaration of the Second Summit of the Non-Aligned Movement (10 October 1964, Cairo). 3. 
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intervention "which some are now trying to disregard."116 Nonetheless, the willingness of 
developing states on the Security Council to vote for resolutions authorizing enforcement 
measures in internal conflicts in Somalia, Bosnia and (belatedly) Rwanda strongly 
suggests that Southern opposition to "interventionism," at least when authorized by the 
UN, has not been total. Moreover, among African states in particular, the failure of the 
UN or the great powers to intervene in a timely manner to prevent the Rwandan genocide 
has provided a strong impetus for rethinking the traditional defence of absolute non-
intervention in favour of a move towards a regional norm of "non-indifference" and the 
establishment of an (admittedly embryonic) mechanisms for regional intervention against 
massive human rights abuses."7 This parallel ideological development, and its interaction 
with the older anti-interventionism of the NAM, will play an important part in my case 
study. 
For my case study, I will seek to measure Southern ideological coherence on 
matters concerning intervention by closely surveying Southern reactions to individual 
interventions or proposed interventions, as well as looking at more general statements by 
developing countries and their multilateral organizations concerning "humanitarian 
intervention," the "responsibility to protect" and their implications for sovereignty. This 
is an admittedly inexact method of measurement, and faces the same problems as the 
attempt to measure norms. Statements made by statesmen can always be strategic rather 
than principled, though for the purpose of my analysis this is not a fatal problem: as the 
question 1 am concerned with is the effect of Southern ideological coherence on the 
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ability of developing countries to influence the direction of norm change, the motivations 
for particular statements (whether strategic or principled) are not particularly significant. 
If states choose to align themselves with a collective Southern position for the strategic 
purpose of exercising leverage in inter-state discussions, this in itself is highly significant. 
4.3 Northern capabilities and attitudes 
This variable measures both the capabilities of Northern states and their attitudes 
towards multilateralism. In Krasner's account of North-South conflict, "Northern 
capabilities" refers to the relative power of developed states, and especially the United 
States, vis-a-vis the global South and the Soviet bloc. Writing in the mid 1980s, Krasner 
saw the US as a declining hegemon, both in terms of its military power—declining since 
the mid-1970s relative to the USSR—and in terms of economic power—declining 
relative to its nearest competitors among the advanced industrialized capitalist states.118 
By "Northern attitudes" Krasner refers in particular to US commitments to multilateral 
action through international institutions. Krasner argues that while the US had supported 
multilateral mechanisms while it could exert preponderant influence on them in the 
immediate postwar period, its commitment to them began to erode as decolonization 
brought larger numbers of Third World states into international institutions, and as these 
states increasingly sought to shape the agendas of these institutions in a manner harmful 
to US interests. Krasner thus argues that the early to mid 1970s provided developing 
countries with a window of opportunity for their attempt at international regime change, 
with US hegemony in relative decline while the US remained committed to working 
through international institutions which it no longer controlled. By the later 1970s, 
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however, and especially under the Reagan administration in the early 1980s, this 
commitment seriously declined. Taking as his examples the US's withdrawal from the 
International Labor Organization in 1977 and from UNESCO in 1985, its refusal to 
participate in the International Court of Justice case over Nicaragua, and the rejection by 
a number of Northern states of the UN Convention on the Law of the Seas in 1982, 
Krasner argues that the US and the North more broadly were increasingly turning away 
from multilateral venues, leaving Southern proposals for international regime change 
still-bom.119 The end point of Northern withdrawal from multilateral processes, Krasner 
believed, would be an overall decline in interdependence between North and South and a 
greater resort to collective self-reliance on the part of both. 
Many of Krasner s expectations have, of course, proven mistaken. Most 
importantly, the expectation of US hegemonic decline, widely shared in the late 1970s 
and early 1980s, proved to be widely off the mark. The end of the East-West conflict and 
the subsequent demise of the Soviet Union left the US as the sole superpower, replacing a 
bipolar international system with a unipolar one. While the stability and durability of 
unipolarity has been debated by IR scholars,120 there has been little doubting US primacy 
in most dimensions of power. While US economic hegemony may have declined in 
relative terms with the rise of the European Union, Japan and China, in terms of military 
power, the US in the post-Cold War period has remained supreme, maintaining by far the 
largest military budget in the world since the 1980s. Continued high-levels of investment 
in military technology and a global projection capability and basing structure have 
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arguably given the US virtually uncontested "command of the commons" on land and 
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sea, in the air and in space. More broadly, as Krasner would have predicted, the 
balance of economic and military power between the North and South has remained 
largely unbridged, despite the notable development achievements by a number of Newly 
Industralized Countries, a number of which (notably China) have sizeable military 
capabilities and regional projection capabilities. 
For our purposes the Northern capabilities that are most significant are those 
directly related to the capacity to conduct armed "humanitarian intervention," especially 
the ability to rapidly project military force. In this respect, the US remains unrivalled at a 
global level, though other actors (Russia, the European Union, China) maintain varying 
projection capabilities on a regional level. These capabilities can be used either 
unilaterally or multilaterally, and with or without UN authorization. In the context of UN 
mandated military interventions, Northern involvement in these has generally proceeded 
on the basis of "subcontracting," or military missions with UN authorization but not 
under UN command and control. This has been the case particularly in enforcement 
missions (the 1991 Gulf War) but also in peacekeeping missions (such the US-led 
operations in Somalia and Haiti in the 1990s, the French-led Operation Turquoise in 
Rwanda). This is not to say that only Northern military capabilities are important. Indeed, 
several developments should draw our attention to the emerging capabilities within the 
global South itself. First, as Northern military participation in UN peacekeeping as a 
whole has declined since the Bosnian war, a larger proportion of peacekeeping troops has 
come from countries in the global South, meaning that troops from the global South may 
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increasingly be involved in coercive civilian protection as such protection becomes 
integrated into the mandates of UN peacekeeping missions. In additional, regional 
initiatives in the global South are highly significant, particularly ECOWAS's intervention 
in the civil wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone in the 1990s and, potentially, the African 
Union's emerging peace and security architecture which sanctions collective 
"humanitarian intervention" under article 4(h) of the AU's Constitutive Act. 
Despite these important developments, however, there are several reasons why 
our focus should remain on the military capabilities of the North. First, while Southern 
troops in UN peacekeeping operations have been deployed with increasingly "robust" 
mandates that involve civilian protection duties, it is important to distinguish between 
"robust" UN peacekeeping on the one hand and armed "humanitarian intervention" on 
the other. The latter, by most definitions, involves military intervention within a state 
without the consent of that state. While it is true that modern UN peace operations have 
increasingly taken place in environments in which consent is uncertain or manipulated by 
parties to the conflict, the importance of the overall consent of the host state for a 
peacekeeping deployment remains crucial. As a rule, the Security Council has been 
extremely reluctant to authorize the deployment of a peacekeeping mission without the 
consent of the target state. Possibly the only example so far is Somalia, but this one is 
ambiguous as there existed no effective government to provide consent. 
A second reason to focus on Northern capabilities is that, even if troops from the 
South are increasingly deployed in internal conflicts through the UN or through regional 
efforts, in instances in which robust use of force for civilian protection has been deployed 
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it has generally been delegated to an individual country or group of countries from the 
global North (e.g. the US-led UNITAF mission in Somalia, French-led Operation 
Turquoise in post-genocide Rwanda, British Operation Paliser in Sierra Leone in 2000, 
the European Union's Operation Artemis in Ituri). The reasons for this are that Northern 
countries uniquely enjoy the military and economic capabilities necessary to mount 
prolonged military interventions in internal conflicts. In 2000, the UN Panel on Peace 
Operations argued that "while the United Nations has acquired considerable expertise in 
planning, mounting and executing traditional peacekeeping operations, it has yet to 
acquire the capacity to deploy more complex operations rapidly and to sustain them 
effectively," and concluded that "the UN does not wage war. Where enforcement action 
is required it has consistently been entrusted to coalitions of willing states with the 
authorization of the Security Council." In practice, this has meant primarily UN 
authorization for Western states, led by the US, to take military action in the name of the 
international community. As Thomas Weiss argues, US "airlift capacity, military muscle, 
and technology" will likely remain a requirement for larger and longer deployments in 
the foreseeable future.124 
For the purposes of this study, we may take Northern capabilities as more or less 
constant. To be sure, the US's military engagements in Afghanistan and Iraq have 
"distracted" the remaining superpower, drawing substantial manpower and funding, and 
making it less likely that the US will intervene in cases where it does not perceive its vital 
interests to be at stake.1 5 Nonetheless, in Krasner's terms, this is more a question of 
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"attitudes" than "capabilities": proponents of "humanitarian intervention" have argued 
that such intervention is in the vital national interest of Northern states because of the 
destabilizing effects of humanitarian crises.126 Were such an attitude to prevail in 
Washington and other Northern capitals, there is little reason to doubt that the capabilities 
could be found to act, and if they were, there would be little to stop them militarily. 
Taking Northern capabilities as constant then, the more significant variable for 
our case is Northern "attitudes." As we have seen Krasner defined Northern attitudes in 
terms of the commitment of Northern states, and especially the US, to multilateral action 
through international institutions. For our purposes, the focus will be on Northern 
commitments to existing multilateral mechanisms for authorizing and/or legitimating 
military intervention. In practice, this means the UN Security Council, which, as we saw 
above, is widely recognized as having the "primary responsibility for the maintenance of 
international peace and security" and as being the only body with the legal authority to 
authorize the non-defensive use of force. Northern attitudes towards Security Council 
authorization of the use offeree have not been uniform in the post-Cold War period. The 
attitude of the US in particular has been one of ambivalence, characterized by a sense of 
"exceptionalism" that is characteristic of its broader relationship with international 
institutions and international law.127 According to Edward Luck, "exceptionalism" has 
four central characteristics: 
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-a willingness to "go it alone" when it suits ones interests, and an apparent 
immunity to the criticism of other states 
-an assumption about the universal validity and morality of one's values and 
practices 
-an inward-looking orientation that gives primary consideration to domestic 
political considerations when deciding international behaviour 
-a belief that action through multilateral institutions is only an option rather than 
an obligation.128 
On the issues of military intervention and sovereignty, the US has exhibited these 
characteristics on numerous occasions in the post-Cold War period, evincing a 
willingness to use force unilaterally without the sanction of the UN Security Council, as 
it did in Panama in 1989, in Iraq during the 1990s and in 2003, against Sudan and 
Afghanistan in 1998. In certain circumstances, the US has preferred "narrow 
multilateralism" in acting through NATO and has, as we shall see in the next chapters, 
sought to reserve a role for NATO to act militarily outside the structures of the UN. 
The US's "exceptionalist" approach to the use of force—adopting multilateral 
actions when it suits US interests, "going it alone" when it doesn't—has been contrasted 
with the more "genuine" multilateralism of its principal Western allies like the United 
Kingdom, France and Canada. These countries, according to David Malone, "view 
multilateralism as an important goal in itself." With regard to military intervention, 
however, this judgement has to be seriously qualified, particularly in the case of the post-
Cold War UK, which was alone among NATO allies in joining the US in its unilateral 
strikes on Iraq in the late 1990s (France had earlier participated in patrolling the Iraqi "no 
fly" zones but withdrew in 1996) and its invasion of that country 2003. Along with the 
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rest of NATO, the UK, France, and Canada joined the US in the unauthorized use of 
force against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 1999—not a "unilateral" use of force 
in the strict sense, but in-line with the US's goal of making NATO more autonomous 
from the UN. However, in all cases, it is fair to say that NATO countries participating in 
unauthorized interventions have followed the lead of the United States; there have been 
no unilateral interventions by the US's NATO allies on their own initiative. 
But "Northern attitudes" in my case study refers not only to the willingness to use 
force unilaterally, but also to a broader commitment to multilateral mechanisms in the 
legitimation of interventions and the promotion of new doctrines and norms, as opposed 
to a preference for unilateral policies or narrower, North-only mechanisms such as 
NATO. In this respect, US allies like Canada have remained more committed to 
multilateral actions through the UN. As we shall see, this is particularly important in the 
case of "humanitarian intervention" as it was this commitment that ensured that Canada 
and other Northern countries sought to bring the issue of intervention back into the UN 
system following Kosovo. Measuring Northern attitudes thus involves analyzing both 
military actions—specifically the willingness of Northern states to disregard Security 
Council authorization and to resort to unilateral or "narrow multilateral" military 
action—and diplomatic actions—specifically the willingness of Northern states to 
promote new ideas and norms through universal multilateral forums like the UN. 
5 Structure of the case study 
In the case study of international debates over "humanitarian intervention" and 
the "responsibility to protect" which follows, I structure my analysis around the four 
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variables discussed above, dividing each section of the case study into separate 
assessments of each, followed by an assessment of the degree to which the area of 
international consensus at the end of the period in question reflects the stated positions of 
developing countries. As the key "norm entrepreneurs" promoting both "humanitarian 
intervention" and the "responsibility to protect" have been mostly (though not 
exclusively) Northern states, I begin each section of the case study by observing and 
measuring Northern attitudes. Specifically 1 try to measure the degree to which Northern 
states in a given period of time were committed to multilateral mechanisms or were 
willing to look beyond such mechanisms to unilateral or "narrow multilateral" 
alternatives. As mentioned above, this refers not only to a willingness on the part of 
Northern states to abide by UN mechanisms governing the use of force, but also to the 
degree to which Northern states remained committed to using multilateral forums to 
promote new concepts and norms. I follow this with a discussion of the ideological 
coherence of Southern diplomacy, trying to measure the degree to which Southern states 
in a given period of time were able to put forward a coherent collective position on the 
question of intervention and state sovereignty. As we shall see in the case study, by 
"collective position" I do not mean a unanimously held common ideology as such, but 
rather a collectively espoused compromise position which successfully reconciled (or at 
least papered over) inevitable differences for the sake of collective bargaining. Third, I 
discuss the institutional environment in which these positions of both Northern and 
Southern states were put forward and debated. Here I measure to extent to which these 
environments facilitated the participation of developing countries in decision-making 
processes based on their membership rules and decision-making procedures. 
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Having measured the three independent variables, I then seek to measure the 
success of developing countries in influencing the direction of change in international 
norms of sovereignty and intervention by analyzing the shifting areas of consensus and 
contestation over the question of intervention. In particular, I look at successive 
articulations of the concept of the "responsibility to protect," evaluate the implications of 
these articulations for the key norms of sovereignty (non-intervention, non-use of force, 
and sovereign equality), and assess the degree to which they resemble or depart from the 
expressed positions of developing countries. Finally, I evaluate the degree to which the 
evidence supports alternative explanations. 
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Chapter 3: Case Study - Part One, 1999-2001 
This first part of my case study discusses the international debate around 
"humanitarian intervention" from the NATO intervention in Kosovo in the spring and 
summer of 1999 to the publication of The Responsibility to Protect, the report of the 
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), in December 
2001. NATO's military intervention in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) over 
the conflict in its southern province of Kosovo in March-June 1999 has been frequently 
cited as a key turning point in the emergence of post-Cold War doctrines of 
"humanitarian intervention." While previous Northern military interventions in internal 
conflicts during the 1990s (with the exception of northern Iraq in 1991) had been 
conducted with the explicit legal authorization of the Security Council, NATO's war in 
Kosovo, in contrast, was not authorized by the Council. While the Council found that the 
conflict in Kosovo between the FRY and the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) constituted 
a "threat to peace and security" and demanded, under Chapter VII, an immediate 
cessation of hostilities,130 opposition to the use of force and the threat of veto by two 
permanent members (Russia and China) guaranteed that no resolution authorizing NATO 
to use force could be passed. NATO's decision to intervene anyway, and to justify its 
intervention in large part by reference to the "humanitarian emergency" caused by the 
violence in Kosovo, spurred a intense debate among member states of the United Nations 
on what then-UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan called "the dilemma of intervention": 
the apparent contradiction between the humanitarian imperative to rescue vulnerable 
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populations from massive human rights abuse, and the need to uphold an international 
order founded on legal norms of sovereignty, non-intervention, and the non-use of 
force.131 
In what follows I survey Northern attitudes and the ideological coherence of 
Southern diplomacy in the debate over "humanitarian intervention" between 1999 and 
2001 and the institutional environment in which the debate took place. I then seek to 
assess the impact of these factors on the ability of developing countries to influence the 
direction of norm change, specifically, in this case, to influence the evolution (or non-
evolution) of the central norms of sovereignty (non-intervention, non-use of force, and 
sovereign equality). I conclude that, in this part of my case study, my three working 
hypotheses are largely confirmed by the case material: 
-First, while Northern states promoting "humanitarian intervention" were willing 
to resort to force in Kosovo without Security Council authorization, and thus to seriously 
challenge existing norms of non-intervention, non-use of force and sovereign equality, 
these same states still sought to work through the multilateral mechanisms of the UN in 
order to reform the norms of sovereignty in a way that would legitimate their actions. 
This required them to engage with the views of developing countries in a way that would 
not have been necessary had they been content to commit to narrower, non-UN 
mechanisms, with the result that Southern states were able to decisively shape the 
subsequent debate. 
-Second, as the coherence of Southern diplomacy increased, so too did the ability 
of developing states to resist the radical norm change proposed by proponents of 
1,1
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"humanitarian intervention." This can be seen by comparing the initial split within the 
global South over the Kosovo war with its later consensus in rejecting the "right" of 
unauthorized "humanitarian intervention." While the initial Southern split over the 
Kosovo war allowed NATO to secure the appearance of legitimacy for unilateral 
"humanitarian intervention" within the Security Council (in the form of the rejection of a 
Russian-sponsored resolution condemning the intervention), the subsequent coherence of 
the Southern diplomacy in the General Assembly dispelled any possibility of legitimating 
a new norm of unauthorized "humanitarian intervention." 
-Finally, in institutional environments which facilitated the participation of 
developing countries in decision-making processes (i.e. the General Assembly), 
developing countries were largely able to defuse the radical challenge posed by 
"humanitarian intervention" and reaffirm the central norms of the postcolonial 
sovereignty regime. This encouraged Northern proponents of "humanitarian intervention" 
to seek alternative, non-government institutional settings—an independent international 
commission—in which participation by Southern states was only indirect. As I 
demonstrate through an analysis of the report of the ICISS, the ideas that emerged from 
this alternative institutional setting posed a greater challenge to postcolonial sovereignty 
norms than those affirmed by the General Assembly. 
1 Northern attitudes 
In this section 1 survey Northern attitudes concerning "humanitarian 
intervention" in the Kosovo case and in subsequent debates within the UN. 1 show how 
the position staked out by several Northern states during and after the Kosovo 
74 
intervention had potentially revolutionary implications for the three key norms of the 
postcolonial sovereignty regime: non-intervention, non-use of force and sovereign 
equality. With regard to non-intervention, Northern states reaffirmed the developments 
since the end of the Cold War which shrank the scope of the non-intervention rule by 
expanding the Security Council's definition of threats to international peace and security, 
but also sought to carve out a new exception to both the non-intervention norm and the 
norm prohibiting the use of force. This new exception would allow states, in limited 
circumstances, to intervene in cases of "humanitarian emergency" even without Security 
Council authorization. The effect of such an exception, had it been accepted by the 
broader membership of the UN, would have been to significantly alter not only the norms 
of non-intervention and non-use of force, but also that of sovereign equality, reinforcing 
the special rights of a select (and self-selecting) group of states to use force against states 
defined in advance as "rogues" or "outlaws." The Kosovo war can thus be seen as an 
attempt by certain Northern states to promote radical norm change. 
Despite their willingness to resort to unilateral force, however, a number of 
Northern states promoting this change in international norms of sovereignty and 
intervention remained committed to working through the universal multilateral 
mechanisms of the UN, and unwilling to commit to the assertion of new prerogatives for 
the narrower, North-only mechanisms of NATO. As a result, they sought to work through 
the UN to legitimate new practices of intervention, ensuring that they would have to 
engage with the opinions of Southern states. 
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1.1 Unauthorized "humanitarian intervention "from Iraq to Kosovo 
Throughout the 1990s, Northern states on the UN Security Council were key 
proponents of the Council's expansion of the definition of threats to international peace 
and security to include phenomena related to internal conflicts and humanitarian crises. 
This expansion then served as the basis for the increased (if highly selective) 
authorization by the Council of enforcement measures in the context of such conflicts and 
crises, from Somalia in 1992132 to East Timor in 1999.133 In addition, in at least two 
cases, a small number of Northern states made claims for the legitimacy of military 
intervention in situations of "humanitarian necessity" even without explicit Security 
Council authorization. This took place first in the context of US, UK and (for a time) 
French military actions in Iraq following the end of the 1991 Gulf War, and later in the 
context of the 1999 NATO intervention in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) 
over the war in Kosovo. 
While the Iraqi case is beyond the chronological scope of this case-study, it 
deserves a brief discussion, as it served as an early testing ground for some of the claims 
regarding unauthorized "humanitarian intervention" later marshalled by Northern states 
in the case of Kosovo. In the Iraqi case, such claims were first made in the spring of 1991 
in the aftermath of the Gulf War when repression of a Kurdish uprising in northern Iraq 
by the Saddam Hussein regime sparked a refugee and humanitarian crisis, leading to 
pressure from neighbouring states and Western publics for international action to assist 
displaced Kurds. In early April, then French Foreign Minister Roland Dumas publicly 
called for altering the UN Charter to include a "duty of intervention" (devoir 
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d'ingerence) by the international community in cases of massive human rights abuse. The 
only specific actions which Dumas called for, however, were diplomatic and 
humanitarian, not military.134 On 5 April 1991, the UN Security Council passed 
Resolution 688 (drafted by Belgium and France, and cosponsored by the US and UK), 
demanding that the Iraqi government immediately end repression of the Kurds and "allow 
immediate access by international humanitarian organizations to all those in need of 
assistance in all parts of Iraq," and requesting that all member states "contribute to ~ 
humanitarian relief efforts" in the country. While the resolution deemed the Kurdish 
refugee crisis to be a threat to international peace and security, it did not refer to Chapter 
VII or authorize enforcement measures, and it explicitly invoked Article 2(7) on non-
intervention.1 The passing of Resolution 688 was followed by the unilateral declaration 
by the US of a "no-fly zone" for Iraqi aircraft north of the 36th parallel and by the 
deployment in late April of Western ground forces inside Iraq to protect refugee "safe 
havens" ("Operation Provide Comfort"). Western ground forces remained in northern 
Iraq until July 1991. After that, US, British and French aircraft continued to patrol the 
northern "no-fly zone"—as well as a second "no-fly zone" in the south of the country 
declared in August 1992—and to conduct extensive air strikes targeting Iraqi radar and 
command and control centers.136 
Neither the deployment of ground forces as part of "Operation Provide Comfort" 
nor the enforcement of the no-fly zones was explicitly authorized by the Security 
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Council, leading many observers to consider this an early case of unilateral 
"humanitarian intervention."137 The intervention initially met with the acquiescence of 
most members of the Security Council.138 As US and UK airstrikes continued throughout 
the 1990s, however, this initial acquiescence dissipated: France withdrew participation in 
the northern and southern no-fly zones in 1996 and 1998 respectively; after the mid-
1990s the Security Council became increasingly polarized over continued Anglo-
American unilateralism.139 In the face of growing criticism, the UK in particular sought 
to justify the continued bombing on humanitarian grounds. (The US, in contrast, provided 
little detailed justification for its use of force beyond vague references to previous 
Security Council resolutions and self-defence.14 ) In 1992, the UK government for the 
first time explicitly argued that the US and UK's use of force in Iraq was conducted (in 
the words of the Legal Counsel of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office [FCO]) "in 
exercise of the customary international law principle of humanitarian intervention," 
and that "international intervention without the invitation of the country concerned can be 
justified in cases of extreme humanitarian need."14 The UK government also presented 
on several occasion in the 1990s and early 2000s a set of criteria according to which it 
believed "humanitarian intervention" could be justified. The 1992 version of the criteria 
argued that "humanitarian intervention," in order to be legal, had to be in response to an 
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urgent situation of extreme humanitarian crisis demanding immediate relief; had to be in 
a state that was unwilling or unable to address the crisis; had to be the only possible 
course of action; and had to be "limited in time and scope." I43 While these criteria 
changed somewhat in successive iterations, all versions notably omitted Security Council 
authorization as a prerequisite for intervention. 
The UK repeated both its claim to a legal right of unilateral "humanitarian 
intervention" and its proposed criteria in the case of Kosovo. In October 1998, when 
NATO issued its first "activation order" authorizing airstrikes against the FRY if the 
Milosevic regime failed to comply with Security Council resolutions demanding the 
withdrawal of FRY forces from Kosovo, the FCO circulated a note to NATO members 
outlining its views on the legality of the unilateral use of force in Kosovo. Noting that the 
authorization of force for humanitarian reasons by the Security Council was now widely 
accepted, the FCO argued that "force can also be justified on the grounds of 
overwhelming humanitarian necessity without a UNSCR [UN Security Council 
Resolution]" provided several criteria were fulfilled: there had to be "convincing 
evidence, generally accepted by the international community as a whole, of extreme 
humanitarian distress on a large scale, requiring immediate and urgent relief; it had to 
"objectively clear that there is no practicable alternative to the use of force if lives are to 
be saved"; and the proposed use of force had to be "necessary and proportionate to the 
aim" of alleviating humanitarian need and "strictly limited in time and scope to this aim." 
The FCO considered that the first and second criteria were fulfilled in the case of Kosovo 
Ibid. 
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and that therefore "if action through the Security Council is not possible, military 
intervention by NATO is lawful on grounds of overwhelming humanitarian necessity."144 
This argument was repeated several months later by the UK delegate in the Security 
Council once NATO bombardment of the FRY was underway: 
Every means short offeree has been tried to avert this situation. In these 
circumstances, and as an exceptional measure on grounds of overwhelming 
humanitarian necessity, military intervention is legally justifiable. The force now 
proposed is directed exclusively to averting a humanitarian catastrophe, and is the 
minimum judged necessary for that purpose.145 
As numerous observers have noted, the UK was in the minority among NATO 
states in explicitly invoking a legal doctrine of unauthorized "humanitarian intervention" 
in the case of Kosovo.146 As Simon Chesterman has argued, most other NATO states— 
including the United States—apparently remained wary of invoking a legal doctrine of 
"humanitarian intervention." Instead they resorted to other kinds of legal arguments—e.g. 
arguing that previous Chapter VII Security Council resolutions provided implicit 
authorization for NATO actions—and supplemented these with less precise, moral 
arguments justifying the intervention in humanitarian terms.147 Thus, at the end of the 
first week of the airstrikes, US President Bill Clinton argued on American television that 
the purpose of NATO's resort to force was "to protect thousands of innocent people in 
Kosovo from a mounting military offensive" by the FRY forces. He explained that: 
We've seen innocent people taken from their homes, forced to kneel in the dirt, 
and sprayed with bullets; Kosovar men dragged from their families, fathers and 
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sons together, lined up and shot in cold blood. This is not a war in the traditional 
sense. It is an attack by tanks and artillery on a largely defenceless people... 
Ending this tragedy is a moral imperative.148 
Throughout the NATO air campaign, NATO countries on the Security Council 
(the US, UK, France, Canada, and the Netherlands) defended NATO's actions as 
necessary to avert a "humanitarian catastrophe" caused by FRY military actions in 
Kosovo. Military action, in the words of the US representative on the Council, was 
"necessary to respond to Belgrade's brutal persecution of Kosovar Albanians, violations 
of international law, excessive and indiscriminate use of force, refusal to negotiate to 
resolve the issue peacefully and recent military build-up in Kosovo — all of which 
foreshadow a humanitarian catastrophe of immense proportions."149 France argued that 
NATO action aimed "at putting an end to the intolerable actions of the authorities of the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, a policy of deportation that has made it necessary and 
legitimate to apply the severest measures, including military action." Canada argued 
that NATO was acting to prevent a "looming humanitarian disaster" and insisted that 
world could not "simply stand by while innocents are murdered, an entire population is 
displaced, villages are burned and looted, and a population is denied its basic rights."151 
The Netherlands argued that "the impending humanitarian catastrophe" caused by FRY 
military actions "could not be averted by peaceful means." While noting that NATO 
would have preferred to base its action on a specific Security Council resolution, the 
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Dutch delegate on the Council argued that "we cannot sit back and simply let the 
humanitarian catastrophe occur" just because such a resolution was prevented by "one or 
two permanent members' rigid interpretation of the concept of domestic jurisdiction." 
While the resort to moral rather than legal justifications is highly significant in 
terms of the development of international law (arguably foreclosing the possibility of the 
emergence of a new norm of unauthorized "humanitarian intervention" in customary 
international law), for our purposes these less legalistic justifications of the intervention 
remain significant. By refraining from explicitly invoking a legal doctrine of 
"humanitarian intervention," but arguing instead that the NATO intervention was 
justifiable on moral grounds, Northern states were in effect promoting a "softer" standard 
for the use of force which would have allowed a self-selected group of states to resort to 
force in exceptional circumstances to forestall a "humanitarian catastrophe," even if such 
resort to force could not be squared with existing international law because of the rigid 
interpretation of sovereignty by a number of permanent members of the Security 
Council.153 As the next section argues, this amounted to an important challenge to the 
core norms of the postcolonial sovereignty regime: non-intervention, non-use offeree 
and sovereign equality. 
1.2 Implications for the norms of the postcolonial sovereignty regime 
NATO claims regarding the legitimacy of unauthorized "humanitarian 
intervention" in Kosovo posed a potentially radical challenge to the core norms of the 
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postcolonial sovereignty regime. With regard to non-intervention, Northern states in 
Kosovo case reaffirmed the developments since the end of the Cold War which had 
diminished the scope of matters considered as part of domestic jurisdiction by expanding 
the Security Council's definition of threats to international peace and security. In 
justifying their intervention, NATO countries referred repeatedly to the previous Security 
Council resolutions which had found that the war in Kosovo, rather than being an internal 
affair of the FRY, constituted a "threat to peace and security in the region." China and 
Russia abstained from voting on these earlier resolutions and argued that the situation in 
Kosovo was a matter falling within the FRY's domestic jurisdiction, but a majority of the 
Council agreed that the situation was the legitimate concern of the Council. Besides 
arguing for the restricted scope of the non-intervention norm, however, NATO countries 
also sought to carve out a new exception to both the non-intervention norm and the norm 
prohibiting the use of force. This new exception would allow enforcement of Security 
Council demands, including, in cases of extreme humanitarian emergency, through the 
resort to force, by a group of states acting without explicit Security Council authorization. 
While NATO countries characterized their intervention in Kosovo as "exceptional," and 
several (e.g. Germany and Norway) argued expressly against making the NATO 
intervention a precedent for future unauthorized interventions,1 6 for others the invocation 
of the "exceptional" nature of the intervention did not foreclose the possibility that 
similar "exceptions" would arise in the future. Indeed, a number of NATO countries 
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argued explicitly for such a possibility. Denmark, for example, argued that unauthorized 
"humanitarian intervention" could not be foresworn entirely. After the war was over, 
Danish Foreign Minister Niels Helveg Petersen argued that the Kosovo war had 
demonstrated that, though the Security Council retained primary responsibility for 
maintenance of international peace and security, the "international community" could act 
against atrocities "even if the Security Council is blocked." "The challenge," Petersen 
insisted, was "to keep open the option of humanitarian intervention without Security 
Council authorization in extreme cases, but to do so without jeopardizing the 
international legal order."157 Speaking in the Commission on Human Rights in March 
2000, the Danish delegate argued that "If the Security Council was blocked, humanitarian 
intervention might be considered only in extreme cases, only as an 'emergency exit' from 
the norms of international law, and only if clearly justified by political and moral 
considerations in the case concerned."158 
The US and UK appear to have been particularly concerned to maintain NATO's 
future freedom of manoeuvre in the absence of Security Council authorization. Speaking 
at NATO's 50th Anniversary Summit in Washington D.C. in April 1999, US Deputy 
Secretary of State Strobe Talbott argued that NATO's engagement in the Balkans 
foreshadowed a new generation of "non-Article V" missions "beyond NATO 
territory."159 While arguing that "NATO's tasks and mission must always be consistent 
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with the purposes and principles of the UN" (i.e. with both Articles 2(4) and 2(7) of the 
Charter), he made clear that this did not mean that NATO required SC authorization to 
act where it felt necessary: 
we must be careful not to subordinate NATO to any other international body or 
compromise the integrity of its command structure. We will try to act in concert 
with other organizations, and with respect for their principles and purposes. But 
the alliance must reserve the right and the freedom to act when its members, by 
consensus, deem it necessary. 
The UK similarly argued that use offeree by NATO in future Kosovo-like situations 
constituted "collective action" even in the absence of Security Council authorization. 
Speaking in July 2000, the UK's Foreign Secretary Robin Cook argued that "any use of 
force [in humanitarian emergencies] should be collective" and "no individual country can 
reserve to itself the right to act on behalf of the international community," but also made 
clear that this did not foreclose the possibility of unauthorized use of force as long as it 
was conducted by a group of states like NATO. For Cook, the Kosovo intervention 
followed "a collective decision backed by the 19 members of NATO and unanimously by 
the 42 European nations which attended the Washington NATO Summit in April 1999." 
Rather than believing that NATO required Security Council authorization to use force in 
humanitarian emergencies, Cook described such authorization as "preferable."161 
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This attitude on the part of the UK and US amounted to a claim for the right of a 
select group of states to decide without reference to the Security Council when situations 
of "humanitarian necessity" warranted a military response. In addition to claiming a new 
exception to the norm of non-intervention beyond that contained in Article 2(7) of the 
Charter, and a new exception to the norm on the non-use of force beyond those allowing 
for collective action by the Security Council or self-defence, this claim also amounted to 
an attempt to restrict the norm sovereign equality by diminishing further both its 
legislative and existential elements. By moving the locus of decisions about the use of 
force from the Security Council, where states from all regions had the opportunity to 
participate, even if not on equal terms, to a self-selected group of Northern states, 
NATO's claimed right of intervention would have reinforced the "legalized hegemony" 
of the North by granting NATO a special right to resort to force.162 It would also have 
denied the existential equality of states deemed by NATO to be "rogues" or "outlaws," 
depriving them of the basic rights of territorial integrity and political independence. 
1.3 Continued commitment to multilateral processes 
While Northern states demonstrated in Kosovo a willingness to use force without 
Security Council authorization in cases they deemed to constitute sufficiently grave 
humanitarian crises, and while a number explicitly sought to challenge existing norms of 
sovereignty by reserving to NATO the right to resort to such use of force in future cases 
if necessary, it is important to note that a number of Northern states remained committed 
to the multilateral mechanisms of the UN and sought to reform these rather than 
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marginalize them. NATO countries like Germany argued that the evolution of practice of 
"humanitarian intervention" outside the framework of the UN would be highly 
problematic and could "open the door to the arbitrary use of power and anarchy and 
throw the world back to the nineteenth century."163 The solution was not to search for an 
alternative framework but "to further develop the existing United Nations system in such 
a way that in the future it is able to intervene in good time."164 
Canada, the Netherlands and Germany were among those actively promoting 
reform within the UN system so as to facilitate future international action in Kosovo-type 
situations. They argued that this could be achieved through a fundamental rethinking of 
one of the UN's foundational principles, that of state sovereignty. As the Canadian 
Minister of Foreign Affairs Lloyd Axworthy told the General Assembly in September 
1999, while sovereignty remained an important principle of international organization, it 
was no longer "absolute" and could not be "a shield behind which the most egregious 
violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms can be hidden."165 This sentiment 
was echoed by the Dutch foreign minister when he called on the Assembly "to accept that 
the traditional balance between sovereignty and human rights, between the State and the 
people is shifting," and that it was now accepted that sovereignty could not protect gross 
violations of human rights.1 6 The German delegate to the Assembly similarly argued that 
"the concept of non-interference in internal affairs cannot be interpreted as giving the 
green light to blatantly violate of international commitments to the detriment of one's 
16
 United Nations General Assembly, 54* session, provsional verbatim record, 8lh plenary 




 United Nations General Assembly, 54th session, provisional verbatim record, 10lh plenary 
meeting, 23 September 1999 (UN document A/54/PV.10), 17. 
166
 United Nations General Assembly, 54lh session, provisional verbatim record, 13lh plenary 
meeting, 24 September 1999 (UN document A/54/PV. 13), 22. 
87 
own people." Germany he said "encouraged and supported any discussion on how 
humanitarian intervention can be brought into line with the United Nations task to 
maintain peace and security in the world."167 
This commitment on the part of Northern "middle powers" to the UN as the main 
institutional venue for pursuing the reform of international norms of sovereignty ensured 
that they would have to seriously engage and contend with the views of developing 
countries. As we shall see in the third section of this chapter, this engagement and 
contention quickly produced a highly polarized and divisive debate, as ardent opponents 
of "humanitarian intervention" among developing states managed to mobilize the global 
South within the General Assembly to reaffirm existing sovereignty norms. This led 
Northern proponents of "humanitarian intervention," particularly Canada, to search for an 
alternative institutional channel—an independent international commission—in which 
developing countries would have less direct influence. 
2 Ideological coherence of Southern diplomacy 
In this section I analyze the Southern response to the NATO intervention and the 
coherence of subsequent Southern diplomacy in the debate over "humanitarian 
intervention." The global South was initially split over the Kosovo intervention, with a 
number of developing countries on the Security Council supporting or at least not 
opposing NATO's resort to force. While this has been interpreted by some observers as 
evidence of an emergent "moral consensus" on a new "right of intervention" in extreme 
humanitarian emergencies, I argue that this seriously misinterprets the evidence. While it 
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is true that a majority of developing countries in the Council refused to condemn 
NATO's intervention, a closer look at both their individual positions and at the positions 
of other developing states outside the Council reveals virtually no principled support in 
the global South for a "right of intervention" in 1999, and thus no support for the 
potentially radical changes to the norms of sovereignty and intervention that such a right 
would imply. Indeed, most developing states, including those which supported this 
particular intervention, expressed principled opposition to any right of unauthorized 
"humanitarian intervention" by self-selected groups of states like NATO. By the time 
"humanitarian intervention" was debated in the General Assembly in late 1999 and 2000, 
there was thus a high degree of ideological coherence within the South in rejection the 
so-called "right of humanitarian intervention." Both collectively through theNon-
Aligned Movement and the South Summit, and individually in their statements to the 
General Assembly, developing countries reiterated their rejection of unauthorized 
intervention by a self-selecting groups of states. This ideological coherence does not 
mean, however, that there was complete unanimity within the global South on all 
questions related to intervention. In particular, while states belonging to what might be 
called the "counterhegemonic bloc" of opponents to US hegemony vigorously opposed 
any legitimation of non-UN mechanisms for authorizing intervention as basically a form 
of neo-imperialism, African states in particular sought to develop alternative mechanisms 
of intervention that themselves challenged in important ways prevailing norms of 
sovereignty and intervention. 
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2.1 Divisions over Kosovo 
While NATO countries defended their intervention in Kosovo as necessary to 
avert a "humanitarian catastrophe," a large number of states actively opposed it, 
considering it a violation of the UN Charter's legal prohibition on the use of force. 
Within the Security Council, China and Russia, joined by a number of states that were 
not Council members, notably India, spoke out repeatedly against the bombing, 
condemning it as a violation of the UN Charter and the sovereignty of the FRY. A 
majority of non-NATO Council members, however, either explicitly supported or failed 
to condemn the NATO intervention. When Russia, India, and Belarus presented the 
Council with a draft resolution on 26 March 1999 condemning the NATO air campaign 
as a "flagrant violation" of the UN Charter and calling for an immediate cessation of 
hostilities,168 it was defeated by an overwhelming majority of 12 votes to 3, with only 
China, Russia and Namibia voting for it.16 This vote has drawn much attention in the 
scholarly literature on the Kosovo war. The fact that such a large proportion of Council 
members were unwilling to join China and Russia in condemning NATO's actions has 
been interpreted as a sign of broad international support for the intervention. Some 
international legal scholars have argued that the rejection of the Russian-Indian draft 
resolution can be interpreted as a sign of the emergence of a limited right in customary 
international law permitting the use offeree to protect vulnerable populations when "the 
Security Council does not oppose the action," though this view, it must be said, does 
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not appear to be widely held among international lawyers. Among IR scholars 
interested in the evolution of international norms, some have argued that while the failure 
of the Russian-Indian draft resolution cannot be seen as constituting retrospective legal 
authorization of the intervention, it does serve as evidence of an international "moral 
1 TJ 
consensus" around a "right of intervention in supreme humanitarian emergencies." The 
fact that the majority voting against the draft included six developing states—Argentina, 
Bahrain, Brazil, Gabon, Gambia, and Malaysia—has led some to suggest that the 
emerging "moral consensus" around a right of intervention "extended beyond Western 
liberal states" to include at least some portion of the global South.1 
As I will show in this section, this conclusion should be approached with caution. 
The split within the global South over the Kosovo war was largely a split over this 
particular intervention, rather than a fundamental division over the question of 
unauthorized "humanitarian intervention." Of the six developing countries in the Security 
Council that voted against the Russian-Indian draft resolution condemning the 
intervention, only one (Argentina) expressed principled support for the Northern belief in 
the legitimacy of unauthorized intervention in cases of extreme humanitarian necessity. 
Speaking in the Council on 24 March 1999, the Argentine representative argued that the 
NATO intervention deserved support as its only objective was "to avert a humanitarian 
catastrophe" resulting from the policies of the FRY government.174 In the aftermath of the 
war, Argentina explicitly justified NATO's use of force as a "humanitarian intervention" 
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of last resort: "once diplomatic efforts have been exhausted, humanitarian tragedies of the 
magnitude that we have witnessed cannot, at the close of the century, be tolerated in the 
context of the letter and the spirit of the Charter."175 Compared to Argentina, Brazil (the 
other Latin American country on the Council) was far more restrained, stressing its 
concern about the marginalization of the Security Council. Speaking in the Council near 
the end of the bombing campaign in June, the Brazilian representative argued that, 
"independent of the moral considerations invoked for these actions, with which we fully 
identify... problematic precedents have been set in the resort to military force without 
Security Council authorization. These have neither contributed to upholding the 
Council's authority nor improved the humanitarian situation."176 
Of the remaining four developing countries on the Council that supported the 
NATO intervention, three—Bahrain, Gambia, and Malaysia—all had Muslim-majority 
populations and were members of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC). It is 
likely therefore that their support for NATO was in part motivated by religious and 
organizational affinities, not only because of the identity of the primary victims of 
atrocities in Kosovo (ethnic Albanian Muslims), but also because of the long-standing 
engagement of the OIC in the wars of Yugoslav disintegration of which Kosovo was the 
latest chapter. During the earlier war in Bosnia, the OIC had publicly called for aid to the 
Bosnian Muslim forces fighting the FRY-backed Bosnian Serbs. In 1994, the OIC 
established a "Contact Group on Bosnia and Herzegovina" to coordinate OIC diplomacy 
United Nations Security Council. 4011' meeting . provisional verbatim record, 10 June 1999 
(UN document S/PV.4011), 19. 
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and humanitarian aid efforts vis-a-vis the Bosnian war.177 Within the General Assembly, 
OIC states sponsored several resolutions on Bosnia between 1992 and 1995 which 
condemned Serb "aggression" against Bosnia, condemned Serb ethnic cleansing in 
Bosnia as genocide, and called on the Security Council to lift its arms embargo on the 
Bosniak forces and to grant Chapter VII authorization to UN member states to use "all 
I 7k 
necessary means" to assist the Bosnian government. The roll-call votes on these 
resolutions illustrate the degree to which the Yugoslav issue divided the global South 
during this time. All were passed by substantial majorities, with OIC member states, 
joined by Northern states and a majority of Latin American states, voting for them while 
a sizable minority of developing countries, including rising powers like India and Brazil 
and a majority of non-OIC states in Africa, abstained. 79 The Bosnian war was also a 
highly divisive issue within the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). At the NAM's first 
post-Cold War summit in Jakarta in September 1992, Muslim-majority states in the 
Movement, led by Malaysia, had pushed for the expulsion of the FRY from the 
Movement and the granting of Observer status to both Croatia and Slovenia (before either 
had become a member of the UN). A number of other states, including many African 
states, opposed these moves and continued to support the FRY, both because of 
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Yugoslavia's historic role in the founding of the Movement and also because of their 
concern over the impact of Yugoslavia's dissolution on the norm of territorial integrity. 
The Kosovo war in 1999, and the divide within the Southern response to NATO 
intervention, should be seen in this context. The OIC's annual foreign ministers' 
conferences had been consistently expressing concern over the discrimination and 
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violence faced by ethnic Albanian Muslims in Kosovo since 1993, and at their March 
1998 conference in Doha, OIC foreign ministers specifically "called on the international 
community to take all necessary measures to immediately end all violations of the rights 
of the Muslims in Kosovo."1 2 Also in 1998, the OIC added Kosovo to the agenda of its 
Bosnia Contact Group, which at the time was made up of Iran, Malaysia, Pakistan, Saudi 
Arabia, and Qatar. Against this background, when the NATO air campaign against the 
FRY began in March of 1999, the Contact Group issued a statement accusing the 
Milosevic regime of committing "crimes of genocide and ethnic cleansing" in Kosovo 
and calling for "decisive international action" to "prevent a humanitarian catastrophe and 
further violations of human rights."1 Two weeks later, meeting at the ministerial level in 
Sally Morphet, "The Non-Aligned in the New World Order: the Jakarta Summit, September 
1992/' International Relations 9, no. 4 (April 1993): 360-363. 
See OIC, Final Communique of the Twenty-First Islamic Conference of the Foreign Ministers 
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Twenty-Third Islamic Conference of the Foreign Ministers (Conkary, 9-12 December 1995), paragraph 42; 
Final Communique of the Twenty-Fourth Islamic Conference of the Foreign Ministers (Jakarta, 9-13 
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Geneva, the Contact Group issued a long declaration again condemning Serb ethnic 
cleansing and calling for Kosovar self-determination.184 
While expressing support for NATO's resort to force, the OIC Contact Group was 
careful to reaffirm the Security Council's "primary responsibility for the maintenance of 
international peace and security" while also expressing "regret that the Security Council 
ha[d] been unable to discharge its responsibility" in this particular case. This 
position—supporting NATO actions while expressing hope that the Security Council 
would be better able to take up its responsibilities—was repeated by a number of OIC 
states individually. Malaysian and Pakistani officials, for example, defended NATO air 
strikes as necessary to "prevent further violations of human rights in Kosovo and a 
humanitarian catastrophe" while expressing hope that "beyond this phase, the UN 
Security Council will be allowed ultimately to address" the situation.1 Within the 
Security Council, the OIC Contact Group's position on the war—supporting the NATO 
bombing while simultaneously stressing the UNSC's primary responsibility for the 
maintenance of international peace and security—was reflected in the statements of the 
four OIC member states—Malaysia, Bahrain, Gabon and Gambia—that sat as non-
permanent members on the Council for the duration of the crisis. All four voted against 
the March 26 Russian-Indian draft resolution condemning the NATO bombing as a 
OIC, Statement and Declaration by the Contact Group of the OIC on Bosnia and Herzegovina 
and Kosova (Geneva, 7 April 1999) in UN Security Council, Letter from the Permanent Representative of 
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violation of the UN charter, and all explicitly accepted the arguments of the NATO 
powers that the war was being fought out of "humanitarian necessity." 
There were of course important exceptions to this general support for NATO 
among Muslim-majority countries. OIC members among the former Soviet republics 
(Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan) joined Russia in decrying the NATO intervention 
as a violation of international law and threat to world peace. Within the Middle East 
and North Africa, Iraq, Libya, Sudan and Iran—all branded as "rogue states" by the US 
and targeted with unilateral force or subversion in the 1990s—denounced the NATO 
campaign as illegal. For Sudan and Iran, this denunciation was carefully balanced with at 
least a formal commitment to the OIC position condemning Serb atrocities in Kosovo. 
Thus Sudan, while voting along with other OIC members on resolutions condemning 
Serb ethnic cleansing within the UN Commission on Human Rights, expressly argued 
that "unilateral action by certain States outside the framework of international law has 
resulted in violations of civil and political rights."1 8 Iran's position was even more 
delicate as it was in 1999 the chair of both the OIC as a whole and of its Balkans Contact 
Group. Iranian leaders thus studiously balanced pan-Islamic solidarity with the victims of 
1 RQ 
Serb repression with a condemnation of the illegality of NATO's war. 
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The strongest opposition to the NATO bombing campaign from the global South 
came from what we might call the "counterhegemonic bloc" made up of both rising 
powers and regional "rogue states" opposed to US hegemony. Cuba and China were 
undoubtedly NATO's most vociferous critics. Cuba denounced NATO intervention in 
Kosovo as an instance of US imperialism, and its destruction of civilian infrastructure in 
the FRY as genocide.190 China insisted that the situation in Kosovo was an internal matter 
of the FRY to be resolved on the basis of its sovereignty and territorial integrity, and 
denounce NATO's air campaign as a "blatant violation of the United Nations Charter."191 
On March 26, China voted with Namibia and Russia (against the rest of the Council) in 
support of the Russian-Indian draft resolution.1 Chinese opposition was reinforced on 
May 8 following the bombing of its embassy in Belgrade by NATO.193 Beside Cuba and 
China, India was NATO's most severe critic. On the first day of bombing, India joined 
Council deliberations, denounced the illegality of NATO's use of force, and rejected its 
humanitarian justifications: 
No country, group of countries or regional arrangement, no matter how powerful, 
can arrogate to itself the right to take arbitrary and unilateral military action 
against others. That would be a return to anarchy, where might is right... [W]e 
have been told that the attacks are meant to prevent violations of human rights. 
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Even if that were to be so, it does not justify unprovoked military aggression. Two 
wrongs do not make a right. 
The following day, the India Foreign Ministry issued an official statement criticizing 
NATO's resort to force as a violation of the UN Charter, calling for an immediate halt to 
hostilities, and warning against the rise of "NATO extraterritorial engagement."195 
Together with Russia and Belarus, India sponsored the draft resolution condemning 
NATO's war as illegal which failed to pass a vote in the Council on March 26. Even after 
the defeat of the resolution, the Indian representative insisted that, given the fact that 
China, Russia and India had all opposed NATO actions, "the international community 
can hardly be said to have endorsed [NATO's war] when representatives of half of 
humanity have said that they do not agree with what they have done."196 
Beyond the two extremes formed by the OIC states on the one hand and the 
"counterhegemonic bloc" of China, India, and the "rogue states" on the other, most 
developing states took positions on the NATO intervention that (with a few exceptions) 
fell short of outright support, but also avoided strong rhetorical denunciations. Within 
sub-Saharan Africa, NATO's most prominent critic was South Africa, then chair of both 
the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the Non-Aligned 
Movement. On 25 March 1999, the South African Foreign Ministry issued a statement 
condemning NATO's actions as a violation of the UN Charter and "accepted norms of 
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international law" and warning that it would erode the authority of the UN system. On 
April 9, South Africa issued a statement in the name of the NAM "troika" (made up of 
current, former and future chairs of the NAM - South Africa, Colombia, and Bangladesh) 
which called for the immediate cessation of all hostilities, reaffirmed the primary 
responsibility of the UNSC for the maintenance of international peace and security, and 
reaffirmed the NAM's commitment to the "sovereignty, territorial integrity and political 
independence of all states." Speaking in Beijing the following month, South African 
President Nelson Mandela delivered a balanced condemnation of both Serb atrocities and 
NATO's use of force: 
On the one hand, human rights set out in the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights are being violated in ethnic cleansing. On the other hand, the United 
Nations Security Council is being ignored by the unilateral and destructive action 
of some of its permanent members. Both actions must be condemned in the 
strongest terms. This is a matter that troubles us not only because of its immediate 
impact.. .Can the world afford, at the end of a century that has seen so much pain 
and suffering, to risk damaging the authority of the world body that has the task of 
maintaining international peace and security on the basis of respect for the 
sovereignty of nations!199 
The evidence that exists suggests that other African countries adopted a broadly similar, 
balanced approach. Speaking on April 1 on behalf of the 14-member "Africa Group" in 
the UN Commission on Human Rights, the representative from Tunisia stated that the 
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Group "condemned all acts of repression and destruction and all forms of human rights 
violations, including the reported acts of ethnic cleansing" in Kosovo, but simultaneously 
insisted on the primary responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of 
international peace and "deplored" NATO's resort to force.200 
In Latin America, a majority of states expressed serious concern about NATO's 
resort to force, while also condemning Serb repression. On 25 March, the "Rio Group" of 
23 Latin American and Caribbean countries issued a statement expressing "anxiety" 
about the commencement of NATO air strikes and "concern" that no peaceful means of 
solving the Kosovo conflict had been found "in conformity with international law." The 
statement explicitly declared NATO's use of force to be in contravention of Article 53(1) 
of the UN Charter which requires that enforcement action by regional arrangements 
obtain prior Security Council authorization.201 However, in their individual statements, 
members of the Rio Group did not always speak with a single voice. At least one of 
them—El Salvador—openly supported NATO's resort to force as necessary to "prevent 
further aggression, repression and death" in Kosovo.202 As we have seen, of the two Latin 
American countries (Argentina and Brazil) sitting in as non-permanent members of the 
Security Council during the intervention, Argentina was the most sympathetic to the 
NATO intervention while Brazil was decidedly more cautious. The reactions of Mexico 
and Costa Rica to the intervention were decidedly negative. On the day of the start of the 
United Nations, Commission on Human Rights, 55" session, summary record, 14th meeting of, 
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intervention, the Mexican Foreign Ministry published a statement which "deplore[d] the 
recourse to force in the Balkans without the explicit consent of the UN Security 
Council."203 Speaking within the UN Commission on Human Rights, Mexico called for 
an immediate ceasefire, stressing that "under the Charter of the United Nations, the 
Security Council alone was empowered to authorize enforcement action under regional 
arrangements or by regional bodies."204 Near the end of the bombing campaign, in June 
1999, Costa Rica presented to the UNSC a clear repudiation of any resort to force outside 
of the Security Council framework, insisting that "the adoption of any measure involving 
the use of force or military troops should satisfy all the legal, political and strategic 
requirements called for by the Charter... With the very limited exception of the right to 
legitimate defence, any option involving the use of force requires the clear authorization 
of the Security Council in each specific case." 
Given these strong statements, it is evident that the more supportive positions of 
developing states regarding the Kosovo intervention in the Security Council (by 
Argentina, Gambia, Malaysia) must be seen, to some extent, as outliers rather than the 
norm. While most developing states expressed concern over the gravity of the human 
rights and humanitarian crisis in Kosovo, and relatively few resorted to open 
denunciation of NATO in the manner of India or Cuba, most were quite clear in their 
unambiguous defence of existing international law and institutions. Based on this fact, it 
is hard to sustain the view that the support for (or non-opposition to) the Kosovo 
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intervention by a majority of developing countries within the UNSC can be seen as 
evidence of a broader "moral consensus" on a new "right of intervention." As we shall 
see in the next section, when it came to the principled question of whether it might be 
permissible for a group of states to use force for humanitarian purposes without Security 
Council authorization, even NATO's strongest supporters among the OIC states adopted 
positions not far from those of NATO's principal (and principled) opponents. 
2.2 The rejection of the "so-called 'right' of humanitarian intervention" 
Once the Kosovo war was over, the gap between the OIC states on the one hand 
and the "counterhegemonic bloc" of China, India, and the "rogue states" on the other, 
became progressively smaller. One sign of this convergence can be seen in the positions 
taken by the Non-Aligned Movement in the months following the war. During the 
Kosovo crisis itself, the NAM "troika" made up of South Africa, Colombia and 
Bangladesh issued a statement on April 9 which called for the immediate cessation of all 
hostilities, reaffirmed the primary responsibility of the Security Council for the 
maintenance of international peace and security, and reaffirmed the NAM's commitment 
to the "sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of all states." While 
issued in theory in the name of the entire Movement, it is clear that NAM was at this time 
deeply split on the Kosovo issue. In March and April, the Coordinating Bureau of the 
NAM met in New York but was apparently unable to come to an agreement on a 
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movement-wide position on the war. By the time of the NAM's annual ministerial 
meeting in New York in September, however, the NAM states put on at least an outward 
show of unity, issuing a communique in which they reaffirmed "the sanctity of the United 
Nations Charter," condemned "all unilateral military actions or threats of military actions 
against the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of the members of the 
Movement," and stressed that "the maintenance of international peace and security is a 
primary responsibility of the United Nations and that the role of regional arrangements, in 
that regard, should be in accordance with Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter, and 
should not in any way substitute the role of the United Nations." Finally, the document 
explicitly rejected "the so-called 'right of humanitarian intervention' which has no legal 
basis in the UN Charter or in the general principles of international law."20 The 
following day, the Group of 77 (made up of all the NAM states plus several others) 
issued its own Ministerial Declaration from New York which reiterated word-for-word 
the NAM's rejection of "the so-called right of humanitarian intervention."209 In April 
2000, the first joint NAM-G77-Chinese South Summit in Havana, attended by 122 heads 
of state from the global South, issued a final declaration which, while concerned 
primarily with economic matters, repeated the NAM's stance on "humanitarian 
intervention": 
We reject the so-called "right" of humanitarian intervention, which has no legal 
basis in the United Nations Charter or in the general principles of international 
law... we stress that humanitarian assistance should be conducted in full respect 
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of the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political independence of host 
countries, and should be initiated in response to a request or with the approval of 
these States.210 
It is difficult to say to what extent these collective positions by the NAM and G77 
reflected a "consensus" within the NAM. In theory, according to the NAM's procedural 
norms, its communiques and declaration are adopted by a "consensus" that is understood 
to reflect "substantial agreement" among its members.211 States that have reservations 
concerning particular elements of the joint communique make them public in the days 
that follow its issuance. Of all the reservations issued concerning the above mentioned 
statements, none objected to the paragraphs concerning "humanitarian intervention." That 
the NAM's continued reiteration of its rejection of "humanitarian intervention" was not 
driven by the countries of the "counterhegemonic bloc" alone but reflected a genuine 
convergence between that group of states and the OIC states became evident in June 
2000, when OIC foreign ministers—including from countries like Malaysia and Pakistan 
that had supported the Kosovo intervention—issued a communique from Kuala Lumpur 
that stressed the need for states "to abide by the principles of international law concerning 
the sovereignty, political independence and territorial integrity of States, the non-use of 
force in international relations, and non-interference in the internal affairs of states" and 
affirmed the OICs "rejection of the so-called right to humanitarian intervention under 
whatever name or from whatever source, for it has no basis in the Charter of the United 
Declaration of the South Summit (Havana, 10-14 April 2000), para. 54. 
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Nations or in the provisions of the principles of the general international law." Rather 
than revealing an emerging "moral consensus" on the "right of intervention" then, the 
aftermath of the Kosovo intervention if anything revealed a high level of coherence in the 
South's rejection of this "right." 
2.3 Remaining differences 
But if developing states were largely united in rejecting NATO's claim to a right 
of unauthorized "humanitarian intervention," there remained important differences 
among them on issues related to what mechanisms for legitimate intervention might look 
like. At the very moment when the divide between the "counterhegemonic bloc" and the 
OIC states over Kosovo was being bridged within the NAM, a second divide was 
beginning to emerge between most African states and most of the rest of the global South 
over the question of intervention by regional organizations in situations of gross violation 
of human rights. In July 2000, soon after the South Summit's rejection of the "so-called 
'right' of humanitarian intervention," the heads of government of 53 African states 
signed the Constitutive Act establishing the African Union (AU). While the Constitutive 
Act, like the Charter of the Organization of African Unity which it replaced as the 
constitutional document of African international society, cited the defence of the 
"sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of its Member States" and the non-
use of force as among its foundational principles, it also enshrined a novel regional "right 
of intervention" by the AU as a whole in its member states in certain circumstances. 
Specifically, Article 4(h) of the Act declared the "right of the Union to intervene in a 
Organization of the Islamic Conference, Final Communique of the Twenty-Seventh Session of 
the Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers (Kuala Lumpur. 27-30 June 2000) para. 79, http://www.oic-
oci.org/enelish/conf/fm/27/final27.htm (accessed 15 July 2010). 
105 
Member State pursuant to a decision of the [AU] Assembly in respect of grave 
circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity". Article 
4(h) has been seen as the sign of an important normative shift in African international 
society away from rigid adherence to the norm of non-intervention (not mentioned 
explicitly in the Constitutive Act) towards a norm of "non-indifference" to grave human 
rights abuses, a shift spurred by both a concern with OAU's past failures in addressing 
such abuses (from Idi Amin's Uganda and Bokkassa's Central African Republic to 
Rwanda) and a disappointment with international responses to African conflicts.214 
While the actual practice of African states in dealing with grave human rights 
crises since the adoption of the Constitutive Act suggests that the normative shift has not 
been as revolutionary in practice as on paper, the AU "right of intervention" is notable 
for our purposes in that it potentially challenges the core norms of the postcolonial 
sovereignty regime in several ways. To begin with, this new "right of intervention," if 
operationalized would likely challenge the norms of non-intervention and non-use of 
force by carving out a new exception to these norms allowing for forceful intervention by 
the AU (and potentially by other regional organizations) beyond what is generally 
thought to be permitted under the Charter. Specifically, Article 53(1) of the Charter 
permits "regional arrangements" to use force only with authorization of the Security 
Council. While this has historically been understood to refer to prior authorization, 
certain developments in the 1990s raised the possibility that this understanding was 
13
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changing. Within Africa, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) 
twice intervened militarily in situations of civil conflict (in Sierra Leone and Liberia) 
without prior Security Council authorization. In both cases, the Council welcomed the 
interventions after the fact, leading some observers to believe that a new practice of ex 
post facto Council authorization of regional and sub-regional interventions was 
emerging.216 Article 4(h) of the Constitutive Act seemed to seek to formalize this practice 
by creating permanent mechanisms to regulate the use of force within the African 
continent separate from those of the UN, though African states did not immediately make 
clear how they conceived of the relationship between article 4(h) and the UN Charter 
framework. 
Outside of Africa, however, most developing states were quite reluctant to depart 
from the understanding that intervention by regional organizations could proceed only 
with prior Security Council authorization. In arguing this point, however, they were 
concerned primarily not with the nascent AU, however, but with NATO, which after all 
was itself a "regional arrangement" and which had resorted to force in Kosovo without 
Security Council authorization. Thus the NAM—of which the AU states were of course 
members—argued in response to NATO's intervention in Kosovo, that "that the role of 
regional arrangements [in the maintenance of international peace and security] should be 
in accordance with Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter, and should not in any 
way substitute the role of the United Nations."2il The apparent contradiction between this 
assertion and the new African regional "right of intervention" would become an 
' Cristina G. Badescu, "Authorizing Humanitarian Intervention: Hard Choices in Saving 
Strangers," Canadian Journal ofPolitical Science 40, no. 1 (March 2007): 13-74. 
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important issue undermining the coherence of Southern diplomacy in later years, as we 
shall see in the next chapter. 
3. Institutional environment 
The primary venues of the debates concerning "humanitarian intervention" during 
and after the Kosovo intervention were the UN Security Council and the General 
Assembly. Within the Security Council, as we have seen above, NATO countries failed 
to obtain Security Council authorization for their use of force against the FRY because of 
the threatened Chinese and Russian vetoes. They did succeed, however, in obtaining a 
kind of symbolic victory with the defeat of the 26 March 1999 Russian-Indian draft 
resolution condemning NATO's use offeree as a flagrant violation of the Charter's 
prohibition on the use offeree. This vote has been widely referred to by subsequent 
observers as evidence that the NATO intervention, even if "technically illegal," was 
"widely" seen as "legitimate." As we have seen above, we should be sceptical of the 
claim that this vote can be seen as having legitimated a new "right of intervention" 
without Security Council authorization. It nonetheless remains the case that the defeat of 
the Russian-Indian draft, created a widely held impression (at least in the West) that the 
NATO intervention was "illegal but legitimate."21 Important for our purposes here is to 
note the way in which the membership and decision-making rules of the Security Council 
facilitated this impression. As the survey of Southern responses to the NATO 
intervention in the previous section has shown, the developing countries in the Council 
that strongly supported NATO can be seen as outliers in the global South rather than the 
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norm. A look beyond the Council shows much greater concern with NATO's 
unauthorized use offeree, even if not all developing countries with such concerns 
resorted to rhetorical denunciations of NATO in the manner of Cuba, India and China. 
This broader spectrum of opinion was not reflected in the vote of the Security Council on 
the Russian-Indian draft as the rules and procedures of the Council—restricting 
membership and voting rights to five permanent and ten non-permanent members— 
prevented a majority of UN members states from voting on it. 
There are good reasons to believe that, had a substantially larger number of states 
been allowed to vote on the Russian-Indian draft resolution, the result may have been 
different, better reflecting the deep scepticism towards the unauthorized use of force 
within much of the South. NATO powers themselves seemed to be aware of this. 
According to Adam Roberts, when the idea was proposed within the UK government to 
take the Kosovo issue to the General Assembly and seek a "Uniting for Peace" resolution 
in support of NATO's intervention, this was rejected because of uncertainty about 
whether the necessary two-thirds majority necessary to pass such a resolution could be 
achieved. Unlike the Security Council, the procedures of the General Assembly, based 
on the principle of sovereign equality and "one country, one vote," ensured that whatever 
came out of the Assembly on Kosovo or the question of intervention more broadly would 
reflect the scepticism of a large segment of the global South. Indeed when then Secretary-
General Kofi Annan initiated the debate on intervention within the Assembly during the 
general debates of 1999 and 2000, this scepticism came out in force. In 2000, Annan had 
hoped that the Assembly would take up the question of intervention in the final 
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declaration of its Millennium Summit. The controversial nature of the question ensured 
that this was not to be. Not only was "humanitarian intervention" nowhere mentioned in 
the Millennium Declaration (adopted without a vote by the Assembly on 8 September 
2000), but paragraph 4 of the declaration included a ringing endorsement of the existing 
norms of sovereignty and intervention: 
We rededicate ourselves to support all efforts to uphold the sovereign equality of 
all States, respect for their territorial integrity and political independence, 
resolution of disputes by peaceful means and in conformity with the principles of 
justice and international law, the right to self-determination of peoples which 
remain under colonial domination and foreign occupation, non-interference in the 
internal affairs of States, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms... 
Not only did the Assembly not endorse Annan's view on "humanitarian 
intervention" or welcome NATO's intervention in Kosovo, but some of the most ardent 
Southern critics of NATO and "humanitarian intervention" were able to use the rules and 
procedures of the Assembly to put forward and gain considerable support for their views. 
This occurred for example in December 2000 with the resolution passed by the Assembly 
on Respect for the purposes and principles contained in the Charter of the UN to achieve 
international cooperation in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and 
for fundamental freedoms and in solving international problems of a humanitarian 
character?22 This resolution originated in the Third Committee (Social, Humanitarian 
and Cultural) of the Assembly as a draft proposed by Cuba and several other developing 
countries. The main committees of the Assembly are, like the Assembly itself, universal 
bodies with "one country, one vote" decision-making procedures. During the Cold War, 
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they had been important venues for initiatives from the global South related to 
disarmament (First Committee), development (Second Committee), and decolonization, 
apartheid, and Palestinian self-determination (Fourth Committee).223 Throughout the 
post-Cold War period, Southern opponents of US hegemony, especially Cuba, had used 
the Third Committee to advance resolutions to the full Assembly that sought to reaffirm 
traditional notions of sovereignty, for example on the subject of elections.224 Now Cuba 
and 16 other states put forward a draft resolution in the Third Committee which affirmed 
the importance of inter-state cooperation in the realm of human rights and humanitarian 
assistance, but also affirmed, in clear reference to NATO's intervention in Kosovo, that 
"no State or group of States has the right to intervene unilaterally in any other State, 
particularly through armed force."225 
A subsequent revised version of the draft strengthened this emphasis on non-
intervention, quoting directly from the 1970 Declaration on Principles of International 
Law for Friendly Relations, stating that "no State or group of States has the right to 
intervene, for any reason whatever, directly or indirectly, in the internal or external affairs 
of any other State, and, consequently, that armed intervention and all other forms of 
interference or attempted threats against the personality of the State or against its political 
M.J. Peterson, The UN General Assembly (London and New York: Routledge, 2006), 60. 
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economic and cultural elements, are in violation of international law." In order to gain 
the support of African states, which apparently found this expansive formulation of non-
intervention to be potentially in conflict with the regional "right of intervention" 
enshrined in Article 4(h) of the AU Constitutive Act, Cuba subsequently orally revised 
this paragraph so that it now stated merely that humanitarian activities had to "fully 
comply with the principles set forth in Articled of the Charter, in particular respecting 
the sovereign equality of all States and refraining from the threat or use of force against 
the territorial integrity or political independence of any State."227 
Within the Third Committee and again before the full Assembly, the US, EU 
countries, Australia, New Zealand and Canada all claimed that the draft resolution was a 
selective reflection of existing international law, and that (in the words of the Canadian 
delegate), "it focused too strongly on national sovereignty without including 
counterbalancing language on human rights, suggesting that sovereignty was a shield 
behind which human rights could be violated with impunity."228 These concerns were 
shared by some developing countries, such as Argentina, which argued that draft 
resolution sought to pre-empt a necessary debate over the proper international response to 
massive violations of human rights, and Mali, which argued that intervention had to be 
better defined so that "sovereignty did not give States a licence to flout universal 
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standards." Ultimately, however, these concerns were not sufficient to discourage a 
large number of developing states from supporting the resolution: it was passed by the 
Third Committee by a vote of 78 to 52 with 21 countries abstaining. The supporters 
included China, Russia, and a majority of developing states. All 52 opposed were 
Northern, Eastern European and small island states. The 21 abstaining represented a mix 
of developing countries from Latin America, Africa and Asia.230 In the full Assembly, the 
Committee's resolution was adopted in December 2000 by a vote of 104 to 52 with 15 
abstentions. Again, besides Russia and China, all supporters were developing countries 
(including a number of states which had abstained in the Third Committee); nearly all 
opponents were from the North. The 15 abstentions were mainly from Latin America 
(Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay), with a few 
from Africa (South Africa, Cape Verde, Sao Tome and Principe) and Thailand and 
Singapore from Asia.231 The history of this resolution illustrates the way a small groups 
of developing states strongly opposed to norm change can potentially use international 
institutions with universal membership and "one country, one vote" decision-making 
procedures to promote their agendas against Northern opposition. Cuba's concession to 
the African position on intervention in the Third Committee effectively enabled it to 
obtain a resolution in the Assembly that implicitly criticized NATO's claims regarding 
the permissibility of "humanitarian intervention" without Security Council authorization, 
lzv
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and reaffirmed existing norms of non-intervention and non-use offeree, while splitting 
the membership quite dramatically along North-South lines. 
By the time this resolution was passed by the Assembly, countries in the global 
North that hoped that Kosovo would provide the impetus for a fundamental rethinking of 
the question of sovereignty and intervention at the UN, had become frustrated with the 
polarized nature of the debate that this resolution exemplified. Canada in particular took 
the initiative and, responding to the call of the Secretary-General, appointed an 
independent international commission to consider the question. The creation of the 
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), announced by 
the government of Canada in late 2000, was thus a direct response to the divisive debate 
on intervention within the Assembly. As Canadian Minister of Foreign Affairs Lloyd 
Axworthy explained in a speech in June 2000, since Annan's initial bold challenge to the 
Assembly, "the negative reaction of many countries... [had] resulted in a loss of 
momentum." This loss of momentum, Axworthy argued, convinced the Canadian 
government to take the initiative and appoint an "International Commission on 
Humanitarian Intervention" to consider the subject.232 While the reference to 
"humanitarian intervention" in the commission's title was dropped, its mandate was to 
build consensus and "find common ground" on the issue of intervention in humanitarian 
emergencies.233 Significantly for our purposes, it did so not through an intergovernmental 
process of consultation with UN members states but through a series of "regional 
roundtables" involving both governmental and non-governmental (academic and NGO) 
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representatives. While five of these roundtables were conducted in the global South—in 
Maputo, Santiago, Cairo, New Delhi and Beijing—only one of these (in Santiago) 
involved significant numbers of government officials.234 The participation of Southern 
governments in determining the outcome of these consultations was thus less direct than 
it would have been in a universal membership, intergovernmental institution such as the 
General Assembly (though participation of Southern civil society was more direct than it 
would have otherwise been). The separate regional consultations also prevented trans-
regional coordination through a platform like the NAM, or the kind of forging of 
collective positions that we have seen in the case of the December 2000 resolution in the 
General Assembly. As we shall see, below, the end product of the ICISS consultations, 
while sensitive to concerns of the anti-interventionists among developing countries, also 
reflected some of the differences within the global South. In several important respects, 
however, the ICISS's report challenged the central norms of the postcolonial sovereignty 
regime in a way that many developing countries would be unlikely to countenance. 
4. Success of developing countries in shaping the direction of norm change 
In this section I assess the impact of Northern attitudes, the ideological coherence 
of Southern diplomacy, and institutional environments between 1999 and 2001 on the 
success of developing countries in shaping the direction of change in international norms 
of sovereignty and intervention. Over all, I conclude that, in this part of my case study, 
my three working hypotheses are largely confirmed by the case material. 
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4.1 Impact of Northern attitudes 
As we have seen above, Northern states promoting "humanitarian intervention" in 
1999 were willing to resort to force in Kosovo without Security Council authorization, 
and thus to seriously challenge existing norms of non-intervention, non-use of force and 
sovereign equality. At the same time, a number of these states still sought to work 
through the multilateral mechanisms of the UN in order to reform the norms of 
sovereignty in a way that would legitimate their actions. Northern attitudes were thus 
characterized by both a commitment to multilateral UN mechanisms and a willingness to 
act through narrower, North-only channels when these mechanisms failed to deliver the 
outcomes desired. As we have seen the continued commitment to UN mechanisms 
ensured that Northern states seeking to promote norm change were forced to engage with 
the views of developing countries. The result was that Southern states were given the 
opportunity to decisively shape the subsequent debate on "humanitarian intervention" in 
a way that would not have been possible had Northern states been content to fully 
commit to enshrining a new North-only mechanism for future interventions. Bearing in 
mind that I am keeping "Northern capabilities" as constant, this finding supports my third 
hypothesis that the success of developing countries in influencing the direction change in 
international norms of sovereignty and intervention should increase if Northern attitudes 
remain committed to action through multilateral institutions. 
4.2 Impact of Southern ideological coherence 
As we have seen above, the coherence of Southern diplomacy was initially quite low on 
the question of intervention in Kosovo, with the global South largely split between ardent 
supporters of NATO's intervention among the OIC states and NATO's ardent opponents 
116 
within the "counterhegemonic bloc," with a majority of states falling somewhere in the 
middle, many expressing serious concern over NATO unilateralism while also 
condemning the violence in Kosovo. Following the intervention, partly it seems, through 
the medium of the Non-Aligned Movement, ideological coherence on the question of 
intervention increased as the global South declared its collective rejection of the "so-
called 'right' of humanitarian intervention." As ideological coherence increased, so too 
did the ability of developing states to resist the radical norm change proposed by 
proponents of "humanitarian intervention." Thus, while the initial Southern split over the 
Kosovo war allowed NATO to secure the appearance of legitimacy for its intervention 
within the Security Council (through the rejection of the Russian-Indian draft resolution 
condemning the intervention), the subsequent coherence of the Southern diplomacy in the 
General Assembly dispelled any possibility of legitimating a new norm of unauthorized 
"humanitarian intervention." While there is no question of ideological unanimity within 
the global South, there was nonetheless a broad enough consensus to enable ardent 
opponents of "humanitarian intervention" to mobilize general Southern support for an 
anti-interventionist position. This finding thus lends support to my second hypothesis, 
that the success of developing countries in influencing the direction of change in 
international norms of sovereignty and intervention should increase as the ideological 
coherence of Southern diplomacy increases. 
4.3 Impact of institutional environments 
Finally, as we have seen above, the post-Kosovo debate on "humanitarian 
intervention" occurred in at least three important institutional venues: the Security 
Council, the UN General Assembly, and the non-governmental IC1SS and its consultation 
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process. As was described above, in institutional environments which facilitated the 
participation of developing countries in decision-making processes (i.e. the General 
Assembly), developing countries were largely able to defuse the radical challenge posed 
by "humanitarian intervention" and reaffirm the central norms of the postcolonial 
sovereignty regime (for example in the December 2000 General Assembly resolution on 
international cooperation in the realm of human rights and humanitarian assistance). This 
encouraged Northern proponents of "humanitarian intervention" to seek an alternative, 
non-government institutional setting to further the debate on intervention. In this setting, 
participation by Southern states was only indirect and not as broad as would have been 
possible in a universal, inter-governmental process. As I will describe presently, the ideas 
that emerged from this alternative institutional setting posed a greater challenge to 
postcolonial sovereignty norms than those affirmed by the General Assembly. 
The ICISS published its report, The Responsibility to Protect, in December 2001. 
It introduced three key innovations in the international debate over "humanitarian 
intervention." First, the Commission suggested a shift in language, moving away from 
the concept of the "right of intervention" towards the concept of "responsibility to 
protect." This was intended to "shift the terms of the debate" over "humanitarian 
intervention" from a zero-sum confrontation between sovereignty and human rights, to a 
reconciliation of the two through a redefinition of sovereignty itself as a responsibility of 
the state to protect its population from grave human rights abuses. Conceptualizing 
"sovereignty as responsibility," in the words of the Commission's report, had three 
important implications: "First, it implies that state authorities are responsible for the 
functions of protecting the safety and lives of citizens and promotion of their welfare. 
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Secondly, it suggests that the national political authorities are responsible to the citizens 
internally and to the international community through the UN. And thirdly, it means that 
the agents of the state are responsible for their actions; that is to say, they are accountable 
for their acts of commission and omission." 35 In addition, the concept of sovereignty as a 
"responsibility to protect" had the implication that the "international community" itself 
had acquired a responsibility to protect vulnerable populations in cases where the state 
was "unwilling or unable" to protect them. In such cases, the report argued, "the principle 
of non-intervention yields to the international responsibility to protect."236 
The second important modification introduced by the ICISS, was to broaden the 
conception of "intervention" beyond the use of military force in humanitarian and human 
rights emergencies, conceptualizing it as a continuum of measures including actions 
focused on the prevention of crises, reaction (including, but not limited to, military 
intervention), and post-conflict rebuilding. Indeed the report stressed that "prevention is 
the single most important dimension of the responsibility to protect" and that "prevention 
options should always be exhausted before intervention is contemplated and more 
commitment and resources must be devoted to it."237 
Despite this emphasis on prevention, however, the bulk of the ICISS report dealt 
with the issue of military intervention rather than prevention, leading some to suggest that 
its discussion of prevention was added as a "superficially attractive but highly unrealistic 
way to try...[to] finesse the hard issue of what essentially amounts to humanitarian 
intervention." Indeed the report was quite explicit in stating that it was primarily 
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concerned with armed "humanitarian intervention," stating in its opening chapter: "This 
report is about the so-called 'right of humanitarian intervention': the question of when, if 
ever, it is appropriate for states to take coercive - and in particular military - action, 
against another state for the purpose of protection people at risk in that other state."239 
The third important element of the report, then, was its discussion of the conditions under 
which the use of force for humanitarian ends might be permissible. Borrowing from 
previous attempts to articulate criteria governing "humanitarian intervention," the 
Commission suggested six criteria drawn from just war theory to guide military 
intervention for "human protection" purposes. The first, just cause, established the 
threshold which would justify international military intervention in cases where states 
were unable or unwilling to halt atrocities. Here the Commission recommended that 
military intervention was justifiable only in extreme cases to halt or avert "large scale 
loss of life, actual or apprehended, with genocidal intent or not, which is the product 
either of deliberate state action, or state neglect or inability to act, or a failed state 
situation," and "large scale 'ethnic cleansing', actual or apprehended, whether carried out 
by killing, forced expulsion, acts of terror or rape."240 The remaining criteria were made 
up of five "precautionary principles": right intention ("the primary purpose of the 
intervention must be to halt or avert human suffering"), last resort ("every diplomatic and 
non-military avenue for the prevention or peaceful resolution of the humanitarian crisis 
must have been explored"), proportional means ("the scale, duration and intensity of the 
planned military intervention should be the minimum necessary to secure the 
ICISS, Responsibility to Protect vol. 1, vii. 
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humanitarian objective in question"), and reasonable prospects ("military action can only 
be justified if it stands a reasonable chance of success").241 
On the key question of who had the authority to decide on whether these criteria 
had been met and whether military intervention was therefore warranted in any particular 
case, the Commission's formulation was notably equivocal. The report strongly endorsed 
the central role of the Security Council in authorizing any use of force for humanitarian 
purposes, arguing that "there is no better or more appropriate body than the United 
Nations Security Council to authorize military intervention for human protection 
purposes" and that "the task is not to find alternatives to the Security Council as a source 
of authority, but to make the Security Council work better than it has." Arguing that 
Council authorization should always be sought prior to any intervention, the Commission 
further argued that the Council had a duty to deal promptly with any requests for 
authorization in cases of large scale loss of life or ethnic cleansing and recommended that 
the P5 should agree not to use their veto power to obstruct authorization of humanitarian 
intervention "in matters where their vital state interests are not involved." In instances in 
which the Security Council failed to authorize necessary interventions, the Commission 
suggested two "alternative options": the "Uniting for Peace" procedure in the General 
Assembly (requiring a two thirds vote of the Assembly) and "action within area of 
jurisdiction" by regional or subregional organizations "subject to their seeking 
subsequent authorization from the Security Council." 
Both of these options, it should be noted, had their advocates within the 
developing world. As we have seen above, the development of regional mechanisms for 
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intervention by regional organizations supported by ex post facto Security Council 
authorization was supported by the states of the nascent African Union. The ICISS report 
specifically cited the precedent of ECOWAS interventions in Liberia and Sierra Leone, 
and argued that "there may be certain leeway for future action" of the same type. As 
for the proposal regarding the "Uniting for Peace" procedure, this too had its supporters 
within the global South. Several Southern states at the 1999 and 2000 General Assembly 
plenaries spoke in favour of granting the General Assembly a greater role in international 
peace and security matter in general, and in interventions in civil conflicts and 
humanitarian emergencies in particular. Speaking before the Assembly in late September 
1999, Egyptian Foreign Minister Amre Moussa stressed that "any international [military] 
action must stem from the Security Council as the competent organ primarily responsible 
for the maintenance of international peace and security," but that, in cases where the 
Council was "unable" to fulfill its role, "the General Assembly would be the organ that 
must deal with any threats to international peace and security, as it represents the 
common interest of all its members."244 Speaking to the Assembly the next day, the 
Uruguayan foreign minister recalled the "paralyzing effect of the veto" in the Kosovo 
case and suggested "entrusting the General Assembly, under certain conditions...with 
new competencies so that it could be formally informed and its decision be required in 
situations which demand it, particularly when it concerns cases that could involve the 
legitimate use of force."245 As we shall see in the next chapter, proposals for including 
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the General Assembly in mechanisms for authorizing military intervention would 
continued to be articulated in the global South. 
The ICISS report was thus significantly sensitive to the concerns and opinions of 
developing countries, as these had been expressed to commission-members in regional 
roundtables. On one issue, however, the Commission seems to have gone significantly 
further in challenging the norms of sovereignty and intervention than most developing 
countries would have been prepared to go. This concerned the controversial issue of 
unauthorized "humanitarian intervention" by individual states or ad hoc coalitions. Here 
the report was notably equivocal: 
Interventions by ad hoc coalitions (or, even more, individual states) acting 
without the approval of the Security Council, or the General Assembly, or a 
regional or sub-regional grouping of the which the target state is a member, do 
not...find wide favour... As a matter of political reality, it would be impossible to 
find consensus, in the Commission's view, around any set of proposals for 
military intervention which acknowledged the validity of any intervention not 
authorized by the Security Council or General Assembly. But that may still leave 
circumstances when the Security Council fails to discharge what this Commission 
would regard as its responsibility to protect.. .[I]f the Security Council fails to 
discharge its responsibility in conscience shocking situations crying out for 
action, then it is unrealistic to expect that concerned states will rule out other 
means and forms of action to meet the gravity and urgency of these situations. If 
collective organizations will not authorize collective interventions against regimes 
that flout the most elementary norms of legitimate governmental behaviour, then 
the pressures for intervention by ad hoc coalitions or individual states will surely 
intensify... [l]f, following the failure of the Council to act, a military intervention 
is undertaken by an ad hoc coalition or individual state which does fully observe 
and respect all the criteria we have identified, and if the intervention is carried 
through successfully...then this may have enduringly serious consequences for 
the stature and credibility of the UN itself.246 
While reaffirming the centrality of the Security Council and noting the impossibility of 
finding consensus on unauthorized intervention by ad hoc coalitions, the report 
6
 ICISS, Responsibility to Protect vol. 1, 54-55. 
123 
nonetheless hedged its bets, arguing that there existed situations that objectively required 
intervention regardless of whether the Council could agree to them, and that the 
Council's "failure to act" in such situations meant that unauthorized interventions would 
occur anyway. 
The 1CISS report notably refrained from opposing unauthorized interventions as 
such, and has been interpreted by numerous observers as having left open a possible 
loophole for such interventions.47 The fact that the report specifically argued that 
unauthorized interventions that followed the report's proposed criteria for military 
intervention would undermine the reputation and legitimacy of the Council suggested an 
attitude towards UN mechanisms similar to that adopted by the US and UK during the 
Kosovo war: it was "preferable" to act through such mechanisms, but when these "failed" 
to produce the desired outcome, then a higher morality could be invoked to justify 
unauthorized action. This attitude posed a potentially radical challenge to sovereignty 
norms. It opened up the possibility of a new exception to the norm of non-intervention 
and non-use of force in cases where a group of states determined that both the target state 
and the Security Council had failed to fulfill their respective "responsibilities to protect." 
It also suggested a further erosion of legislative and existential sovereign equality through 
the granting of special intervention rights to self-selected group of states based on their 
assessment (according to apparently objective criteria) of the gravity of a given crisis. As 
we shall see in the next chapter, these proposed departures from the norms of sovereignty 
and intervention were greater than those that most developing states were willing to 
contemplate. As a result, in the next part of the international debate over "humanitarian 
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intervention," "R2P," as the new concept became known, would undergo further 
evolution, bringing it closer to the views of the global South. 
4.3 Alternative explanations 
The failure of the NATO intervention in Kosovo to bring about radical change in 
international norms of sovereignty and intervention, by creating a new exception to both 
the norms of non-intervention and non-use of force and by significantly diminishing the 
significance of existential and legislative sovereign equality, was clearly congruent with 
the expressed preferences of a majority of developing countries. While these countries 
may have been split on the Kosovo intervention itself, they were largely united in 
rejecting the "so-called right of humanitarian intervention," and a number of them 
successfully used universal-membership international institutions to reaffirm traditional 
norms of sovereignty in the wake of the Kosovo war. This congruence does not, however, 
necessarily prove that the failure of Northern states to bring about radical norm change 
was the result of developing country influence and of the three factors which I have 
argued facilitated that influence. Other potential factors could have been equally or more 
important. 
One alternative explanation for the failure of the intervention to radically change 
the norms of sovereignty and intervention is that Northern states themselves sought no 
such change. As legal scholars in particular have pointed out, NATO countries were 
notably reluctant to claim a legal right of unauthorized "humanitarian intervention," 
invoking instead legal rationales based on existing Security Council resolutions.24 
Moreover, as we saw above, several NATO countries (Germany, Norway) argued 
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explicitly that the Kosovo intervention should not serve as a precedent for "humanitarian 
intervention" outside the framework of the UN. Nonetheless, as is clear from my survey 
of Northern attitudes above, a number of NATO powers, including, most significantly, 
the US, did view the Kosovo intervention as a model for possible future autonomous 
action by NATO independently of the UN. This is the core message of the comment 
quoted above from the American Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott ("the alliance 
must reserve the right and the freedom to act when its members, by consensus, deem it 
necessary"249) and is implicit in the UK's assessment that the NATO intervention was 
sufficiently a "collective action" to qualify under its proposed criteria for "humanitarian 
intervention"—i.e. that "collective action" did not necessarily mean UN action. This is 
not an argument, moreover, that NATO "middle powers" like Canada, despite their 
evident commitment to UN multilateralism, at any time actively contested. 
Another possible explanation for the failure of the NATO intervention in Kosovo 
to radically alter existing norms of intervention and sovereignty is opposition to such 
change by non-NATO major powers, rather than by the global South as a whole. To be 
sure, both Russia and China stridently opposed both the NATO bombing of the FRY and 
the larger claim of NATO's right to intervene on humanitarian grounds even without 
Security Council authorization. Even so, that such opposition might not itself have been 
enough to defuse the challenge posed by the intervention to existing norms of sovereignty 
and intervention can be seen in the 26 March 1999 Security Council vote on the Russian-
Indian draft resolution condemning NATO. The Council's overwhelming rejection of that 
resolution has been widely interpreted as conferring "legitimacy" (if not legality) on 
NATO actions, and has even been suggested as a model of a new mechanism for 
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"jurying" future interventions whose authorization by the Council is blocked by a 
prospective veto. 50 As I have argued above, this symbolic victory for NATO and for 
proponents of unauthorized "humanitarian intervention" was in large part a result of the 
institutional environment of the Security Council, whose membership rules limited 
representation of the spectrum of views within the global South that were far more 
sceptical of the intervention. A similar victory was not achieved in the General Assembly 
where all developing countries were represented. On the contrary, opponents of NATO 
and "humanitarian intervention" were able to use this venue to reaffirm traditional 
sovereignty norms. Though Russia and China joined the South in this reaffirmation, they 
could not have achieved it alone. Instead, it took the organizational platform of the NAM 
to reconcile differences and mobilize a common Southern rejection of the proposed 
change in sovereignty norms. 
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Chapter 4: Case Study - Part Two, 2002-2005 
Following the publication of the report of the ICISS in December 2001, the 
international debate on "humanitarian intervention" was temporarily sidelined as a result 
of the September 11 terrorist attacks on the United States, and the ensuing US-declared 
"global war on terror." The hugely controversial US-UK-led invasion of Iraq in March 
2003, conducted without specific Security Council authorization and justified publicly in 
part on humanitarian grounds, seemed to seriously harm the prospects for the emergence 
of the new international consensus on military intervention for human protection 
purposes sought by the ICISS. The Iraq war arguably revealed the ease with which 
humanitarian justifications for the use of force could be abused for narrow security and 
geopolitical ends. 51 Within two and a half years of the Iraq invasion, however, a version 
of the "responsibility to protect" concept was enshrined in a declaration by the largest-
ever gathering of world leaders, the September 2005 High-Level Plenary meeting of the 
General Assembly, also known as the World Summit. This version of the "responsibility 
to protect," however, differed in several important respects from the version of the 
concept first articulated by the ICISS. Indeed, as some have suggested, the very speed 
with which agreement was reached on "R2P" in 2005 was due to the fact that important 
elements of the concept were altered or omitted. This chapter surveys the evolution of the 
"responsibility to protect" from 2001 to 2005, focusing in particular on the role of 
Northern attitudes, the ideological coherence of Southern diplomacy, and institutional 
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environments on the emergence of what some proponents of the original version of the 
"responsibility to protect" have called "R2P-lite." Based on this survey I conclude that 
developments during the period largely support my working hypotheses: 
-First, Northern attitudes during the period following the publication of the ICISS 
report exhibited both a willingness to use force unilaterally and a commitment to 
multilateralism. Specifically, while the US under the administration of George W. Bush 
embraced a foreign policy that dispensed with multilateral organizations when these 
failed to suit US security interests and geopolitical objectives—most controversially 
during the US-led invasion of Iraq—Northern countries promoting the "responsibility to 
protect" (e.g. Canada) reacted to the reassertion of US unilateralism by trying 
increasingly to tie "R2P" more firmly to multilateral mechanisms. As a result of this 
commitment to multilateralism, these states were forced to engage with the views of 
Southern states in a manner that would not have been necessary had they decided to fully 
join the US in unilateralism or moved towards a new North-only mechanism for future 
interventions. This finding supports my third hypothesis that the success of developing 
countries in influencing the direction change in international norms of sovereignty and 
intervention should increase if Northern attitudes remain committed to action through 
multilateral institutions. 
-Second, Southern states continued to exhibit a high degree of ideological 
coherence in terms of their collective rejection of unauthorized "humanitarian 
intervention" by ad hoc coalitions, particularly in the wake of the Iraq war. This was 
probably the primary cause of the emergence of "R2P-lite" in 2005, and, in particular, its 
exclusive focus on Security Council authorization of military intervention which, in 
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effect, reinforced existing norms of non-intervention and the non-use of force. In 
addition, the global South was able for the first time to articulate a collective position 
recognizing the problem of Security Council inaction in cases of grave human rights 
abuses. But it signally failed to translate this recognition into a coherent diplomatic 
position on possible solutions to this problem. While virtually all developing countries 
argued for reform of the Security Council as the primary means of legitimating any 
increase in future interventionist behaviour by the UN, the deep divisions within the 
global South over the shape of Security Council reform ensured that the project of reform 
would, for the time being, go nowhere. This then was notable failure of the South to 
influence the direction of change in the norms of sovereignty and intervention in a 
direction that would have enhanced legislative sovereign equality. 
-Finally, the debate on the "responsibility to protect" between 2001 and 2005 took 
place primarily within the General Assembly, including in a series of informal 
consultations of the Assembly plenary held in the spring and summer of 2005 in 
preparation for the September 2005 World Summit. The universal membership and 
voting rules of the Assembly ensured that the views of developing countries would be 
well represented. The ability of the Non-Aligned Movement to block the passage in 2002 
of a Canadian-backed Assembly resolution on the "responsibility to protect," and then to 
pass against Northern opposition a resolution in 2004 reaffirming existing norms of non-
intervention, non-use of force and sovereign equality, illustrates the leverage of 
developing countries in the Assembly. These events support the hypothesis that the 
success of developing countries in influencing the direction of change in international 
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norms of sovereignty and intervention should increase where institutional environments 
facilitate the participation of developing countries in decision-making. 
1. Northern attitudes 
The ICISS's report was published three months after the September 11 attacks in 
New York City and Washington D.C. and two months after the US-led invasion of 
Afghanistan. The report addressed the September 11 attacks in the introduction to its 
report, arguing that the framework it was proposing for thinking about the use of force for 
humanitarian ends should not be confused with the existing international framework for 
the use offeree in response to transnational terrorist attacks. The latter form of force, the 
report argued, was already covered by the existing exception to the norm of non-use of 
force embodied in Article 51 of the UN Charter which allowed for an "inherent right of 
individual and collective self-defence" against armed attack. Despite the Commission's 
desire to keep the two issues of "humanitarian intervention" and counter-terrorism 
separate, however, the reaction of the George W. Bush administration to the 9/11 
attacks—proclaiming a "global war on terror" and resorting to the use offeree in 
Afghanistan and later Iraq—had a profound impact on the prospects for and evolution of 
the "responsibility to protect." 
The first effect was the marginalization of the entire debate over "humanitarian 
intervention" in international diplomatic fora. In the words of Thomas G. Weiss, "when 
the dust from the World Trade Center and the Pentagon settled, humanitarian intervention 
became a tertiary issue" on the international agenda. While the war in Afghanistan was 
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justified by the US and other NATO powers in part in humanitarian terms—particularly 
by reference to the plight of women under the Taliban's extreme interpretation of 
Islam—the primary legal and political rationale for the war was based on self-defence 
and security.253 The second effect of 9/11 and its aftermath, and in particular of the Iraq 
war and its post-hoc rationalization by the US and UK in humanitarian terms, was the 
intensification, particularly in the global South, of concerns over the potential abuse of 
humanitarian justifications for the use of force by great powers for narrow security and 
geopolitical ends.254 In the aftermath of the Iraq war, even one-time friends of the 
"responsibility to protect" became more cautious, and advocates of the concept (both 
state and non-state) sought to allay concerns over the issue of abuse by more firmly tying 
the concept to multilateral mechanisms for the authorization of the use of force. The 
consequence of the Iraq war for the "responsibility to protect" was thus paradoxical: 
while US commitment to multilateralism under the George W. Bush administration was 
at its lowest perhaps since Ronald Reagan, Northern proponents of the "responsibility to 
protect" (particularly Canada and several European countries) reacted to resurgent US 
unilateralism by reaffirming their commitment to multilateral institutions, and by 
emphasizing the centrality of these institutions to the "responsibility to protect." 
The "R2P" concept itself was not universally welcomed in the North. Middle 
powers such as Canada, Sweden, New Zealand and Australia were highly supportive. The 
reaction of the US, on the other hand, was largely negative. The George W. Bush 
administration reportedly decided early on not to support any formal UN declaration on 
the subject and in particular rejected the notion of criteria of legitimacy to guide Security 
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Council decision-making "on the grounds that it would not bind itself in ways that might 
constrain its right to decide when and where to use force."255 The UK and France were 
more positive, though both remained concerned that even agreement on criteria for 
intervention would not guarantee the political will and consensus to act.256 On the key 
issue of "right authority," the Western members of the US, UK, and France all "flatly 
rejected the view that unauthorized intervention should be prohibited in all 
circumstances." The US in particular maintained its traditional approach of 
"exceptionalism" on the issue of use of force, now articulated in the context of an even 
more expansive framework for the unilateral use of force. This framework was 
articulated in the administration's September 2002 National Security Strategy (NSS), 
which argued that, faced with the dual threat of transnational terrorism and "rogue states" 
seeking weapons of mass destruction (WMD), the US would not hesitate to use force 
unilaterally and "preemptively." In the words of the NSS 
The United States has long maintained the option of preemptive actions to counter 
a sufficient threat to our national security. The greater the threat, the greater is the 
risk of inaction—and the more compelling the case for taking anticipatory action 
to defend ourselves, even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the 
enemy's attack. To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the 
United States will, if necessary, act preemptively... While the United States will 
constantly strive to enlist the support of the international community, we will not 
hesitate to act alone, if necessary, to exercise our right of self-defence by acting 
I C O 
preemptively. 
While the US claim to a right of the unilateral "pre-emptive" (actually preventive) 
use of force was articulated specifically as a doctrine of "self-defence" against 
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transnational terrorism and the proliferation of WMD, the NSS also included a militant 
defence of liberal-humanitarian universalism which unmistakably echoed previous 
justifications of "humanitarian intervention." "The values of freedom are right and true 
for every person, in every society," the NSS declared, "and the duty of protecting these 
values against their enemies is the common calling of freedom-loving people across the 
globe and across the ages."259 The NSS further determined that "rogue states"—i.e. states 
that the US unilaterally decided were threats to the world—were characterized not only 
by their determination to acquire weapons of mass destruction and by their sponsorship 
of international terrorism, but also by the fact that they "brutalizefd] their own people" 
and "rejected] basic human values."260 The NSS specifically labelled genocide as 
"behaviour that no respectable government can condone or support and all must 
oppose"261 and argued that dealing with protracted conflicts and humanitarian crises was 
not only a moral duty, but was intimately related to security concerns, as the kinds of 
regimes and "failed state" situations which threatened "basic human values" also tended 
to become breeding grounds for extremism and terrorism. This, the NSS argued, was the 
lesson of 9/11, "that weak states, like Afghanistan, can pose as great a danger to our 
national interests as strong states."262 
The mixture of security and moral arguments found in the 2002 NSS was also 
characteristic of the justifications provided by the US for the subsequent invasion of Iraq 
in 2003. While the primary public justification for the war concerned the threat posed by 













advanced, particularly after post-invasion investigations found no evidence of a 
significant Iraqi WMD capability. But it was the UK which made particularly strong use 
of humanitarian arguments to justify the war. Speaking before the beginning of the war, 
in February 2003, British Prime Minister Tony Blair argued that, given the history of 
grave human rights abuses in Saddam Hussein's Iraq, "ridding the world of Saddam 
Hussein would be an act of humanity," while leaving him in power would be 
"inhumane."263 
Some of the humanitarian justifications proffered by the US and UK echoed or 
drew directly on the language of the "responsibility to protect." In the US, then-director 
of policy planning at the US State Department Richard Haas justified the use of force 
against Iraq in terms reminiscent of the "responsibility to protect" in February 2003. 
Writing the New York Times, Haas argued that there was "an emerging global consensus 
that sovereignty, rather than being a blank check, is contingent on each state fulfilling 
certain fundamental obligations, both to its own citizens and to the international 
community," and that "when a government fails to live up to these responsibilities or 
abuses its prerogatives, it risks forfeiting its sovereign privileges — including, in extreme 
cases, its immunity from armed intervention." For Haas such forfeiture of sovereignty 
could occur for three reasons: when a state harboured terrorists, when it threatened global 
security, and when it committed or failed to prevent genocide or crimes against humanity 
from occurring on its territory. In the latter case, Haas argued, "the international 
community has the right, and in some cases the obligation, to act to safeguard the lives of 
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innocents." Speaking a year after the beginning of the war, Tony Blair also echoed the 
terms of the "responsibility to protect," arguing that "the essence of [international] 
community is common rights and responsibilities...We do not accept in a community that 
others have a right to oppress and brutalise their people. We value the freedom and 
dignity of the human race and each individual in it... we surely have a responsibility to 
act when a nation's people are subject to a regime such as Saddam's." 5 
The willingness of the US and UK to use force against Iraq in the absence of 
explicit authorization by the Security Council, and to justify it in part by humanitarian 
arguments, was highly controversial, even among key NATO allies. Unlike the 
intervention in Kosovo and the war in Afghanistan, in both of which numerous NATO 
countries participated, key NATO countries such as France, Germany and Canada 
declined to participate in the invasion of Iraq. Among these, Canada in particular, was a 
key supporter of the "responsibility to protect" and was evidently aware of the potential 
for Iraq to damage the prospects for gaining support for the new concept. This potential 
was evident already in July 2003, at a summit of left-of-centre governments in the UK, 
during which attempts by Canada and the UK to include a reference to the "responsibility 
to protect" in the summit's communique were actively opposed by Northern governments 
that had been hitherto considered supporters of the "R2P" concept, including Germany, 
New Zealand and Sweden. The wording of the communique proposed by Canada and the 
UK—"where a population is suffering serious harm, as a result of internal war, 
insurgency, repression or state failure, and the state in question is unwilling or unable to 
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halt or avert it, the principle of non-intervention yields to international responsibility"— 
was rejected, reportedly because it was feared that it could be construed as providing post 
hoc justification to the invasion of Iraq. The final communique limited itself to calling on 
the General Assembly to discuss the "responsibility to protect" and declaring that "the 
Security Council remains the sole body to authorise global action." 
Reacting to the widespread negative reaction against US and UK unilateralism, 
key "norm entrepreneurs" promoting the "responsibility to protect" now sought to tie the 
concept more closely to multilateral mechanisms and institutions. According to Alex 
Bellamy, Canada in particular consciously adopted a policy of "tying non-consensual 
force under the banner of R2P exclusively with Security Council authorisation - rather 
than primarily, as proposed by the ICISS."267 Speaking before the plenary of the General 
Assembly in 2004, Canadian Prime Minister Paul Martin argued explicitly that the 
Security Council was central to the authorization of any use offeree under the aegis of 
the "responsibility to protect," and that R2P advocates were "not arguing for a unilateral 
right to intervene in one country whenever another country feels like it."268 Other 
important "norm entrepreneurs" promoting the "responsibility to protect," similarly 
emphasized the central role of existing UN mechanisms for the authorization offeree. 
Secretary-General Kofi Annan embraced the "responsibility to protect" and, in the wake 
of Iraq, sought to propel the UN membership towards a new consensus on the concept. In 
September 2003, Annan appointed a UN High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and 
Change to produce an in-depth study of global threats and challenges, including those 
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posed by civil conflict and humanitarian crisis. The Panel, chaired by the former prime 
minister of Thailand Anand Panyarachun, included among its members Gareth Evans, 
former foreign minister of Australia and co-chair of the ICISS. The report of the High-
Lev el Panel, published in December 2004, endorsed the concept of the "responsibility to 
protect" but, unlike the ICISS, reserved the exclusive authority to decide on the use of 
force for humanitarian purposes to the Security Council (see discussion below).269 The 
Panel's conclusion was endorsed by the Secretary-General himself in his report on UN 
reform published in March 2005.270 
Along with this commitment to multilateralism on the part of the key state and 
non-state promoters of the "responsibility to protect," it is important to note that the 
agreement on "R2P" at the 2005 World Summit was also preceded by an important, if 
subtle, shift in US attitudes. While the Bush administration did not renounce its doctrine 
of unilateralism, the post-Iraq invasion period saw signs of significant US reengagement 
with the UN and the debate over the "responsibility to protect." As Bellamy argues, the 
groundwork for this reengagement was laid within the US by a high profile bipartisan 
task force on UN reform organized by the US Institute of Peace and co-chaired by US 
senators George Mitchell and Newt Gingrich. The task force's report, published in June 
2005, included an endorsement of the "responsibility to protect," arguing that 
"governments have a responsibility to protect their people" and that "if a government 
fails in its primary responsibility to protect the lives of those living within its jurisdiction 
from genocide, mass killings, and massive and sustained human rights violations, it 
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forfeits claims to immunity from intervention." In such cases, the report argued the 
"United States should be prepared to lead the Security Council in finding the most 
effective action across the full range of legal, economic, political, and 
military tools." In cases in which non-military means of stopping massive human rights 
abuses proved insufficient, the Security Council should authorize the use of force and 
ensure that any intervention possessed "the authority and capability to achieve its 
objective of preventing or halting genocide, mass killing, and massive and sustained 
human rights violations." 71 Unlike other promoters of R2P in the global North and at the 
UN, however, the Task Force explicitly left open the possibility of unauthorized armed 
intervention "in cases in which the Security Council is unable to take effective action in 
response to massive human rights abuses and/or genocide." As Bellamy argues, this 
permissive attitude towards unauthorized intervention arguably facilitated American 
engagement with the R2P debate by addressing one of the primary concerns of the Bush 
administration with the concept, namely its potential to restrain the US's ability to use 
force unilaterally when it decided that this was in the US's national interest. 
2. Ideological coherence of Southern diplomacy 
As during the debate over "humanitarian intervention" that followed the Kosovo 
intervention, the commitment of Northern states that promoted the "responsibility to 
protect" to going through the multilateral mechanisms of the UN and making the "R2P" 
part of their program for UN reform, meant that they would have to engage with views of 
the global South. As we saw in the previous chapter, there was a great deal of coherence 
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among countries in the global South after the Kosovo intervention on the question of 
unauthorized "humanitarian intervention" by self-selected groups of states. The invasion 
of Iraq by the US-led "coalition of the willing" without explicit Security Council 
authorization, and the use of humanitarian arguments to justify it, reinforced the 
opposition of developing countries to legitimizing any framework of intervention that 
could permit self-appointed ad hoc coalitions to intervene in the name of the international 
community. Beyond a general opposition to unilateralism, however, the Southern 
response to the "responsibility to protect" showed that a number of important differences 
on the question of intervention persisted within the global South. These concerned three 
questions in particular: first, the degree to which the "responsibility to protect" was or 
was not essentially the same thing as the "right of humanitarian intervention" which the 
South had rejected in 1999 and 2000, and thus the degree to which the new concept 
should be opposed as a threat to traditional norms of sovereignty; second, the question of 
the usefulness and/or legitimacy of formally recognizing criteria for the use of force as 
proposed by the ICISS, the High-Level Panel and the Secretary General; and third, the 
question of what solutions were possible to the problem of Security Council inaction in 
cases of grave human rights abuse and humanitarian need. On all three questions, the 
organizational platform of the Non-Aligned Movement was able to serve as a venue for 
reconciling differences only to a very limited extent. On the first question, divisions 
among NAM members over whether to support or oppose the new R2P concept meant 
that the Movement was able to present only a noncommittal stance, a stance which 
persisted due to the strong opposition of a small group of ardent R2P sceptics, even as 
most other NAM countries moved towards at least a willingness to consider the concept, 
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which they increasingly viewed as being different from the "so-called right of 
humanitarian intervention." On the question of criteria for the use of force, the NAM 
declared the South's fundamental opposition to the formalization of such criteria even 
though many developing countries evidently support them. On the issue of Security 
Council inaction, the NAM was able for this first time in its history to collectively agree 
that this was indeed a problem (hitherto the Movement had largely focused on the 
Council's overuse of coercive action), but none of the three possible solutions proposed 
by NAM members—intervention by regional organizations with ex post facto 
authorization by the Security Council, the formalization of mechanisms to overrule the 
veto power of the P5 through the General Assembly, and reform and expansion of the 
Security Council—managed to secure sufficient consensus to form the basis of a 
collective bargaining position. Security Council expansion and reform, seen by many as a 
potential answer to the problem of the Security Council's ineffectiveness and 
illegitimacy, was particularly divisive. 
2.1 "Responsibility to Protect" vs. "Humanitarian Intervention " 
Following the release of the ICISS report in late 2001, few developing countries 
directly addressed the "responsibility to protect" in their public statements at the United 
Nations. Those that did, especially Latin American and African states, were supportive, 
while a few others (e.g. India) were sceptical.273 After the "responsibility to protect" was 
endorsed by the reports of the High-Lev el Panel and Secretary-General, and as 
preparations for the September 2005 High-Level Plenary got underway, the 
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"responsibility to protect" was discussed more frequently within the General Assembly, 
providing developing countries several opportunities to voice their opinions on the 
concept. Between January and April of 2005, the General Assembly held a series of 
"informal thematic consultations" on the reports of the High-Level Panel and the 
Secretary-General. During these meetings, at least 24 developing countries presented 
statements directly addressing the "responsibility to protect," while several others 
addressed the concept by endorsing the collective statements of either the NAM or the 
53-member African Group. In broad terms, these statements revealed that the global 
South was split roughly evenly between those countries that basically supported (though 
often cautiously and with numerous qualifications) the concept of a "responsibility to 
protect" as articulated by the High-Level Panel and the Secretary-General, and those 
whose responses were largely negative or even outright hostile. In general, the former 
group included most Latin American countries (with the notable exceptions of Cuba and 
Venezuela) and most sub-Saharan African countries. The latter group included Cuba, 
Venezuela and Egypt as the most hostile to the concept, and a variety of Middle Eastern, 
South Asian and East Asian states which expressed varying degrees of scepticism or 
hostility. 
Among Latin American states, Argentina, Chile, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Mexico 
and Peru were strongly supportive of the "responsibility to protect" during the informal 
General Assembly consultations of early 2005, while Colombia was notably cautious. 
Brazil initially said very little on the subject, limiting its comments to a call for a detailed 
examination of the concept by the General Assembly.274 At the informal thematic 
" Statement by Ambassador Ronaldo Sardenberg, Permanent Representative of Brazil to the UN 
at the Informal Thematic Consultations on the Report of the Secretary-General, In Larger Freedom: 
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consultations held by the General Assembly on the Secretary-General's report in April 
2005, the Argentine representative argued that the "responsibility to protect" was a 
legitimate expansion of the definition of threat to international peace and security, and 
therefore could be used by the Security Council under chapter VII of the UN Charter to 
suspend the non-intervention rule enshrined in Article 2(7). However, any use offeree 
under the auspices of the "responsibility to protect" had to be a "last resort [used only] 
once all methods not implying the use of force have been exhausted, in order to impede 
or stop massive, systematic and flagrant violations of human rights."275 Costa Rica agreed 
with the Secretary-General's contention that the principle of sovereignty could not shield 
the commission of crimes against humanity and stressed that the international community 
had an obligation to act to prevent and stop such crimes when governments were unable 
or unwilling. Any such action, however, had to have prior Security Council authorization 
under Chapter VII, and the "responsibility to protect" could not become a pretext for 
unilateral interventionism.276 The representative of Mexico expressed support for the 
Secretary-General's view that the "collective responsibility to protect" constituted an 
emerging international norm in the practice of the Security Council, in particular in its 
977 
expansion of the definition of threats to international peace and security. Colombia was 
more cautious but also supportive, agreeing that states had a duty to protect their citizens 
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but insisting that the concept of the "responsibility to protect" had to strictly accord with 
the UN Charter and emerge from intergovernmental negotiations so as to prevent it from 
becoming "an excuse to impose, intervene, and judge."278 It is notable that none of these 
statements viewed the "responsibility to protect" as in any significant way altering the 
norms of non-intervention or non-use of force. Instead, they reaffirmed the expansion of 
the definition of "threats to international peace and security" which allowed for Security 
Council to pursue enforcement action as an exception to Article 2(7), and several Latin 
American states argued explicitly that R2P should not become an excuse for unilateral 
intervention. 
Among sub-Saharan African states, the strongest supporters of the "responsibility 
to protect" in discussions leading up to the 2005 World Summit were Cote d'lvoire, 
Senegal, Uganda, Benin and Tanzania. Tanzanian president Benjamin Mkapa was a 
strong supporter of the "responsibility to protect", declaring that the concept recognized 
that, in the wake of Rwanda 
the principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of a State can no longer 
find unqualified, absolute legitimacy... States must firmly be placed on notice 
that the humanity we all share demands that we should collectively have an 
interest in its promotion as well as in its protection. Governments must first be 
held responsible for the life and welfare of their people. But there must also be 
common agreed rules and benchmarks that would trigger collective action, 
through our regional organizations and the United Nations, against Governments 
that commit unacceptable human rights abuses or threaten regional peace and 
279 
security. 
Statement by H.E. Mrs. Maria Angela Holguin Cuellar, Ambassador, Permanent 
Representative of Colombia to the United Nations, Informal Thematic Consultations of the General 
Assembly on Cluster III: Freedom to Live in Dignity. 20 April 2005. 5. 
httpV/wwAv.reformtheun.org/index.php/issues/l02?theme=alt4 (accessed 15 July 2010). 
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Not all African states were equally supportive of intervention and R2P however, and 
many expressed varying degrees of caution, stressing that the "responsibility to protect" 
should not serve as a pretext for unilateral intervention by powerful states in the affairs of 
the weak, and that its exercise had to be closely supervised to prevent misuse in a way 
that would undermine state sovereignty.280 This caution was reflected in the official 
collective statement of the 53-member African Group, presented at the General Assembly 
consultations by the representative of Malawi. While expressing support for "the moral 
obligation behind the 'responsibility to protect' as a basis for collective action" in 
humanitarian emergencies, the Group's statement stressed that "care must be taken to 
ensure that responsibility to protect must not lend itself to subjective interpretation." In 
particular, the Group argued for a clear distinction to be maintained between the 
"unwillingness" and "inability" of states to protect their populations, and between 
"crimes against humanity" and "gross violations of human rights" as thresholds for 
external involvement. The Group also argued that the emphasis of the "responsibility to 
protect" should be on "building the capacity of states to assist in efforts to protect" rather 
than on coercive intervention. With regard to who should decide whether a state was 
"unwilling" to protect its population and whether or not non-forceful means of 
international engagement had proven insufficient in any given case, the Group referred to 
the Constitutive Act of the African Union and the collective African position on UN 
reform (the so-called "Ezulwini Consensus" - see below), both of which gave this 
authority to the AU Assembly, with the latter document explicitly allowing for regional 
^ See e.g. Declaration de S.E.M. Philippe Djangone-Bi, Representant Permanent de la Cote 
d'lvoire Aupres des Nations Unies, Sur le module IIIL : Vivre dans la dignite, 19 April 2005. 
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interventions authorized ex post facto by the Security Council. The African Group thus 
both welcomed the R2P concept and warned that "the protection of citizens should not be 
used as a pretext to undermine the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of 
States."282 
North African, Middle Eastern, and Asian states, as well as Cuba and Venezuela 
in Latin America, were far more sceptical of, and even hostile to, the "responsibility to 
protect." Egypt argued that the concept "conflicted] directly with well established 
principles enshrined in the Charter, particularly those related to the use of force, 
sovereignty, territorial integrity and non interference in the internal affairs of states," and 
that "it would allow the strong to judge the weak" and "further deepen suspicions among 
civilization and cultures." The Algerian representative, while acknowledging that 
states had a duty to protect their populations and the international community could not 
remain indifferent to gross violations of rights, stressed that the "responsibility to protect" 
was a vague concept which was highly reminiscent of the older "right to intervene" and 
thus had to be careful examined to determine its implications for the principles of 
sovereignty and non-intervention.284 From the Middle East, Syria and Iran were highly 
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sceptical, with the latter warning that the "responsibility to protect" could "pave the 
ground for certain powers to pursue their political agenda under the pretext of 
humanitarian intervention and protection."285 Qatar was less hostile though still quite 
cautious, arguing that "a concept such as the 'collective responsibility to protect' cannot 
be adopted without clarifying all its aspects, including the grounds that must be present 
and the methods and measures that have to be exhausted before it is enforced, provided 
such enforcement conforms with the U.N. Charter." Qatar also insisted that the concept 
could not be considered legitimate unless the Security Council was reformed and made 
more representative. 
From South Asia, India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka were notably 
sceptical. The Pakistani ambassador, while acknowledging that the international 
community should seek to deter and punish violations of international humanitarian law 
in conflict situations, argued that "Pakistan cannot embrace the concept of a 
'responsibility to protect' [as] it appears to us that this is an evolution of the earlier 
concept of'humanitarian intervention'." The Pakistani representative did concede that 
international action may be necessary in situations of state collapse, but that even then, 
"it will be essential to guard against unilateral or unauthorized intervention by regional or 
global powers to promote their own political, economic or strategic interest." 
Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security, And Human Rights For All, 19 April 2005, 2. 
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Interestingly, the Pakistani representative argued that any such international actions in 
collapsed states had to be authorized collectively by the Security Council "or, failing this, 
by the General Assembly." Even in such circumstances, however, "the sovereignty, unity 
and territorial integrity of the State concerned must be fully safeguarded and preserved 
and authority transferred back as soon as possible to its own people." Pakistan also 
emphasized that any credible "responsibility to protect" would have to rely on prior 
"responsibility to assist" states in fulfilling their right to development. The Bangladeshi 
representative was similarly critical, disagreeing with the Secretary-General's assertion 
that the "responsibility to protect" constituted an "emerging norm," arguing that, "at 
present, there is no consensus whatsoever in the membership about the notions of 
'responsibility to protect' or 'humanitarian intervention'." While agreeing that genocide 
and ethnic cleansing deserved unequivocal condemnation, Bangladesh urged "extreme 
caution against subjective application of these so-called principles of'responsibility to 
protect' or 'humanitarian intervention,' which would ignore some and acknowledge other 
atrocities."288 Echoing the concerns of others, the Indian representative argued that 
discussion of the "responsibility to protect should not become a "cover for conferring any 
legitimacy on the so-called 'right of humanitarian intervention'." Among East Asian 
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states, Indonesia, Malaysia and Vietnam all expressed reservations regarding the R2P 
principle.290 
The most critical of the new concept were Cuba and Venezuela. Cuba argued that 
"responsibility to protect" was little more than a new version of the "right of 
intervention," and that its adoption by the UN would be "suicidal" to small states under 
conditions "characterized by the existence of an economic and military dictatorship 
exerted by the superpower," double-standards, contempt for international law and the 
political manipulation of human rights.291 The Venezuelan delegate was scathing in his 
criticisms of the Secretary-General's recommendation "that the so-called international 
community — a euphemism for the major Powers and their representatives — should 
shoulder the 'responsibility to protect' as a basis for collective action against genocide, 
ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity." R2P was "a pretext for interfering in the 
internal affairs of States — the weak ones, of course — applying double standards and 
concealing unmentionable motives," and would encourage the Security Council to adopt 
"coercive measures against the States — States of the South — which, on the basis of the 
views of just a few, would be stigmatized as systematic violators of collective human 
rights and punished through 'humanitarian intervention'."292 
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There was thus very little "ideological coherence" apparent in the initial reactions 
of the developing countries to the "responsibility to protect." While opponents like Cuba, 
Venezuela and Egypt saw it as a fig-leaf for interference by great powers in the internal 
affairs of weaker states, supporters, especially in Latin America and sub-Saharan Africa, 
welcomed it as an innovation that could facilitate future action by the United Nations in 
response to mass atrocities. The NAM remained unable to bridge this gap. When they 
first addressed the "responsibility to protect" directly in February 2003 during the NAM's 
thirteenth conference of heads of state and government in Kuala Lumpur, NAM members 
could agree only to take note of "similarities between the new expression 'responsibility 
to protect' and 'humanitarian intervention'" and request the Movement's Co-ordinating 
Bureau in New York to "carefully study and consider the expression 'the responsibility to 
protect' and its implications on the basis of the principles of non-interference and non-
intervention as well as the respect for territorial integrity and national sovereignty of 
States."293 This noncommittal position was repeated word for word in the NAM's August 
2004 ministerial declaration from Durban, South Africa,294 and in the NAM's official 
statements on the High-Level Panel report295 and the report of the Secretary-General.296 
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As the NAM's position indicates, a key concern of many developing countries 
was the degree to which the "responsibility to protect" concept could be used to 
reintroduce the "right of humanitarian intervention" which the South had decisively 
rejected in 1999 and 2000. Supporters of the "responsibility to protect," from the North 
and South, thus went out of their way in the lead-up to the 2005 World Summit to assert 
that the "responsibility to protect" and "humanitarian intervention" were not the same 
thing. While ardent critics like Venezuela, Cuba and Iran could not be won over—thus 
ensuring that the NAM as a whole stuck to its noncommittal position in the ensuing 
discussions of the successive drafts of the World Summit Outcome Document —an 
important development in the last few months before the World Summit was the slow 
shift in position of a number of other sceptical states such as Malaysia, Pakistan and 
Egypt. This shift was facilitated by the successful distancing of R2P from its association 
with "humanitarian intervention" and the emphasis in newer iterations of the concept on 
non-coercive measures, including those aimed at assisting states in building their capacity 
to protect and those aimed at addressing "root causes" of conflict and humanitarian 
crises. The new emphasis on R2P as a "continuum" of measures, most of them non-
coercive, was evident in the first draft of the Outcome Document presented by the 
President of the General Assembly on 3 June 2005. The document characterized the 
"responsibility to protect" as follows: 
We agree that the responsibility to protect civilian populations lies first and 
foremost with each individual State. The international community should, as 
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necessary, encourage and help States to exercise this responsibility. The 
international community has also the responsibility to use diplomatic, 
humanitarian and other peaceful means under Chapter VI and VIII of the UN 
Charter to help protect civilian populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic 
cleansing, and crimes against humanity. If such peaceful means appear 
insufficient, we recognize our shared responsibility to take collective action, 
through the Security Council and, as appropriate, in cooperation with relevant 
regional organizations under Chapter VII of the Charter.298 
The sequential nature of R2P—moving from state responsibility to international 
encouragement and assistance, the use of peaceful means under Chapter VI and VIII, and 
finally collective action under Chapter VII—was also emphasized by several R2P 
supporters during the GA President's first informal consultations on the draft Outcome 
Document held in the Assembly in late June and late July-early August. Tanzania, 
reiterating its claim that "the responsibility to protect is not humanitarian intervention," 
and insisting that the concept was entirely compatible with the principles of sovereignty, 
territorial integrity and non-interference, argued that R2P be seen as progressing through 
four stages: first, a "national responsibility to protect"; second, international prevention 
efforts through diplomatic means and early warning mechanisms; third, international 
assistance including technical, social and humanitarian; and, fourth, as a last resort 
"collective action to protect civilians by the Security Council under chapters VI and VII 
of the Charter or by regional organisations in consultations with the Security Council on 
matters related to genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes." The Chilean 
representative at the these meeting argued that the "responsibility to protect" implied an 
United Nations General Assembly, draft Outcome Document of the High-Leve] Plenary 
Meeting of the Genera] Assembly of September 2005 submitted by the President of the General Assembly, 
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international "responsibility to prevent and assist" and that, in order to protect 
populations from atrocity crimes, "the international community is obliged to have 
recourse first of all to the peaceful means provided for in Chapters VI and VIII of the 
Charter... Collective action under Chapter VII, through the Security Council and with the 
cooperation of regional organizations, must be undertaken only if the peaceful means and 
instruments provided for in Chapters VI and VIII prove ineffective."300 The Mexican 
delegate similarly proposed "emphasizing that the concept is a continuum and that it 
therefore includes prevention and international assistance, including development and 
capacity-building." ' The Argentine representative acknowledged the legitimacy of fears 
that R2P could be misused for political purposes, but insisted that "the [draft outcome] 
document clearly establishes that this is a last resort, when all diplomatic, humanitarian 
and pacific means have failed and it comes to the protection of a civil population of a 
genocide, of war crimes or other crimes against humanity."302 
This sequential approach, with its emphasis on state responsibility and non-
coercive means, seemed to be more acceptable to several R2P sceptics. Thus Pakistan, 
while reiterating that "many doubts remain regarding the concept of the so-called 
'responsibility to protect'," also allowed that the concept should be further discussed and 
studied. The Pakistani delegate declared that while all states agreed on the necessity of 
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civilian protection in armed conflicts, it was necessary to ensure that international efforts 
to promote such protection did not contravene the principles of non-intervention, national 
sovereignty and territorial integrity.303 Egypt also seemed to indicate that it would be 
prepared to support a declaration on R2P provided it did not alter existing international 
law concerning intervention and the use of force. The Egyptian delegate declared: "States 
are fully responsible for the protection of their own citizens. In doing so, states are free to 
receive assistance or support from regional and international organizations and 
arrangements, or from the international community as they see fit. In cases of violations 
to international law that could constitute a breach to international peace and security, the 
Security Council may interfere in accordance with its mandate in the Charter."30 The Sri 
Lankan delegate declared that his country "agree[d] with the proposition that primary 
responsibility to protect the civilian population lies exclusively within the sovereign 
domain of each individual State" and that "the international community should, where 
necessary, encourage and help States to exercise this responsibility." International action 
had to begin with "peaceful means under Chapter VI and Chapter VII of the Charter to 
protect civilians... and if such measures prove insufficient, the exercise of shared 
responsibility to take action through the Security Council, must be in full conformity with 
the purposes and principles of the UN Charter and discharged in a manner that the 
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concept of responsibility to protect is not diverted for the achievement of political 
ends."305 
While the hardcore R2P sceptics in the NAM (Cuba, Venezuela, Iran) continued 
to reject any inclusion of the concept in the Outcome Document, the shift in emphasis 
towards non-coercive measures, and assurances that R2P was not the same thing as 
"humanitarian intervention," ensured that enough developing countries were willing to 
agree to its inclusion in the final document. 
2.2 Criteria for the use of force 
This shift on the part of notable Southern R2P sceptics made some consensus 
position on R2P possible, provided it emphasized the "continuum" nature of R2P, 
emphasized state responsibility, preventive and non-coercive measures, and limited 
coercive action to that authorized by the Security Council. On the question of coercive 
measures, however, important divergences of views remained within the global South on 
the question of the usefulness and legitimacy of criteria for guiding decision making on 
the use of force. As we saw in the previous chapter, the ICISS had proposed several 
criteria—just cause, right intention, last resort, proportional means and reasonable 
prospects—that the Security Council should use to guide decision-making on whether to 
authorize coercive intervention for human protection purposes. The Commission had also 
suggested that such criteria could be used by ad hoc coalitions or individual states in 
Statement by Mr. V. Padukkage, Charge d'Affaires of the Permanent Mission of Sri Lanka to 
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cases where the Security Council failed to authorize prompt action. The report of the 
High-Level Panel essentially reiterated the proposed criteria, though without any 
discussion of the possibility of unauthorized intervention.307 The Secretary General called 
on the Security Council to adopt a resolution setting out these criteria and expressing its 
intention to be guided by them in decisions on the use of force.3 The early drafts of the 
World Summit Outcome Document proposed that states "recognize the need to continue 
discussing principles for the use offeree, as identified by the Secretary-General, and that 
such principles should be among the factors considered by the Security Council in 
deciding to authorize the use of force as provided under the Charter." 
Within the global South, there was a division of opinion between those who 
accepted that the criteria could be useful in both enabling the Security Council to come to 
agreement on the necessity of collective action in R2P-type situations and constraining 
the abuse of the concept for political ends, and those who feared that the formalization of 
such criteria would actually encourage abuse by giving interveners more arguments to 
use to justify illegitimate intervention. Among the supporters of criteria were several 
African as well as a Latin American states.310 The AU's official position on UN reform, 
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the so-called "Ezulwini Consensus" (see below) also supported the use of the criteria by 
the Security Council when authorizing the use offeree in R2P situations.31' Among the 
opponents of criteria were the R2P sceptics in the NAM. Pakistan, for example, argued 
that the criteria would be subjectively and selectively applied and frequently abused.312 
The permanent representative from Algeria pointed to the difficulty of having any 
proposed criteria interpreted by a unrepresentative body like the Security Council, and 
that there was no guarantee that these criteria would facilitate agreement between great 
powers if these continued to pursue their narrow political interests.313 Egypt and Vietnam 
expressed similar concerns.314 Other states (such as Malaysia) rejected the development 
of criteria by the Security Council but supported their discussion within the General 
Assembly.315 At least one state (Uruguay) opposed the formalization of criteria on the use 
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of force for fear that they could inhibit rather than facilitate collective action under 
Chapter VII.316 
Despite this evident difference of opinion, the position of those opposed to the 
formalization of criteria on the use of force by the Security Council carried the day within 
the NAM. While the NAM's official response to the High-Level Panel report contained 
no statement on the question of criteria, by the time of the informal consultations on the 
Secretary-General's report a few months later, the NAM was official opposed to the 
Security Council adopting a resolution laying out criteria for the use of force,317 a 
position which the NAM reiterated in the informal Assembly consultations on successive 
drafts of the Outcome Document. Of course, this does not mean that those developing 
countries in favour of the adoption of criteria had changed their minds; a number of them 
continued to promote the adoption of criteria by the Security Council,319 though a 
significant number seem to have agreed on a compromise position whereby any criteria 
on the use of force should be elaborated and adopted by the General Assembly rather 
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than the Security Council. In early September 2005, as the Outcome Document was 
nearing its final draft, the NAM submitted to the President of the General Assembly a 
final set of proposed amendments which again called for removing any reference to 
criteria from the Outcome Document. In the end, reference to the criteria on the use of 
force, included in the early drafts of the Outcome Document, were dropped in the final 
draft, though this was likely because of the opposition of the US to the proposal as well 
as that of the NAM.322 
2.3 The problem of Security Council inaction 
All developing countries that supported (or at least stopped actively opposing) the 
"responsibility to protect" in the lead-up to the 2005 World Summit did so on the 
understanding that the concept should not be used to legitimate unauthorized unilateral 
"humanitarian intervention." Those developing countries that opposed the concept argued 
that it was dangerous precisely because it would facilitate such intervention. There was 
thus largely a consensus in the global South, as there had been since the Kosovo war, 
against any consecration of unilateral "humanitarian intervention." There was also an 
awareness, however, that the problem that gave rise to unilateral "humanitarian 
intervention"—the problem of Security Council inaction in the face of grave crises—had 
to be faced if such intervention was to be avoided. In February 2005, this awareness was, 
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for the first time, translated into a collective position by the Non-Aligned Movement. 
Where the NAM had in the past routinely criticized (and continued to criticize) the 
Security Council's overreliance on coercive measures under Chapter VII, it now added 
criticism of the Council's inaction, arguing that "the Security Council has been too quick 
to threaten or authorize action [under Chapter VII] in some cases while being silent and 
inactive in others."323 This novel formulation was likely the result of pressure from 
African states which had consistently expressed concern over the Council's inaction in 
the case of Rwanda, but it may also have been supported by Arab states which had long 
sought greater Council activism in the context of the conflict in Palestine. Part of the 
problem in the latter case in particular (as it had been the case of Kosovo) was the power 
of the veto. In March 2001, NAM countries on the Council had proposed a resolution 
calling for the deployment of an international intervention force in the Palestinian 
Occupied Territories which obtained nine affirmative votes but was vetoed by the US. 
If there was some coherence in the South on the diagnosis of the problem of 
Security Council inaction, there was little agreement on possible solutions. Three 
possible solutions were proposed by NAM countries: a new "right of intervention" for 
regional organizations with only ex post facto Security Council authorization; a formal 
mechanism allowing the Security Council to override the veto; and reform of the Security 
Council to increase its membership and make it more accountable to the general UN 
membership. None of these proposals, however, gained general adherence among 
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Southern states in the lead-up to the 2005 World Summit. Security Council enlargement 
and reform, while generally agreed to be necessary, was particularly divisive. 
2.3.1 Regional intervention and ex post facto authorization 
As we saw in the previous chapter, African states had committed themselves in 
the Constitutive Act of the African Union to a regional "right of intervention" which 
would allow the AU Assembly to authorize regional intervention in AU member states in 
"grave circumstances" involving war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity.325 
As numerous scholars have noted, this proposal emerged directly out of the African 
experience of the lack of international political will in dealing with its crises, most 
notably and disastrously in Rwanda. In Rwanda, international inaction—what Simon 
Chesterman calls "inhumanitarian non-intervention"—occurred not because of concerns 
with Rwanda's sovereignty, but because of a lack of interest or will by the permanent 
members of the Security Council to address the looming genocide. This lack of will was 
famously symbolized by the Council's April 21, 1994 vote to withdraw (rather than 
reinforce) most of the UN peacekeeping mission in Rwanda, leaving the Rwandan Tutsi 
to their fate. At least one African state proposed that it would intervene but requested 
logistical support which was not forthcoming. The experience of international inaction 
over Rwanda was arguably the formative experience of African international politics of 
the second half of the 1990s and spurred serious consideration of the development of 
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regional mechanisms to provide "African solutions to African problems" without being 
dependent on an inattentive Security Council. 6 
The Constitutive Act, which entered into force in 2002, left unanswered the 
question of the compatibility of the AU's "right to intervene" with the UN Charter's 
proscription of regional resort to force without Security Council authorization. A strict 
reading of the Charter, Article 53 of which provides that "no enforcement action shall be 
taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of 
the Security Council," would suggest that any AU-authorized intervention would have to 
be pre-authorized by the Council. In practice, however, subregional interventions in the 
1990s (by ECOWAS in Liberia and Sierra Leone) had proceeded without prior 
authorization, and had been subsequently welcomed and authorized by the Council. As 
we saw in the previous chapter, the ICISS had argued that the Liberian and Sierra 
Leonean cases had created a "certain leeway" for future interventions by regional 
organizations that receiving ex post facto Security Council authorization. 7 The High-
Level Panel similarly suggested that while "peace operations" undertaken by regional 
organizations should in all cases seek Security Council authorization, "in some urgent 
situations that authorization may be sought after such operations have commenced."328 
This was largely in accordance with the view of most AU states. The AU position on 
regional intervention was fleshed out in March 2005 by the AU Executive Council 
* For an African perspective on Rwanda see Ibrahim Gambari, "An African Perspective," in The 
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(composed of foreign ministers from all AU states) which met in Ezulwini, Swaziland 
and agreed on a common AU position on UN reform. The "Ezulwini Consensus" 
endorsed the "responsibility to protect," and, recalling Article 4(h) of the AU Constitutive 
Act, argued for a larger role for regional organizations in fulfilling the responsibility to 
protect: 
Since the General Assembly and the Security Council are often far from the 
scenes of conflicts and may not be in a position to undertake effectively a proper 
appreciation of the nature and development of conflict situations, it is imperative 
that Regional Organisations, in areas of proximity to conflicts, are empowered to 
take actions in this regard. The African Union agrees with the [High-Level] Panel 
that the intervention of Regional Organisations should be with the approval of the 
Security Council; although in certain situations, such approval could be granted 
"after the fact" in circumstances requiring urgent action. 
This position was an important challenge to existing norms of non-intervention 
and non-use of force, seeking to carve out a new exception to these norms, in a way not 
unlike that sought by Northern defenders of NATO's right of "humanitarian 
intervention." Unlike unauthorized "humanitarian intervention" of the kind conducted by 
NATO in Kosovo, however, the AU "right of intervention" had less drastic implications 
for legislative and existential sovereign equality, largely because it did not grant special 
rights to a self-selecting group of states to unilaterally determine which states had 
forfeited their sovereign inviolability, but instead vested the ability to make such a 
determination in a body that represented all states that were potentially subject to 
intervention. In principle, this safeguarded the legislative equality of all states in Union as 
they consented to the right of intervention by their adherence to the Constitutive Act. 
Despite this, beyond Africa there was little enthusiasm for the new exception to the rule 
of non-intervention and non-use of force that the AU?s "right of intervention" implied. 
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Most developing countries, while refraining from criticizing the AU, opted for a strict 
reading of Article 53 (Chapter VIII) of the Charter. The Non-Aligned Movement's 
official comments on the report of the High-Level Panel thus argued that "the role of 
regional arrangements [with regard to international peace and security] should be in 
accordance with Chapter VIII of the UN Charter and should not in any way substitute the 
role of the UN."330 In these same consultations, AU states were not particularly assertive 
in their promotion of the argument for ex post facto authorization, with no African states 
arguing explicitly for the formalization of such a mechanism, except indirectly through 
their endorsement of the "Ezulwini Consensus." As such, no reference to ex post facto 
authorization of regional intervention was included in the successive drafts of the 
Outcome Document, which referred only to "cooperation' between the Security Council 
and "relevant regional organizations" and specifically stated that such cooperation should 
be in accordance with Chapter VIII of the Charter. 
2.3.2 Overruling the veto 
If the impediment to intervention in Rwanda was lack of political will on the part 
of the P5, the impediment to intervention in Kosovo was, as we have seen, the power of 
the veto. The ICISS, the High-Level Panel, and the Secretary-General's report all 
addressed the problem of the veto. The ICISS noted that the veto was widely viewed "as 
likely to be the principal obstacle to effective international action in cases where quick 
and decisive action is needed to stop or avert a significant humanitarian crisis." In order 
to deal with this problem the ICISS endorsed the concept of a "code of conduct" for the 
Non-Aligned Movement, Comments of the Non-Aligned Movement, para. 52. 
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P5 whereby every permanent member of the Council, "in matters where its vital national 
interests were not claimed to be involved, would not use its veto to obstruct the passage 
of what would otherwise be a majority resolution" authorizing action on the 
"responsibility to protect."332 The High-Level Panel also endorsed this view and further 
suggested a system of "indicative voting" under which Council members could call for a 
public indication of positions on a proposed action before an actual vote in order to force 
powers contemplating the veto to explain their positions. 3 The Secretary-General 
endorsed the proposals of the High Level Panel.334 
In its official comments on the report of the High-Level Panel, the NAM 
addressed the problem of the veto directly, and criticized the High-Level Panel's 
proposals as insufficient. Instead of voluntary "self-restraint" by the P5 and "indicative 
voting" the NAM proposed three possible measures to formally restrain or overrule the 
use of the veto: 
-limiting the right of veto to actions taken by the Council under Chapter VII 
-introducing a possibility of overruling the veto by an affirmative vote of certain 
number of members of an expanded Security Council 
-introducing a possibility of overruling the veto by a two-thirds majority vote in 
the General Assembly under the Uniting for Peace procedure.335 
While the NAM had been calling for the restraint and eventual abolishing of the 
veto for many years, these were the first concrete proposals for mechanisms to overrule 
the veto that the NAM had ever proposed, and they were proposed specifically to 
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overcome Security Council failure to authorize coercive measures to address conflict 
situations and humanitarian crises. Of these proposals, the last one was the only one 
which developing countries spoke in favour of in any number during the informal 
consultations on the reports of the High-Level Panel and Secretary-General and the drafts 
of the World Summit Outcome Document. The proposal to empower the General 
Assembly with a competence to override the veto was in consonance with the broader 
desire expressed by the NAM and by developing countries to claim a larger role for the 
General Assembly, in which the South was fully represented, and to reverse what the 
NAM viewed as the Council's "encroachment" on the prerogatives of the Assembly. This 
desire was clearly reflected in the NAM's response to the report of the High-Level Panel, 
which affirmed the role of the Assembly on issues related to peace and security, and 
argued that the General Assembly was "better equipped to address a broader range of 
threats and challenges than the Security Council." In discussing the need to enhance 
the role and authority of General Assembly, the NAM document expressed support for 
the use of the "Uniting for Peace" procedure, which it recommended simplifying "in 
order to enable swifter and urgent action by the General Assembly."337 All of these 
proposals were again put forward by the Chairman of the NAM Coordinating Committee 
in the informal consultations on the Secretary-General's report in April 2005,33g and were 
echoed by a number of states in their individual comments in the informal Assembly 
consultations on the drafts of the Outcome Document. A number of states (including 
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India and Mexico) referred in a general way to the competencies of the General 
Assembly in the realm of international peace and security,339 while others (El Salvador, 
Colombia) referred specifically to the "Uniting for Peace" procedure as a means of 
overcoming "paralysis" in the Security Council.340 Pakistan, still a prominent critic of the 
"responsibility to protect," argued that international intervention in collapsed states 
"when necessary can only be authorized collectively by the Security Council and, failing 
this, by the General Assembly." 
In general, however, there was no coherent and consistent demand from the global 
South for the formalization of the competencies of the General Assembly in authorizing 
coercive action in humanitarian crises or overruling the veto. After April 2005, the NAM 
stopped proposing the formalization of mechanisms for overruling the veto. In early 
September 2005, as the Outcome Document was nearing its final draft, the NAM 
submitted to the President of the General Assembly a final set of proposed amendments 
to his draft document. These included a call for the recognition of the General Assembly's 
role in the realm of international peace and security, but made no more reference to the 
"Uniting for Peace" procedure or the overruling of the veto.342 Following this 
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intervention by the NAM, reference to "the role of the General Assembly relating to the 
maintenance of international peace and security in accordance with the relevant 
provisions of the Charter" appeared in subsequent drafts of the Outcome Document and 
in the final resolution adopted by the Assembly, but the veto was not mentioned.343 
2.3.3 Security Council reform 
Developing countries were much more persistent in arguing for expansion and 
reform of the Security Council than they were in arguing for either ex post facto 
authorization of regional intervention or the overruling of the veto by the General 
Assembly. While Security Council enlargement and reform was presented as a crucial 
means of making the UN more democratic and representative of the realities of the early 
21s t century world, it was also considered by some representatives of developing 
countries as a prerequisite for enhancing both the effectiveness and legitimacy of future 
Security Council action in R2P-type situations. The rationale behind this argument was 
explained subsequently by the Indian ambassador to the UN (and noted R2P sceptic) 
Nirupam Sen. In Sen's opinion, mere affirmation by UN member states of an abstract 
"responsibility to protect" would not be enough to prevent or halt mass atrocities. As he 
explained 
The genocide in Rwanda happened because the strategic interests of the 
permanent five members were not affected and each of them has a veto. The 
responsibility to protect is not enough (if their strategic interests are not involved, 
the permanent five would not exercise it). Therefore, a key part of the solution is 
democratizing the Security Council. If major developing countries, including 
See United Nations General Assembly, World Summit Outcome Document, para 80. 
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from Africa, had been permanent members, it is inconceivable that the genocide 
in Rwanda would have been permitted to occur.344 
Even more than the issue of ex post facto Security Council authorization of 
regional interventions or the overruling of the veto by the General Assembly, however, 
the question of Security Council expansion and reform failed to garner any consensus 
among developing countries. While virtually all developing states (and many Northern 
states) called for Security Council reform, the precise^brm that such reform should take 
was perhaps the single most divisive issue discussed in the run-up to the World Summit. 
The High-Lev el Panel had argued that Security Council expansion was crucial if Council 
decisions were to be seen as legitimate by UN member states, but failed to produce a 
single proposed model for Council expansion. Instead it proposed two models for 
expanding the Council. The first ("Model A") would have expanded it from 15 to 24 
members by adding both permanent (though non-veto-wielding) and non-permanent 
members from all geographical regions (but especially from Africa and Asia). The 
second ("Model B") would also have expanded the Council to 24 members, but by 
adding only non-permanent (but renewable) seats.345 The report of the Secretary-General 
failed to endorse either option and only urged members states to consider both, "or any 
other viable proposals."346 Over the course of the summer of 2005, several such proposals 
emerged. On the one hand, Germany, Japan, Brazil and India, known collectively as the 
"G-4," proposed adding four non-permanent and six permanent seats, with the latter 
" Nirupam Sen, "Nonstate Threats and the Principled Reform of the UN," Ethics & International 
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assigned to themselves and to two African states. This proposal was vigorously 
opposed by the so-called "Uniting for Consensus" group, made up largely of regional 
rivals of the G-4. These states ardently opposed any expansion of the Council that 
granted their rivals permanent status.348 Meanwhile, African states staked out their own 
position on Security Council expansion in the "Ezulwini Consensus" which demanded 
not less than two permanent seats with veto powers for African states, as well as five non-
permanent seats. On the key question of which two African "states would get the new 
permanent seats, however, the Ezulwini Consensus left it to the AU to decide, noting 
only that it should take into consideration "the representative nature and capacity of those 
chosen." 9 In July 2005, these contending proposals were presented as draft resolutions 
to the General Assembly. Though there was a real possibility that the G-4 would push for 
a vote, in the end no vote was taken on any of them. Reflecting the divisiveness of the 
issue, the final draft of the World Summit Outcome Document contained very little on 
Security Council reform, merely committing states to "support early reform of the 
Security Council.. .in order to make it more broadly representative, efficient and 
ISO 
transparent." 
Expansion of membership was not the only aspect of Security Council reform. It 
was clear to many that the Council would act effectively in future humanitarian crises 
only if its working methods were also reformed, particularly the veto. As we have seen, 
both the ICISS and the High Level Panel had proposed voluntary self-restraint on the part 
347
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of the P5 in R2P-type cases, while the NAM had proposed more formal mechanisms for 
overruling the veto once it was cast. The NAM countries did not, however, collectively 
push for any such mechanisms during the negotiations over the Outcome Document. In 
any case, it is unlikely that the P5 would have agree to any such proposal. While the 
penultimate draft of the Outcome Document still included a bracketed text in the section 
on the "responsibility to protect" which invited the P5 to refrain from using the veto "in 
cases of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity,"351 this was 
dropped from subsequent drafts and the veto was not mentioned in the final outcome 
document. 
3. Institutional environment 
As with the debate over "humanitarian intervention" that followed the Kosovo 
war, the discussions of the "responsibility to protect" between 2001 and 2005 took place 
primarily within the UN General Assembly, especially in the informal thematic 
consultations on the reports of the High-Level Panel and Secretary-General and on the 
drafts of the Outcome Document held in the lead-up to the September 2005 World 
Summit. This institutional environment ensured that the opinions of developing countries 
would be heard and taken into account—provided Northern states remained committed to 
existing multilateral processes. As we have already seen, even as the US under the 
administration of George W. Bush increasingly favoured unilateralism over 
multilateralism, key Northern proponents of the "responsibility to protect," especially 
Canada, sought to attach R2P firmly to multilateral mechanisms, particularly after the 
"
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highly controversial US-led invasion of Iraq. Within the General Assembly, the Canadian 
delegation announced its intention to seek a resolution the "responsibility to protect" in 
October 2002. While Canada was encouraged by the good reception of the ICISS 
report among many member states, particularly those from sub-Saharan African and 
Latin America, it quickly ran into a roadblock with the Non-Aligned Movement. As we 
have seen above, by 2002 the NAM had reiterated multiple times its rejection of the "so-
called 'right' of humanitarian intervention," and even though the ICISS report had sought 
to shift the terms of debate, its overriding concern with military intervention "for human 
protection purposes" still raised suspicions in much of the developing world. Thus, while 
many Southern states may have welcomed R2P as an improvement on the earlier concept 
"humanitarian intervention," opponents of both concepts in the NAM were able, at least 
initially, to muster enough support within the Assembly to block Canadian efforts to 
promote the new concept. Thus, in 2002, the NAM succeeded in blocking a draft 
technical resolution proposed by Canada which would have bound the Assembly to 
deliberate the ICISS report. A revised draft that limited itself to asking the Secretary-
General to facilitate dialogue on the "responsibility to protect" also failed to win support, 
largely because most Southern states decided to vote with the NAM. 
The Iraq war, and the use of humanitarian claims to justify it, enhanced the ability 
of the countries in the NAM most sceptical of the "responsibility to protect" to mobilize 
the support of other developing countries in opposition to the kind of change in norms 
implied by the new concept. While Canada sought and failed to persuade the General 
Assembly to pass a resolution that would "revise its interpretation of sovereignty to 
35i
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reflect.. .the core concepts inherent in The Responsibility to Protect" R2P sceptics in 
the NAM sought to mobilize the Assembly to reaffirm traditional norms of sovereignty 
and intervention. This they succeeded in doing in August 2004, when the Assembly 
passed resolution 58/317, Reaffirming the central role of the United Nations in the 
maintenance of international peace and security and the promotion of international 
cooperation. Based on a draft resolution proposed by Malaysia on behalf of the NAM, 
the resolution explicitly recalled the 1970 Declaration on Principles of International Law 
Concerning Friendly Relations and committed member states to "upholding the need to 
abide strictly by the relevant provisions of the Charter on the sovereign equality of all 
Member States, respect for their territorial integrity and political independence and non-
interference in their internal affairs, the non-use of force or threat of force, [and the] 
resolution of disputes by peaceful means in conformity with the principles of justice and 
international law."355 While calling upon states to "cooperate through constructive 
dialogue to ensure the full enjoyment, promotion and protection of all human rights.. .the 
prevention and end of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes and the 
prosecution of those responsible for such crimes," it also expressed "deep concern over 
any act or threat of foreign intervention or occupation of any State or territory in 
contravention of the Charter."356 The resolution was passed by the Assembly in August 
by a vote of 93 to 2 with 47 abstentions. As with the resolution on Respect for the 
purposes and principles of the Charter passed by the Assembly following the Kosovo 
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war (see previous chapter), the vote on Resolution 58/317 divided the membership 
starkly along North-South lines, with virtually all developing countries voting for it, 
while virtually all Northern states abstained, with the exception of the US and Israel 
which voted against it.357 Both Canada and EU states explained that their abstentions 
were based on a concern that the resolution over-emphasized the principles of 
sovereignty and non-intervention without including reference to the "responsibility that 
• 5 C Q 
States have vis-a-vis their own populations." As the Canadian delegate explained: "we 
cannot agree to explicitly raising the principles of sovereignty and noninterference 
without clearly identifying the responsibilities inherent in those principles. Member 
States carry the primary responsibility to protect their people from threats to their 
physical security. We believe that, when they fail to do so, the United Nations has a clear 
responsibility to act."3 9 It is notable that even supporters of R2P in the South such as 
Argentina and Chile felt that these concerns were not sufficient to warrant not supporting 
the resolution. 
The informal consultations that took place throughout 2005 on the reports of the 
High-Level Panel and Secretary-General and on the successive drafts of the Outcome 
Document were conducted within the framework of the Genera] Assembly and according 
to its principles of sovereign equality and "one country one vote." They therefore 
provided developing countries with significant opportunities to state their positions on the 
"responsibility to protect." As the World Summit was billed as an important opportunity 
5
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for the UN membership to affirm its collective commitment to implementing the 
commitments of the Millennium Declaration, it was expected in advance that the 
Outcome Document would be adopted unanimously rather than through a vote of the 
Assembly. This probably enhanced the leverage of the developing states, whose consent 
would be sought on all issues, though it also put pressure on dissidents to compromise in 
order not to be seen as spoilers. With respect to the "responsibility to protect," this was 
significant. Now that the concept had been distanced from "humanitarian intervention" 
and had been firmly tied with multilateral mechanisms for the authorization of the use of 
force, enough developing countries could agree to support (or not oppose it) to allow for 
its inclusion in all drafts of the Outcome Document. It is notable that very few Southern 
states called for the concept's complete removal from the draft. Those few that did 
(Venezuela, Cuba) could theoretically still have derailed the entire negotiations, but the 
political costs of this would have been very large. In the end, the Outcome Document, 
along with its section on the "responsibility to protect," was adopted by the Assembly on 
16 September 2005 without a vote. Venezuela and Cuba (but no other state) subsequently 
expressed reservations both on the content of the document and on the manner in which it 
had been negotiated and adopted.360 
4. Success of developing countries in shaping the direction of norm change 
In this section I assess the impact of Northern attitudes, the ideological coherence 
of Southern diplomacy, and institutional environments between 2002 and 2005 on the 
success of developing countries in shaping the direction of change in international norms 
3
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of sovereignty and intervention. Over all, I conclude that, in this part of my case study, 
my three working hypotheses are largely confirmed by the case material. 
4.1 Impact of Northern attitudes 
As we have seen above, Northern attitudes during the period following the 
publication of the ICISS report exhibited both a willingness to use force unilaterally and a 
commitment to multilateralism. Specifically, the US under the administration of George 
W. Bush embraced a foreign policy that dispensed with multilateral organizations when 
these failed to suit US security interests and geopolitical objectives. Some key figures in 
the administration were actively hostile to multilateral institutions such as the United 
Nations; Bush's ambassador to the UN, John R. Bolton, was notably sceptical of the very 
organization to which he was appointed as representative.361 With regard to the use of 
force, the so-called "Bush doctrine," which called for the preventive use of force in 
response to the threat of transnational terrorism and "rogue states" seeking WMD, posed 
a radical challenge to the central norms of the postcolonial sovereignty regime. In effect, 
it claimed an special right for the US to intervene coercively at will against what it 
perceived as emerging threats, exempting it from the norms of non-intervention and non-
use of force, and empowering it to unilaterally withdraw the sovereign rights of countries 
it designated to be "rogue states." 
This assertion of unilateralism was highly controversial internationally, including 
among key US allies. The 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq, joined by the UK and a few 
other NATO countries, was opposed by NATO allies like France, Germany and Canada. 
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The use of humanitarian arguments to justify this invasion—including arguments that 
drew on the language and logic of the "responsibility to protect—seemed to illustrate to 
many the danger of abuse of humanitarian justifications for political ends, and led key 
Northern proponents of the "responsibility to protect" to try to tie that concept more 
firmly to multilateral mechanisms. As a result of this commitment to multilateralism, 
these states were forced to engage with the views of Southern states in a manner that 
would not have been necessary had they decided to fully join the US in unilateralism or 
moved towards a new North-only mechanism for future interventions. Bearing in mind 
that 1 am keeping "Northern capabilities" as constant, this finding supports my third 
hypothesis that the success of developing countries in influencing the direction change in 
international norms of sovereignty and intervention should increase if Northern attitudes 
are committed to action through multilateral institutions. 
4.2 Impact of Southern ideological coherence 
As we have seen above, Southern ideological coherence was high in the post-
Kosovo period on the issue of unauthorized "humanitarian intervention" by ad hoc 
coalitions of states. This coherence was reinforced by the Iraq war, which seemed to 
vindicate the long-standing critique of US hegemony articulated by its most ardent critics 
in the NAM. Beyond its consensus against US unilateralism, however, the global South 
was divided over other issues related to the "responsibility to protect," specifically the 
question of whether R2P was essentially the same or different from "humanitarian 
intervention" (and thus whether it should be welcomed or opposed), the question of the 
usefulness and legitimacy of the formalization of criteria for the use of force for 
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humanitarian purposes, and the problem of Security Council inaction in grave human 
rights crises. On some of these issues, a degree of ideological coherence eventually 
emerged, while on others deep divisions remained. Thus most developing countries were 
eventually won over to the position that the "responsibility to protect" was not essentially 
the same thing as "humanitarian intervention," and that it was therefore acceptable for the 
concept to be endorsed by the General Assembly. Most developing countries also agreed 
that Security Council inaction in grave crises was a genuine problem. On the issue of how 
to deal with this problem, however, no consensus emerged. While most developing states 
favoured expansion and reform of the Council, no single model could be agreed on. 
On issues on which a high degree of ideological coherence emerged among 
developing countries, the global South appears to have been more successful in shaping 
the direction of the debate over the "responsibility to protect" and the eventual area of 
consensus represented by the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document than on issues on 
which ideological coherence was low. This then supports my second working hypothesis, 
according to which the success of developing countries in influencing the direction of 
change in international norms of sovereignty and intervention should increase as the 
ideological coherence of the Southern diplomacy increases. This is clear for example 
when we look at the question of unauthorized intervention. As described in the previous 
chapter, the ICISS was equivocal on the question of who had the authority to decide upon 
the use of force in the context of the "responsibility to protect." While expressing a 
preference for the Security Council as "the first port of call on any matter relating to 
military intervention for human protection purpose," the Commission argued that it could 
178 
not be the last in cases where it failed to discharge its responsibilities. While Southern 
reactions to the ICISS report were split, this split was largely about whether or not R2P 
was same as "humanitarian intervention" and could be used to legitimize unauthorized 
intervention. On the issue of unauthorized "humanitarian intervention" itself, the South 
was highly united in opposition. Conscious of this, those promoting the "responsibility to 
protect" now sought to tie the concept more firmly to existing norms of non-intervention 
and non-use of force and to the Security Council as the only legitimate mechanism for 
authorizing coercive action. 
Unlike the ICISS, neither the High-Level Panel nor the Secretary-General's report 
discussed possible alternatives to the Security Council for authorizing the use offeree as 
part of the "responsibility to protect." The High-Level Panel argued that the Security 
Council was "fully empowered under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations to 
address the full range of security threats with which states are concerned" and tied the use 
of force for humanitarian ends exclusively to action by the Council, arguing that "there is 
a collective international responsibility to protect, exercisable by the Security Council 
authorizing military intervention as a last resort." The Secretary-General's report 
essentially endorsed the HLP's formulation of the "responsibility to protect," tying the 
use offeree for humanitarian purposes explicitly to the Security Council. In discussing 
the use offeree, the Secretary-General argued that the Charter gave the Council "full 
authority to use military force, including preventively, to preserve international peace and 
security," and that this could be applied in cases of genocide, ethnic cleansing or other 
crimes against humanity which threatened international peace and security. In such cases, 
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the Secretary-General argued, "the Security Council may out of necessity decide to take 
action under the Charter, including enforcement action, if so required."364 
The exclusive emphasis on the Security Council as the body empowered to 
authorize the use of force in the context of the "responsibility to protect" remained a key 
element of the subsequent articulations of the concept in all successive drafts of the 
Outcome Document of the World Summit. While these drafts, unlike the High-Level 
Panel and Secretary-General's reports, did refer explicitly to the role of regional 
organizations in the use of force, they made clear that this role was always subordinate to 
that of the Council, and one of collaboration rather than authorization. Thus the June 3 
and July 11 drafts referred to states "shared responsibility to take collective action, 
through the Security Council and, as appropriate [or "as necessary" in the July 11 draft], 
in cooperation with relevant regional organizations ["arrangements"] under Chapter VII 
of the Charter."365 By the final draft in September the wording had changed slightly, but 
the primacy of the Council remained evident, with the document stating that states "were 
prepared to take collective action, in a timely and decisive manner, through the Security 
Council, in accordance with the UN Charter, including Chapter VII, on a case by case 
basis and in cooperation with relevant regional organizations as appropriate.'' 
Elsewhere, in their sections on the use of force, all the drafts between June and 
September 2005 reaffirmed the authority of the Council to authorize force "to maintain 
and restore international peace and security, in accordance with the pertinent provisions 
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of the Charter" and all drafts except the first included reference to a "commitment" or 
"obligation" of states "to refrain from the threats or use of force in any manner 
inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations." 
While it is difficult to demonstrate that the views of developing countries on 
unauthorized intervention were the driving force behind this shift in the conceptualization 
of the "responsibility to protect," it is likely that this was the case. Between 2002 and 
2005, developing countries, including Southern supporters of R2P, repeatedly stressed 
that any use of force under the aegis of the new concept had to be in conformity with the 
UN Charter, including Chapter VII which gave the Security Council the power to 
authorize the use of force. During the negotiations on the draft Outcome Document, the 
NAM succeeded in inserting references to the norms of non-use of force and non-
intervention, and to the 1970 Declaration of Principles of International Law concerning 
Friendly Relations, that were not there in the earlier drafts.367 Developing countries also 
stressed that R2P should form a "continuum" with coercive measures resorted to only 
after non-coercive means had been exhausted. 
Where developing countries were less united, however, they were also less 
successful in shaping the direction of norm change. As we saw above, developing 
countries were divided over what solutions were desirable to the problem of Security 
Council inaction. While African states favoured the recognition of the role of regional 
organizations in intervening with ex post facto Security Council authorization, this 
position found little support elsewhere in the global South, and African states did not 
push vigorously for its inclusion in the Outcome Document. Similarly, while several 
' United Nations General Assembly. World Summit Outcome Document, paras 5, 73, 77. Cf. 
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states spoke favourably of empowering the General Assembly to override the veto 
through the "Uniting for Peace" procedure, the NAM dropped this demand early in the 
negotiation process. Finally, while all developing countries agreed on the importance of 
Security Council enlargement and reform to improve the effectiveness and legitimacy of 
Security Council action, including coercive action for the protection of civilians, 
irreconcilable differences over the model of any expansion ensured that no collective 
Southern position on Security Council reform could emerge. It is not inconceivable that, 
had such a position emerged, the South could in fact have forced through a more concrete 
commitment by the P5 to Security Council expansion and eventually the desired reform 
itself. This, after all, is exactly how the first round of Council expansion was brought 
about in 1965, beginning with a General Assembly resolution supported by developing 
countries and the Soviet bloc but initially opposed by the Western P5.368 A similar vote in 
2005 may have brought enough pressure to bear on the P5 to allow for Council 
enlargement, a development which could have significantly enhanced legislative 
sovereign equality. In the event, low ideological coherence among developing countries 
prevented this from occurring. 
4.3 Impact of institutional environments 
Finally, as we have seen above, the debate on the "responsibility to protect" 
between 2001 and 2005 took place primarily within the General Assembly, including in a 
series of informal consultations of the Assembly plenary held in the spring and summer 
of 2005 in preparation for the September 2005 World Summit. The universal membership 
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and voting rules of the Assembly ensured that the views of developing countries would 
be well represented. Indeed, the ability of the Non-Aligned Movement to block the 
passage in 2002 of a Canadian-backed Assembly resolution on the "responsibility to 
protect," and then to pass against Northern opposition a resolution in 2004 reaffirming 
existing norms of non-intervention, non-use of force and sovereign equality, illustrates 
the leverage of developing countries in the Assembly. These events thus support my first 
working hypothesis, namely that the success of developing countries in influencing the 
direction of change in international norms of sovereignty and intervention should 
increase where institutional environments facilitate the participation of developing 
countries in decision-making. 
4.4 Alternative explanations 
The emergence of "R2P-lite" from the 2005 World Summit was clearly congruent 
in a number of ways with the articulated preferences of much of the global South, 
particularly its clear linking of the use of force to authorization by the Security Council. 
Assessing the degree to which the "dilution" of the "responsibility to protect" between 
2001 and 2005 was a result of the influence of developing countries, however, requires 
evaluation of possible alternative explanations and examining whether the empirical 
material revealed by process-tracing supports them. 
One possible explanation for the shape of the "international consensus" on R2P 
articulated at the 2005 World Summit is that it was influenced by the preferences of the 
great powers, especially the permanent members of the Security Council. To some extent 
this is undoubtedly true. For example, the absence of any reference to criteria for the use 
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of force in the Outcome Document, was quite likely due to the opposition of most of the 
P5, including especially the US. As Alex Bellamy explains, the US "rejected the idea of 
criteria on the grounds that it could not offer precommitments to engage its military 
forces where it had no national interests, and that it would not bind itself to criteria that 
would constrain its right to decide when and where to use force."369 Thus while the NAM 
also opposed the inclusion of any reference to criteria in the final Outcome Document 
(even though, as we have seen, numerous developing countries individually supported it), 
it is difficult to differentiate the effects of this opposition from that of the P5. In any case, 
the opposition of both seemed to guarantee its exclusion from the final document. 
One area in which a distinct effect developing country influence arguably can be 
observed is in the explicit tying of coercive measures under the "responsibility to protect" 
to the Security Council, and the emphasis on non-coercive measures as preceding any use 
of force. Then-Bangladeshi ambassador to the UN Iftekhar Ahmed Chowdhury, who 
along with the Slovenian ambassador served in 2005 as the General Assembly President's 
"facilitator" in negotiating the language of the paragraphs on the "responsibility to 
protect" in the Outcome Document, has described these aspects of the 2005 version of 
"R2P" as its "safety clauses" and has attributed their inclusion directly to a desire on the 
part of the General Assembly President to address the concerns of the NAM countries. 
Chowdhury describes the negotiations on the "responsibility to protect" section of 
document in the following terms: 
A number of the NAM countries, including Cuba, Iran, Pakistan and Egypt, had 
strong reservations, arguing that the concept would enable 'neo-imperialist'-type 
interventions by the powerful countries in pursuance of their own interests. Russia 
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and China opposed it in sympathy with these views. The United States was 
indifferent to the proposal... The European Union and Canada were supportive but 
realised it was impossible to build a consensus around it without including 
sufficient 'safety clauses' to satisfy the NAM detractors. 
The specific "safety clauses" that Chowdhury points to are fourfold: the tying of 
the "responsibility to protect" to four very specific circumstances and legally defined 
crimes (genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and ethnic cleansing) rather than 
to a broader "just cause" criteria proposed by the ICISS; the prioritization of the non-
coercive, diplomatic and humanitarian means, to be pursued "through the UN"; the tying 
of coercive action to Security Council authorization; and the conditioning of coercive 
action on the "manifest failure" of the target state to fulfill its responsibilities.371 
According to then-GA President, former foreign minister of Gabon and current AU 
Commission Chairman Jean Ping, the inclusion of the first safeguard—the specification 
of the four crimes in response to which R2P could be invoked—was suggested by one of 
the more sceptical of the NAM ambassadors, Pakistan's Akram Munir. This proposal, 
according to Ping, helped weaken opposition among the R2P-sceptics and "enabled us to 
reach an agreement."372 The need to tie coercive action to Security Council action was 
undoubtedly supported more broadly than just by the South, but their role was 
undoubtedly important: as noted above, the NAM succeeded in inserting references to the 
norms of non-use of force and non-intervention, and to the 1970 Declaration of 
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to Protect'," ISAS Insights no. 61 (Singapore: Instititute of South Asian Studies, 30 April 2009), 2. 
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Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations, that were not there in the 
earlier drafts.373 Moreover, Chowdhury argues that the inclusion in the Outcome 
Document of reference to the commitment of the international community to assist states 
in "capacity building" to help them fulfill their "responsibility to protect"374 was at the 
insistence of the NAM countries, "much to the chagrin of some western donors." 
373
 United Nations General Assembly, World Summit Outcome Document, paras. 5, 73, 77. Cf. 
General Assembly President's Draft Outcome Document, 3 June 2005. 
374 -
375 , 
 United Nations General Assembly, World Summit Outcome Document, para. 139. 
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Conclusion 
The preceding case study indicates that my three working hypotheses are 
supported by the evidence in the case of the international debates between 1999 and 2005 
on the subject of "humanitarian intervention" and the "responsibility to protect." In this 
case at least, developing countries were able to act in some part as active "norm-makers" 
rather than merely as passive "norm-takers," and were successful in influencing the 
direction of change in the norms of sovereignty and intervention. Following NATO's 
intervention in Kosovo in 1999, developing countries were successful in defusing a 
potentially radical challenge to existing norms of non-intervention and non-use of force, 
and a further downgrading of legislative and existential sovereign equality; since 2001, 
developing countries have been successful in ensuring that the "responsibility to protect" 
concept, proposed originally by the ICISS as means of overcoming the divisive post-
Kosovo debate over "humanitarian intervention," evolved in a direction that posed less of 
a challenge to traditional norms of sovereignty and intervention. In both periods, I have 
argued, the success of developing countries in influencing the direction of norm change 
has been facilitated by three factors: Northern capabilities and attitudes, the ideological 
coherence of Southern diplomacy, and the degree to which international institutions 
facilitated the participation of developing countries in decision-making. Bearing in mind 
that Northern capabilities (in the sense of overwhelming military superiority) over this 
period remained essentially constant, my case study has shown that where Northern states 
have sought to bring about reform of the norms of sovereignty and intervention through 
multilateral institutions that grant developing countries the opportunity to participate in 
decision-making, and where the global South has managed to forge some coherence in its 
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response to these Northern initiatives, developing countries have been able to shape the 
direction of norm change. Where Northern states have chosen to act through narrower 
mechanisms, where institutional environments have allowed for less direct Southern 
participation in decision-making, or where developing states have been divided over the 
issue of sovereignty and intervention, the global South as a whole has been less able to 
influence the direction of norm change. 
The fact that I find support for my hypotheses in my case study suggests that my 
theoretical framework drawn from Krasner's theory of "international regime change" 
could be useful for further analysis of the role of developing states in international norm 
change in contemporary international politics. Hypotheses about the role of international 
institutions, Northern capabilities and attitudes and Southern ideological coherence in 
facilitating the South's role as "norm-makers" could be tested in a variety of other issue-
areas related to other pressing global issues such as climate change, global financial 
regulation etc. At a time when the global landscape is changing rapidly with the rise of 
new major powers in the global South and increasing Southern regionalism, this 
theoretical framework could be useful for grasping the dynamics of norm change that will 
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